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INTRODUCTION 
„Europa steht für die unbegriffenste Sache der Welt, für ein mächtiges Nicht – nicht 
Staat und nicht Gesellschaft – jedenfalls nicht in dem Sinne in dem beispielsweise die 
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika beides sind.“ (Beck/ Grande 2004, 10) 
 
This thesis will provide an analysis of the unification of the Northern American states and 
a concluding comparison between the unification processes of the USA and the 
European states. The following study will strive to provide answers to two main 
questions: 
 -­‐ Which factors encouraged the unification process in the case of the USA? -­‐ What are the similarities and differences between the US and the EU regarding 
their respective unification processes? 
 
In his book „Political Unification. A Comparative Study of leaders and forces“, Amitai 
Etzioni gives an excellent description of his research goal. He seeks to understand the 
„conditions under which political unification is (not should be or could be) initiated“ 
(Etzioni 1965, xvii). For this thesis, the goal is only slightly different. The author will look 
at the conditions under which political unification was initiated in the US and to a lesser 
extent in the EU. The approach is therefore more historical than political, at least at first 
sight. Etzioni’s research questions lead into the same direction as the ones shown above, 
so to further clarify and deepen this project’s goal, here is his formulation: „we seek to 
establish who led a particular unification effort, under what conditions, by what means, 
and with what results“ (ibid., xviii-xix). 
On the basis of Etzioni’s approach, the independent variable is therefore „the conditions 
under which the [unification factors, R.K.] emerge“ (ibid., 12). In case of the unification 
of the British colonies, one of the background conditions is the American Revolution. 
The independent factors in this thesis are „various unification factors and the conditions 
under which they emerge“ (ibid., 12). An example for an independent factor in Europe’s 
case is the economic and political need to align France and Germany after WWII. The 
dependent variable in this research is both the level and scope of unification. The following 
graph is an illustration of the functional relations between independent variable, independent 
factors and dependent variable. 
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Figure 1. Causal Relations between Independent Variable, Independent Factors and Dependent Variable 
using the Example of Unification Processes (by R.K., 6.4.2011) 
 
So why do these questions matter? This analysis and comparison is not only an important 
one because of its explanatory and descriptive value but it might also allow us - viewing 
history as „applied politics“ - to draw lessons for today’s integration from past unification 
struggles (for example: the importance of a consistent legal framework); Second, it could, 
from a more theoretical perspective, challenge Beck’s/Grande’s viewpoint that the US 
represents both a „state“ and a „society“ and encourage a more open definition, i.e. 
„union“.  Third, it might, on the other hand, encourage US-American scholars to judge 
the European Union’s weaknesses in a milder manner, taking into account its own 200 
yearlong unification struggle. 
 
Roadmap 
 
The article will start with a short methodological and theoretical introduction providing 
the reader with some of the challenges social scientists face while engaging themselves in 
the analysis of unification and comparative regional studies. In addition, the first part of 
the essay will define and explain the term „union“ in order to clarify the concept and 
Level	  and	  Scope	  of	  UniWication	  (DV)	  
UniWication	  Factor	  (IF)	  
UniWication	  Factor	  (IF)	  
UniWication	  Factor	  (IF)	  
Conditions	  of	  Unification	  (IV)	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draw a line between this specific standpoint and other perspectives on the topic of 
comparing the US and the EU. Thereafter, in the main part of the essay, the unification 
process of the US will be analyzed and in a final step compared to the unification process 
of the EU. The conclusion will offer some „lessons learned“ as well as risking a little peak 
into the future of the two unions. 
The author chose to focus primarily on the study of US-American unification, since the 
historical events that led to unification of the former Northern American colonies are less 
familiar to European scholars than European integration. Therefore, it might offer some 
new research perspectives to the relatively well-known and established field of European 
Union studies. The comprehensive examination of European unification and its 
contributing factors was and shall be subject of future generations. 
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METHOD 
With regards to methodology, answering this thesis’ research questions soon leads to a 
major challenge. Comparing the two unions offers a sheer endless number of possible 
research focuses, ranging from constitutional history at one end to religious culture at the 
other. Since this paper provides only limited space, its goal is to give a general thematic 
overview rather than a deep and detailed analysis of the topic. In order to keep this 
comparative study consistent despite its broad topic, it is important to select an intelligible 
method. In the following the method’s composition will be illustrated and it will be 
shown how to avoid possible methodological shortcomings. 
The following chapter gives insight into this project’s source and case selection process, 
patterns and pitfalls of evidence collection, as well as the definition of the term case study 
followed by an overview of the method’s strengths and weaknesses. 
 
Source  Se le c t ion 
In order to reach answers to the research questions and back up this thesis’ argument 
with empirical evidence, two kinds of sources will be put into use. First, there will be an 
analysis and comparison of a range of primary sources, such as historical documents, 
speeches, contracts, and letters. Then, in order to put these sources into greater 
perspective, secondary literature will be employed to classify and explain the context of 
the selected material.  
 
Case Sele c t ion 
For this thesis, the analysis of the two „poster children of unification“, i.e. the United 
States of America and the European Union will be under scrutiny. These two are not the 
only cases of unification and it is important to notice that they are not representative of 
the phenomenon and that they were not chosen from the universe of cases. However, the 
US and the EU are two of the most successful regional unions to date in terms of their 
global economic and political standing. The following graph shows the world’s Top 5 
GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) countries/regions according to data from the CIA World 
Factbook. The European Union ($ 14,51 trillion) and the United States ($ 14,26 trillion) 
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share the two top spots. Place three goes to China ($ 8,791 trillion), while Japan ($ 4,141 
trillion) and India ($ 3,561 trillion) take up seats number four and five. 
 
Figure 2. CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html?countryName=European%20Union&countryCode=ee&regionCode=
eu&rank=1#ee, 31.3.2010) 
 
If we take a look at another source, the United Nation’s Human Development Index 
(HDI), which combines indices of „life expectancy, educational attainment and income“ 
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/hdi/, 31.3.2010), out of the Top 15 countries 
worldwide in 2007, eight are members of the European Union, and the United States 
ranks at #13 (http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/87.html, 31.3.2010). A quick look 
at the HDI world map clarifies the EU’s and the US’ standing further (the darker the area, 
the higher the HDI, grey areas signify countries without data) 
32%!
32%!
19%!
9%!
8%!
Top 5 GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) 
2009 est.!
European Union !
United States!
China!
Japan!
India!
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Figure 3. UNDP Development Reports HDI World Map 2007 
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/hd_map/, 31.3.2010) 
 
These statistics only served as a short reminder of the EU’s and US’ relatively high 
standing in the world when it comes to economic and developmental factors; The few 
indices mentioned here are by far not all that could have served to underline the argument 
(one could have also taken education, gender parity, poverty, health service, etc. into 
account). 
Thus it comes as no surprise that political leaders in other parts of the world have 
depicted the two unions’ institutional designs as prototypes for regional unions. Taiwan’s 
President Chen Shui-bian, for instance, said in 2004 that „the EU is successful [...] 
because the principles of voluntary participation, equality and peace are upheld, and that 
trade-based interactions serve as the initial approach to bringing European countries 
closer for further integration“ (Yun-Ping 2004, 1). Another example is the institutional 
design of the African Union. Babarinde states that, 
„Indeed, the architects of the AU have not hidden the fact that the AU was modeled on 
the EU. President Gaddafi has admitted as much that he drew his inspiration from the 
EU experience.14 Likewise, at the July 2001 OAU summit in Zambia that dealt with the 
transition from the OAU to the AU, “several references were made to the African Union 
being loosely based on the European Union model“ (Babarinde 2007, 8). 
 
To conclude, the relative success of the US and the EU on a global level make them ideal 
cases for a deeper analysis of the specific causes of successful unification. Which factors 
induced unification in the US? Are there similarities and differences between the US-
American and the European unification processes?  
On the other hand, as in a human relationship, there is enough difference – even friction 
- between these two that it makes for an interesting comparative coupling. The disparities 
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serve as a reminder that the general success of unification is not limited to one region at a 
specific time in history. In 1945 it would have been comprehensible to argue that the only 
role model for unification is and will be the United States. Today, however, the world sees 
two examples of prosperous unions that developed in different time periods under 
different political constellations in different geographic spheres. This simple observation 
defies the notion that unification is a process that cannot be repeated. 
Therefore, the selection of the two most prominent cases of unions serve a dual purpose, 
namely the extraction of shared factors that caused unification, as well as the explication 
of differing forces.  
 
Evidence  Col l e c t ion:  Patterns and Pit fa l l s  
Since the topic of unification is a comprehensive issue, the justification and clarification 
of patterns in evidence collection is crucial in order to gain coherency in the analysis. A 
series of methodical questions arises: 
First, how does one select the pieces of evidence and the kind of analytical model that will 
be used? To state the obvious, the answer to the first part of this question is that the piece 
of evidence must have a clear link to unification. Ideally, the source has both explanatory 
and descriptive value for this thesis’ argument and will contribute to the validity of its 
conclusions. Both the elements and the model of analysis – in this case unification – must 
provide either „a highly accurate description of the phenomena [...] a capacity to explain the 
relationships among the phenomena under investigation [and/or, R.K.] offer the promise 
of reliable prediction“ (Singer 1961, 78f). 
Second, at which level-of-analysis will the evidence collection and subsequent analysis be 
carried out? The level-of-analysis at which this project will compare the US and the EU 
and its unavoidable pitfalls are outlined in the first part of the chapter on theory. Since 
this question does not only touch the subject of methodology but also of theoretical 
framing, it will be answered in the following chapter. 
Third, which time period will be the focus of analysis? The time span of this thesis in case 
of the US stretches over circa 50 years. Roughly, it starts at the time of increasing 
estrangement between the colonies and Britain and ends with the consolidation of the 
states at the turn of the 19th century. With regards to previous and successive events, the 
era in spotlight ranges from around 1750 until 1800. It is the time period in US history in 
which political actors laid the structural and ideological fundament of the political system 
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we know today. It is the era in which volumes of politically essential documents were 
drafted and discussed, for example the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, or 
the Federalist Papers. 
With regards to European unification, which will be subject at the end of this thesis, the 
time span in consideration roughly equals 60 years, i.e. from the period from the end of 
the Second World War in 1945 until the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, has 
been chosen. 
Since the two cases in focus lie apart over 200 years, there is a danger of applying 
contemporary categories and concepts to a time period in which they don’t fit. Although 
there is no universal solution to this pitfall of comparative case study from different eras, 
a certain sensitivity towards historical peculiarities can certainly avoid major flaws in 
reasoning. When it comes to the definition of democracy, for instance, it is important to 
note that the US-American version of political participation at its earliest stage did not 
include voting rights for women and minorities. This understanding of democracy cannot 
be applied to the politics of contemporary European Union and vice versa. To forestall 
this potential shortcoming in comparative studies, the author will clarify the specific 
historical context of categories and terms whenever necessary. This way, an intransparent 
commingling of disparate concepts will be prevented. 
Fourth, how will the author structure the argument and empirical findings? To make this 
study easier to read and to frame the analysis of the two cases in a traceable and 
comparable way, the research is organized around these recurrent themes: economy, 
politics, and culture. Since both unification processes will be organized and analyzed 
around these topics in the end, thematic consistency and readability is ensured. In 
addition, the author will establish a time framework, which dissects the respective 
unification processes into three phases. 
 
The Case Study Approach:  Strengths and Weaknesses 
In order to bring further light into the darkness of methodology, it is necessary to ask if 
this thesis’ research is best described as a case study as the title boldly suggests. Does the 
term ‚case study’ encompass the entire perimeter of the research questions? Or to the 
contrary, is the label ‚case study’ too broad to provide a reasonable definition-based 
framework? In the following, the author will answer these questions by using 
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George/Bennett’s (2005) argument as a reference and applying their definitions to the 
research questions. 
George/Bennett define the case study approach in the Social Sciences as „the detailed 
examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations 
that may be generalizable to other events“ (George/Bennett 2005, 5). If one would apply 
this statement to this thesis, the aspect of a historical episode under investigation is 
unification. 
Furthermore, George/Bennett describe „a case as an instance of a class of events [...]. A 
case study is thus a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects 
for analysis, rather than the historical event itself“ (ibid., 17f). To illustrate this slightly 
technical definition with help of the US-American example, the aspect under scrutiny is 
unification, while the historical event is the Revolutionary War and the founding of the 
United States. The answer to the crucial question „what is this event a case of?“ (ibid., 18) 
is therefore unification. 
As a conclusion, the term case study is indeed a useful label in order to describe the 
method of this thesis. Although the multiplicity of historical events in both cases of 
unification analyzed here sometimes makes it hard to distinguish the actual event from 
the case, all in all, the method is quite satisfactory. 
Besides the case study approach there are plenty of other possible ways to gain a better 
understanding of the characteristics and scope of unification processes. For instance, one 
could have worked with long-term statistical data (e.g. economic, democratic, 
infrastructural indicators) of different regions and could have calculated correlations. Or 
one could have conducted an analysis of discourses of unification over time. So why 
choose the case study approach? What are its most prominent strengths and weaknesses? 
George/Bennett (c.f. 2005, 19-34) shed light on these questions. 
In contrast to statistical analysis, case studies offer strong conceptual validity. Researchers 
using the case study approach gain a deeper level of contextual understanding and are 
able to get a grip on variables that „are notoriously difficult to measure“ (ibid., 19). 
Furthermore, scholars who conduct case studies often identify new variables that are 
potentially valuable for subsequent statistical research. Case studies on democracy, for 
example, lead to the classification of different types of democracy (representative, 
majoritarian,...) that were later evaluated further by using other methods. (c.f. ibid., 19f). 
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The birth of new hypotheses is linked to the above paragraph. Case studies allow, for 
instance, that scholars stumble upon new ideas in the process of carrying out qualitative 
research such as interviews. An interviewee can spontaneously introduce new hypotheses 
that would not have been discovered by strictly following the pre-determined path of 
database research (c.f. ibid., 20f). 
Additionally, case studies allow the exploration of causal mechanisms. The contextual 
analysis of a phenomenon, e.g. historical prerogatives of unification in the United States, 
leads to a more thorough knowledge of causal mechanisms. George/Bennett define the term 
causal mechanisms as „ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes 
through which agents with causal capacities operate [...] In so doing, the causal agent 
changes the affected entity’s characteristics, capacities, or propensities“ (ibid., 137). To 
use an illustration from this thesis, since Thomas Jefferson had certain powers in 
decision-making at the time of the Revolutionary War, his reasoning and writing 
influenced the character of US-American unification. The case study approach 
encourages the exploration of these causal mechanisms (c.f. ibid., 21f). 
But besides its strengths, the case study approach also has its Achilles’ heels. The case 
selection bias describes the process in which researchers „deliberately choose cases that 
share a particular outcome“ (ibid., 23). As has already been outlined in the chapter on 
case selection, the author of this thesis is guilty as charged with a case selection bias. There 
was a clear intention behind choosing two unions that share a similar outcome, the 
outcome being a general success of unification. The selection of these cases happened on 
purpose in order to provide new findings on positive as well as negative factors that can 
induce or hinder fruitful unification (c.f. ibid., 22-25). 
Additionally, case studies make only tentative conclusions possible. Since there is a lack of 
representativeness, case studies only hold explanatory value for a limited number of cases. 
They may „uncover or refine theory [or find, R.K.] conditions under which specified 
outcomes occur, and the mechanisms through which they occur, rather than uncovering 
the frequency with which those conditions or outcomes occur“ (ibid., 31). To put it 
simpler, the two case studies in this thesis will not predict that there will be a successful 
new union every 200 years, but it will (hopefully) uncover more information about factors 
that contribute to unification under certain circumstances (c.f. ibid., 25-32). 
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THEORY 
Before we cut to the heart of the thesis – the two case studies – possible theoretical 
approaches to the topic will be outlined and a closer look at the author’s theory choice 
and the thought process that led her to its adoption will be taken. The chapter on theory 
is to be seen in the light of the previous paragraphs on methodology and vice versa. The 
procedures of source, case, and method selection are embedded into a certain theoretical 
landscape. A scholar in the field of International Political Economy, for example, would 
probably focus on long-term structures of hegemony in society. The scholar would select 
his/her case, evidence, and methods according to his/her theoretical predisposition. This 
process is not a one-way-street in the sense that theory always comes before 
methodology. The characteristics of a certain method could also become a precursor of 
theoretical approaches, as is the case in this thesis (conducting a comparative case study 
virtually screams „Comparative Politics“). 
But in order to clarify the theoretical background of this paper, and to escape the 
irresolvable chicken-or-egg dilemma (What was first? The theory or the method?), this 
chapter will first, introduce the main fields of International Relations and Comparative 
Politics as well as their respective origins and advantages for answering the research 
question. Second, this chapter will examine the different levels-of-analysis and their 
implications for this comparative case study. 
 
Internat ional  Relat ions versus Comparat ive  Pol i t i c s?  
In addition to methodological challenges, comparing the unification processes of two 
regional blocs touches many different fields of Political Science, for example International 
Relations, Comparative Politics, US-American Politics, European Studies, etc.; Since all of 
these diverse areas come with their own approaches and paradigms it is no wonder they 
do not always harmonize perfectly with each other. The author does not strive to reinvent 
the wheel of Political Science and introduce a completely new concept. In this thesis a 
„best of“ of different fields will be put into use. This multidisciplinary approach ensures 
the conceptual weakening of weaknesses and the strengthening of strengths. In the 
following, an introduction to the origins, core issues, as well as advantages and 
weaknesses of International Relations Theory and Comparative Politics will be given. In 
the end, these will be set into perspective for the challenges of this thesis. 
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Scholars in the field of International Relations mainly study topics out of three main 
subjects. They analyze the nature of wars, conflicts, and peace, they examine global issues 
such as inequality, the constitution of international organizations, etc., and they take an 
interest in „state craft“, i.e. the consolidation of power over people and territories. For 
this thesis, the evolution of states and state-like structures is of particular interest. 
The origins of International Relations are entangled with the advent of settled societies after 
the Neolithic Revolution. With the development of state-like structures it also became 
necessary for decision-makers to think about their own society’s relation to other 
societies. The consolidation of power, the fighting of wars, and the composition of 
„states“ soon became a topic of interest for the intellectual elites. With the rise of nation 
states, International Relations became an even more prominent field of political thought. Ibn 
Khaldun, Hobbes and Kant are all examples of writers that were concerned with 
questions of International Relations before the field was academically established. 
International Relations Theory offers some advantages to a scholar of unification. It gives 
insight into global dynamics in a long-time perspective and it provides background to the 
causality of structures and events. For example, the relatively strong global standing of the 
British Empire in the midst of the 18th century is – amongst other things - a result of a 
century long maritime hegemony over other European powers. Without the contribution 
of International Relations Theory these global constellations might go unnoticed. On the 
other hand side, International Relations Theory is not at its strongest when it comes to 
providing an intellectual framework for the detailed analysis of political systems. This is 
where Comparative Politics comes in handy. 
 
The subject of Comparative Politics is the comparison of political systems. Scholars of 
Comparative Politics study formal as well as informal institutions within these systems, 
their structures and functions, political culture, and political economy (c.f. Zagorsky 2009: 
8-12). In case of the United States, a student of Comparative Politics would therefore look at 
its legal framework, bureaucracy, parties, lobbies, media, citizen socialization, and 
economy. In comparing his/her results to other political systems the scholar can explore 
similarities and differences between them. In a third step, potential „lessons learned“ and 
„best practice models“ can be explored and applied. 
As was the case with International Relations, the field of Comparative Politics only came to 
life through the steady development of political structures. The study and comparison of 
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formal institutions became popular in the 19th century at the height of „nation states“. 
The analysis of political phenomena outside formal structures, such as the study of 
parties, media, lobbies etc. became a boost in the 20th century with the heyday of 
sociology (c.f. Zagorsky 2009: 8-12). After the Second World War the term “political 
culture” came into focus. It is defined as “political orientations – attitudes toward the 
political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the 
system.” (Almond/Verba 1963, 13). 
What are some of the advantages of Comparative Politics? When it comes to the 
understanding of a political system as a body with multiple institutions, functions and 
agents, Comparative Politics offers a useful framework for the analyst to orientate in the 
wilderness of politics. It helps structuring the research and shedding light on the „body 
parts“ of a political system that are the most profitable to compare. 
 
To conclude, the first question of this thesis (Which factors encouraged the unification 
process in the case of the USA?) will mostly be answered by applying the theories of 
International Relations. The second question (What are the similarities and differences 
between the US and the EU regarding their unification processes?) will mainly be 
addressed by employing the approach of Comparative Politics. But isn’t it too simple to put 
it like that? Aren’t there challenges attached to the selection of multiple concepts within 
one thesis? The answer is Yes: 
 
The leve l -o f -analys i s  chal l enge 
As Singer already pointed out in 1961 in his essay on the level-of-analysis problem, 
 „Whether in the physical or social sciences, the observer may choose to focus upon the 
parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system.  He may, for 
example, choose between the flowers or the garden [...] Whether he selects the micro- or 
macro-level of analysis is ostensibly a mere matter of methodological or conceptual 
convenience. Yet the choice often turns out to be quite difficult, and may well become a 
central issue within the discipline concerned“ (Singer 1961, 77). 
 
Keeping in mind the results from the previous chapter, the next paragraphs will  
introduce the two main levels-of-analysis in World Politics – systemic and national - , link 
them to theoretical frameworks, then suggest some additional levels and take into account 
their respective scientific advantages and disadvantages, as well as conclude and justify my 
decision to use multiple conceptual approaches and therefore levels-of-analysis within my 
thesis. 
 18 
The systemic level-of-analysis is the „most comprehensive“ (ibid., 80) of levels. It allows 
the scholar to take a global perspective, like a sailor does from his crow’s nest. It has a 
high level of descriptive value when it comes to comprehensiveness, but on the other 
hand side it lacks a sense of detail. When it comes to the systemic level’s power to explain a 
phenomenon, it tends to „exaggerate[...] the impact of the system upon the national 
actors and, conversely, discounts the impact of the actors upon the system“ (ibid., 80). 
Additionally, a scholar using this level-of-analysis is likely to assume a high degree of 
uniformity in actorial behavior (c.f. ibid., 80-82). This level corresponds in great parts 
with International Relations Theory. 
The national level-of-analysis, on the other side, „permits significant differentiation among 
our actors in the international system“ (ibid., 82). Through its deep analysis of behavior it 
is more likely to discover underlying (and diverging) categories, which allow for a 
comparative study among nations than the systemic level-of-analysis with its built-in 
tendency to overlook certain crucial details. But the national level’s advantage also 
encompasses a potential disadvantage – the exaggeration of differences among actors. 
Additionally, the national level-of-analysis leads to a whole new set of questions regarding 
the „goals, motivation, and purpose in national policy“ (ibid., 84). Does an actor always 
behave purposefully and intentionally? Why do certain nations want to reach specific 
goals? Are there objective factors to lead an actor, or is it the actor’s „perception of these 
‚objective factors’“ (ibid., 86). All of these questions need to be addressed in order to gain 
coherency in analysis (c.f. ibid. 82-89). The national level-of-analysis is mainly linked to 
Comparative Politics. 
To conclude, the systemic level holds a slight advantage in terms of descriptive capacity, 
since it offers a comprehensive point of view. Conversely, the national level provides a 
more complex and detailed description. When it comes to explanation, the national level 
gives the scholar a better insight into actors’ behaviors and decision-making processes. 
„And in terms of prediction, both orientations seem to offer a similar degree of promise“ 
(ibid., 90). 
Besides these two major levels-of-analysis in World Politics, there exists a range of other 
levels: The sub-national level, at which scholars focus on e.g. organizational behavior, 
bureaucratic dynamics and domestic politics; The individual level, which concerns the 
behavior of actors and their personal relations with their environment; The intra-individual 
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level, which focuses on thought processes and conflicts inside an individual1. Although all 
of these levels can come into play at a certain point, the focus of this thesis does certainly 
not lie on decision-making processes within the COREPER or on Thomas Jefferson’s 
psychological relationship to his mother. 
In this thesis, the systemic, as well as the national level-of-analysis will be take into account. 
Since the levels outlined above crudely correspond to the theories of International 
Relations (systemic level) and Comparative Politics (national level), their usage will follow 
the relative capability2 in answering the two research questions. 
 
A Short  Popular History o f  US and EU Comparison 
In every chapter on theory it is necessary to introduce the reader to the history of the 
stated questions. How does the problem relate to the scholarly and general debates in the 
field? Have the questions been asked before? How did they vary in formulation and in the 
answers given? If and how has the author varied her formulation from that usually found, 
and why? 
Surprisingly, comparisons between the US and the EU have been predominantly made 
outside the halls of academia. Political actors, journalists and the „general public“ have 
been eager to discuss similarities and differences between the US and the EU. Often these 
discussions were lead under a normative spell. The (future) „nature of the EU“ has been 
debated by using the USA as a positive example and guiding light. 
 Especially in the years after the Second World War, the relative wealth, economic and 
military strength of the States became desirable to a war-torn and exhausted European 
people3. Looking over the Atlantic, the French and Germans saw a superpower on the 
height of its success. With this admiration of the US combined with a wide-spread fear of 
the Sowjet Union, it is only logic that many political actors found it tempting to consider 
the model of the US as a possible prototype for Europe’s future. The European public, 
partly under US-American occupation, was equally impressed by the wealth and 
                                                
1 This level can be summed up by Sigmund Freud’s trias super-ego, ego, and id. 
 
2 Description, explanation and prediction. 
 
3 See for example Winston Churchill’s “Speech to the Academic Youth” held at University of Zürich on the 
19th of September 1946, in which he challenged the audience with the idea of a “United States of Europe” 
(Churchill 1946, http://www.scribd.com/doc/19083622/Winston-Churchills-Speech-to-the-Academic-
Youth-1946, 6.4.2011). 
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opportunities the US model stood for. In the author’s opinion, political actions (Marshall 
Plan) and cultural influences (Hollywood movies, supermarkets,...) influenced a whole 
generation of Europeans and brought a mostly positive attitude towards the „American 
Way of Life“. This pro US-American atmosphere in Europe caused and affected a whole 
strand of intellectual debates, which favored an – at least partly – americanized European 
future. 
On the contrary there were always people that voiced critique against „US-
Americanization“ of Europe. After the first years of European excitement for the US 
wore off, negative comments on the USA and its politics grew stronger. The highly 
publicized protests against the Vietnam War, the skepticism against capitalism, etc. lead to 
a more wide spread opposition against the US on the left. On the right side of the 
political spectrum, Anti-Americanism, which had a long tradition, was amongst others 
composed by elements of Anti-Semitism. As was the case with pro US-American 
attitudes, anti US-American opinions were and are prevalent in the „general public“ as 
well as in the thoughts of political elites. 
As the author sees it, the general debate in Europe nowadays can be described as 
schizophrenic. On the one hand, the „American Way of life“ still holds a certain degree 
of fascination. World-class universities, technology, and media products all emanate what 
Nye called „soft power“. On the other hand, the US is under scrutiny because of its 
military operations, jurisdiction (death penalty, etc), social welfare system and hardly 
tamed financial market. 
 
This thesis will not provide a history of European discourses on the USA, but it is 
important to give a short overview on popular normative debates as on which grounds 
political discussions are often exercised. What is missing in past and present discursions 
on similarities and differences between the US and the EU is a systematic comparison of 
the two. It has been previously outlined that comparative debates were often lead 
normatively asking if and why the EU should or should not become the US. It is my goal 
to provide the reader with a set of systematic questions and answers that do not aim to 
swing anyone’s vote from anti to pro US-Americanism. Of course as a European student 
of a certain generation the author carries specific values and norms that will almost 
certainly shine through her work, but the author’s goal is to „de-emotionalize“ the debate 
and lift the veil a little so that the comparison between US-Americans and Europeans can 
be taken to a new and more factual step. 
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A Short  Scholar ly  History o f  US/ EU Evolut ion and Comparison 
The previous paragraphs shone light on general and political discussions on EU/US 
comparisons. Although it is not entirely true that there doesn’t exist scholarly literature on 
the topic, a „large“ systematic comparison of unification processes regarding the US and 
the EU could not be found in the process of researching for this thesis. This fact is 
surprising since one would expect that two of the most powerful regions in the world 
would have already been surgically dissected into every small bit of politics. It is true that 
there is a wealth of historical books and articles on the European Union’s and the United 
States’ evolution and integration. There are also comparative studies of the two, but an 
analysis under the theoretical light of unification is new to the field. To bring order to this 
academic chaos, this chapter will: First, give an overview over theories and terms linked 
to the European Union’s and the United States’ evolution, starting with integration theories 
(intergouvernmentalism and supranationalism), the notion of empire and the term federation. 
Second, introduce and define the term union and its implications, as well as set the 
concept of unification apart from other theories and terms of regional integration. And last, 
introduce some of the comparative works done. 
 
Integration 
In a political science context, the term integration is primarily used to discuss processes 
linked to the development of the European Union. Many scholars of Europe struggled to 
define the term integration and it is no wonder that there are multiple ways to characterize 
integration. According to Ernst Haas (1958, 16), as cited in Pollak/ Slominski, integration is a 
process 
„whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions 
process or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a 
process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-
existing ones“ (Haas cited by Pollak/Slominski 2006, 53). 
 
William Wallace (1990, 9), as cited by Pollak/Slominski, sees integration as  „the creation 
and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of interaction among previously 
autonomous units“ (Wallace cited by Pollak/Slominski 2006, 53). This stripped-down 
definition of the term and the longer characterization by Haas are only two of the many 
examples that show how scholars tried to find a word for processes surrounding the 
 22 
phenomenon that is the European Union. To illuminate the term further, 
Holzinger/Knill et al. (2005) introduced three facets of integration: sectoral, vertical and 
horizontal. Sectoral integration refers to the inclusion of a new policy field under the 
regulatory umbrella of the European Union. Vertical integration means the deepening and 
widening of regulation competence in a certain field, and horizontal integration refers to 
the territorial expansion of the EU (c.f. ibid., 20-22). 
For this thesis, the term integration is only useful in limited ways. Although the term gives 
a name to some of the phenomena that are to be analyzed for this project (i.e. the aspects 
under which the creation of a union takes place), it is too broad a concept to coin it as the 
„dependent variable“ of the thesis. As will be explicated later, the term unification is a 
better fit when it comes to answering the research questions of this thesis.  
Around the concept of integration there exist a whole set of theories, terms, models, and 
categories, that developed parallel to the European Union. So-called integration theories try 
to find models that answer three basic questions: 1) Why are states willing to give up parts 
of their sovereignty? 2) Which policy fields are more likely to be transferred to a supra 
state level, and why? 3) How do institutions come to life in the process? (c.f. Pollak/ 
Slominski 2006, 52). If this thesis were to be packed in the corset of EU integration 
theory, the focus would lie on the first question. 
Integration theories can be divided into two big families, supranational and 
intergouvernmental, which both have their own refined sub-theories. To make a long 
story short, scholars of Intergouvernmentalism, such as Stanley Hoffmann and Andrew 
Moravcsik, stress the importance of sovereign states and their preferences in the process 
of integration. For them, supranational institutions are basically instruments to serve 
nation states with their interests. Theorists of Supranationalism, for example Ernst Haas 
and David Mitrany, emphasize the power of supranational institutions and their role in 
integration (c.f. ibid., 52-68; Holzinger/Knill et al. 2005, 19-80). 
The spotlight of this thesis lies on historical developments and factors that triggered the 
unification of some of the formerly autonomous European and Northern American 
states. It is therefore self-evident that the theoretical strain of intergouvernmentalism with 
its attention towards the behavior and interests of independent state units is more fruitful 
for analysis in this context than supranationalism with its focus on supra-state institutions 
and their operations in long-term integration processes. Basically, supranational theory 
concentrates more on the developments after unification, when institutions are already on 
their way to be consolidated. It is not an ideological decision of the author to prefer the 
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ideas of intergouvernmentalism as a background theory, but rather a pragmatic choice 
that is caused by the temporal location of the three research questions on the very 
beginning of the time-line of integration processes. 
 
But can the term integration and the theories that come with it be applied to the 
development of the United States? It has already been mentioned that integration theory 
has mainly evolved to get a better understanding of European integration and therefore is 
not primarily designed to explain other processes of regional integration around the 
world. However, since political theories always strive to hold a grain of universality and 
generalized conception, integration theories could also be applied to the development of 
other regional blocs. Vice versa, the following terms and arguments might also be applied 
to the European Union. Besides integration, there are other approaches to understand 
and describe the get-together of previously detached units. In the context of the US, two 
terms must be explicated further in order to round up this chapter on the „Short 
Scholarly History of Unification“; First, empire and second, federation. 
 
Empire 
In order to decide whether the US and/or the EU are empires, it is crucial to define this 
term which has been used by many, but confined by few. Herfried Münkler characterizes 
the noun empire with the help of three attributes: First, in comparison to states, empires 
have unclear boundaries, which „involve gradations of power and influence“ (Münkler 
2005, 5). Empires possess peripheral regions and a powerful center, which do not 
recognize its neighbors as equals. Münkler states that „states are always in plural, empires 
mostly in singular“ (ibid., 5). Second, regarding the question of power, „hegemony is 
supremacy within a group of formally equal political players; imperiality, by contrast, 
dissolves this – at least formal – equality and reduces subordinates to the status of client 
states or satellites“ (ibid., 6). As an example for a hegemonic arrangement, Münkler 
mentions NATO and the United States’ role as primus inter pares within the 
organization. The Sowjet Union, on the opposite, would have been an imperial structure 
following this characterization of empires. Third, there is a small but significant difference 
between empire and imperialism, the latter being defined as a condition in which there is „a 
will to empire“ (ibid., 8) (c.f. ibid., 4-8). 
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The United States has been repeatedly described as an empire. In an article of the same 
name, Charles Maier (2006) refers to the US as an „Empire of Consumption“; in his book 
„Colossus“, Niall Ferguson (2004) calls the United States after the Second World War an 
„American Empire“; Amy Chua (2007) does not hesitate to name the US after 1945 an 
empire either and Robert Kagan (2004) even if not explicitly referring to the term, states 
that „Americans are from Mars“ (Kagan 2004, 3). What these examples all have in 
common – and I could name many more - is their referral to the US as an empire primarily 
after 1945 (or even after 9/11). Since this thesis will not focus on the United States’ 
contemporary history, the usage of the term empire is out of place for the purpose of 
answering this projects’ research questions.  
But couldn’t the concept of empire be applied to the characteristics and evolution of the 
European Union? Jan Zielonka (2006) argues that the EU resembles a so-called Neo-
Medieval empire. As opposed to the Westphalian empire, which features fixed borders, 
military control, clear hierarchies of power, and a certain thrive for territorial conquest by 
the means of war, a Neo-Medieval empire is characterized by its fuzzy boundaries, 
economic and bureaucratic control, multi-level decision-making processes, and horizontal 
integration through non-violent invitation (c.f. Zielonka 2006, 11-20). In Zielonka’s mind, 
the EU is somehow a new version of „an empire we know from centuries earlier“ (ibid., 
1), namely from the Middle Ages. By introducing the term Neo-Medieval empire, Zielonka 
succeeded to find a concept that puts the European Union on the discussion table when 
contemporary empires are subject of scholarly debate. On the other hand side, there are 
voices opposing the point of view that the EU should be defined as any kind of empire. 
Chua, for instance, compares the European Union to Rome, which in its „golden age, [...] 
too attracted entire peoples into its orbit. But Rome always had its legions [...]. The EU 
has become a magnet for nations without force or even the threat of force“ (Chua 2007, 
302). Agreeing with Mark Leonard, Chua therefore names the EU an anti-empire, since it is 
not willing to invade countries for territory, but integrates others through lengthy and 
voluntary accession (ibid., 300-311). 
Although there is some discussion in the previously mentioned literature of whether or 
not the EU is an empire in some facets (Neo-Medieval), or if it carries certain imperial 
features (center-periphery), it has yet to be argued that the European Union is an empire in 
the strict sense, like - for example - the British Colonial Empire or militaristic China 
under the Tang dynasty. 
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To conclude, the term empire and its features serve as efficient verbal instruments to give a 
name to countries that rise to and fall from global dominance in the long term. Empire is a 
useful concept in the field of International Relations, since it draws attention to foreign 
affairs, and the emergence of war and peace. However, concepts of empire do not very 
well explain why voluntary unifications of formally equal states take place and which 
forces and actors lead to them. The concept of empire contains a spark of violence within. 
As Münkler states, empires don’t view themselves as standing on the same level as others. 
As a cause, wanting to be an empire per definition implies the usage of force against others 
if necessary4. 
Furthermore, the concept of empire is not the most suitable choice of theoretical 
background for this thesis, the term empire in its traditional sense applies to some 
European powers in the past (Britain, and to a certain extent Spain and the Netherlands), 
but – as explicated above – it is doubtful if the European Union in its present state can be 
described as an empire. There is less of an opposition against calling the US an empire after 
1945, but there is no supported historical case to be made that the US was an empire from 
1776 to 1800. As a result, empire might be an interesting choice of concept to compare the 
EU and the US as they are today, but for the questions of this thesis, the term empire is 
not the first choice. 
 
Federations, Confederations, federal, fédéral, föderal 
In general, the term federation refers to a union between previously independent units, i.e. 
states. In comparison to confederations, federations are characterized by their more intensive 
quality of cooperation and by their higher level of integration. Confederations are loser 
collaborations and possibly short-term coalitions between states, whereas federations are 
built with the intention to exist for a long time period (c.f. Fröschl 1994, 23). Although 
both terms have often been used as pseudonyms and despite the fact that there are 
multiple interpretations of their meanings, in the long historical perspective these 
divergences (depth and duration of collaboration) crystallize. 
In respect to their goals, confederations and federations are both primarily built to avoid 
domestic conflicts, to secure peace among the units and to - as James Madison wrote in 
                                                
4 The whole rationale around an empire’s aggressive and expansionistic decision-making and the defensive 
argument of its soon-to-be attacked unequal neighbor can be comprehended by reading Thucydides’ nearly 
2500 years old Melian Dialogue. 
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1835 - provide „common safety“ (Madison cited by ibid., 26). Joel Barlow defined the 
purpose of these collaborations in 1801 as, 
„permanent Diet [...], composed of delegates from every state, with power to settle all 
disputes that might arise between the several states, to prevent any of them from raising 
armies  on their own account, building forts and fleets to act against each other, or 
forming any foreign alliance, but all exterior relations and all measures of defense should 
be directed and managed by general Diet, in the name of Confederacy“ (Barlow cited by 
ibid., 39). 
 
In 1795 Immanuel Kant proposed the most extensive form of a federation. In his work 
„Zum Ewigen Frieden“, Kant suggested a ‚global foedus’ in order to unify the nations of 
the world within a congress of states that is based on common law. This institution would 
then allow solving conflicts between states in a civilized and enlightened environment and 
would therefore contribute to a peaceful world order.5 
Since this thesis is a comparative case study between the US and the EU it is important to 
point out a crucial linguistic difference. In English, the adjective federal refers to the nation 
state level. Federal is the English equivalent of the German Bundes-. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), for example, is the highest-level national police force, and as an 
agency directly under the rule of the United States Department of Justice. In French, 
fédéral has the same meaning as in English, expressing a support of the central 
government at the expense of the state units. In German, however, the term föderal has a 
different connotation. Föderal suggests a political system in which the units (Länder) enjoy 
a great deal of co-determination at the federal level and hold strong competencies in 
different policy fields. Schools in Germany, for instance, are organized by this principle, 
leading to a diversity of school systems within the same nation state (c.f. ibid., 41). 
In the following, the words federation and federal will sometimes be used synonymously for 
union and unified. Although their meanings and their linguistic history are slightly different, 
the terms’ similarities and connectedness mostly outshine their discrepancy. 
 
Union, Unit, Unification 
After introducing many of the relevant terms, concepts and thinkers that come to mind 
when comparing the US and the EU, and after building up and introducing the idea of 
                                                
5 As with all historical ideas it is important to avoid an ex-post view. Kant and Barlow have to be 
understood as thinkers that reasoned within their respective time period and presumptions. Of course, 
Kant’s ideas influenced the founding of the United Nations, but Kant himself would have probably never 
imagined African countries as independent states. 
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federation, the time has come to direct the reader’s attention to the central category of this 
thesis, union. 
In a comparative context, Goldstein (2001) refers to a union as „a specific subcategory of 
federated union – those formed voluntarily, by independent states, in the modern 
Euro-American cultural context“ (Goldstein 2001, 142). Amitai Etzioni (1965), a US-
American scholar, who became known through his studies of organizations, used a more 
comprehensive sociological approach to formulate the definition of union. 
„[Unions are, R.K.] international systems whose level of integration and scope is higher 
than that of a typical international organization6 and lower than that of an established 
political community7. A union is a group of countries that acts in unison, on a 
continuous rather than an ad hoc basis, on a wide range of matters, and on matters 
more important to its interest than is the case in typical international organizations“ 
(Etzioni 1965, 12). 
 
With this definition, Etzioni located the concept of union on a scale between an 
international organization and a political community. He did not define union as a 
‚positivum’, but rather than that, as a ‚negativum’ in relation to other terms. The concept 
of union is indeed difficult to grasp without referencing other terms and differentiating it 
from them. Union is a verbal crutch to name a phenomenon that is not accurately defined 
by other concepts, such as the previously examined empire, federation, confederation, or 
even other terms like bloc, political community, or international organization. Union, in 
the context of this thesis, is more of an operational and not an analytical category. The 
term is used to first, account for the linguistic similarity between the European Union 
and the United States, and second, a definitory compromise to allow a comparative case 
study that keeps the same level-of-analysis. 
However, Goldstein and Etzioni give us some clues on how to get a better grasp of the 
meaning of the term union. A union is characterized by a voluntary association of units, 
whereby a unit is defined as „a single constituent of a whole“ (ibid., 3). In the context of 
this thesis, the units in focus are independent and sovereign states. Furthermore, the 
states of the union act in joint fashion on multiple matters that concern them. 
Additionally, unions are formed and consolidated over a long period of time. They don’t 
just occur from one day to another. This inherent processoral characteristic of unions is 
                                                
6 Etzioni mentions the World Health Organization or the NATO as examples for international 
organizations. In his mind, the United Nations do not count as an international organization and need their 
own category. 
 
7 Etzioni refers to a political community as „a state, an administrative-economic unit, and a focal point of 
identification“ (ibid., 4). 
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even clearer by defining the term unification, which „refers to the process of increasing [the 
level and scope of integration, R.K.]“ (ibid., 12). 
In order to further deepen the understanding of unions, Fröschl discusses the dichotomy 
between an incorporating union on the one side, and a federal union on the other side. The 
best example for an incorporating union is the union between England and Scotland, which 
came into effect after the Acts of Union were passed in 1707 and laid the foundation for 
what we know today as ‚The United Kingdom of Great Britain’. The Acts of Union 
caused an incorporation of the Scottish Parliament into the newly formed Parliament of 
Great Britain in the Palace of Westminster in London. James Boswell, a Scottish author, 
identified the gist of an incorporating union while talking to an Englishman, „You should not 
talk of we and you, Sir: there is now an [sic] Union“ (Boswell cited by Fröschl 1994, 37). 
In comparison, a federal union is a union in which the states continue their existence, but 
decide to hand certain competencies over to a newly found federal government. The 
United States, for instance, became a federal union after the constitution came into effect. 
In case of the European Union, certain aspects can be described as these of a federal 
union, but since some other fields (e.g. common security) are not primarily under the rule 
of a federal European authority, it is not valid – at this point - to call the EU a federal 
union. 
To conclude, the term unification is used in this essay to describe the process of states 
joining together in a political, economic and cultural union. Here, unification is not as wide a 
temporal category as integration, but the concept rather focuses on the earlier 
developments of a union’s formation and on the factors that had an effect on the union’s 
emergence. 
 
Comparative Case Studies on Unification 
In this chapter the author will take a quick look at the already existing literature on the 
topic. As Italian political scientist Sergio Fabbrini already remarked, „few attempts have 
been made to conduct systemic comparison of democratic experiences on the two sides 
of the Atlantic“ (Fabbrini 2007, 1). Nevertheless the author will present four comparative 
studies on the US and the EU, demonstrate their content and characterize their 
differences and similarities to this thesis’ focus. 
Amitai Etzioni’s book „Political Unification“ from 1965 provides a handy theoretical 
framework to gain a better understanding of the concept of unification. His ideas have 
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already been used in the introductory and theoretical chapter of this thesis. Since Etzioni’s 
book does not contain a direct comparison between the unification processes of US and 
the EU though, but a contrasting of the United Arab Republic, the Federation of the 
West Indies, the Nordic Associational Web, and the EEC (only until 1964), it falls short 
of being of substantial content for this thesis. Additionally, the text is from 1965, so it 
naturally does not consider the European states’ further integration until present day (c.f. 
Etzioni 1965). 
In his book „Compound Democracies“, Fabbrini applies his model of compound democracy 
on the developments of the US and the EU. For Fabbrini, a „compound model is proper 
of polities that have the features of both an interstate (confederal, intergovernmental) and 
a suprastate (federal, supranational) organization. A compound polity is a union of states 
and their citizens [sic]“ (Fabbrini 2007, 3). He argues that the US and the EU are becoming 
more and more similar political entities. The main difference between Fabbrini’s work 
and the outlook of this thesis is the time period under focus. While Fabbrini concentrates 
his comparison on the time after 1945 and strongly bears future outcomes in mind, this 
thesis will aim its attention at the respective beginnings of the two unions and the pivotal 
factors that triggered unification in the past (c.f. ibid.). 
Another comparative study on the topic was conducted by Leslie Friedman Goldstein in 
2001. Although it is certainly more similar to this thesis in approach than Fabbrini’s work, 
Goldstein’s analysis centers around a slightly distinct research question: „[W]hat forces, in 
a nonconsequent situation, cuase formerly sovereign states to continue to maintain their 
willingness to cede sovereignty to a suprastate unit after their initial decision to join that 
unit“ (Goldstein 2001, 142). Goldstein’s research circles around the time period shortly 
after initial unification and the motivation of states to prolong their federal engagement. 
Goldstein then moves on to compare the membership resistance of the EU states, the USA, 
the Dutch Union and the Swiss Union. There are certainly dissimilarities between the two 
studies, but Goldstein’s article provides some useful definitions for this thesis and some 
interesting hypothesis for future research (c.f. ibid., 141-160). 
Peter Gerlich’s article „Unions in Comparison: Can the EU and the United States Learn 
from Each Other?“ from 2007 is perhaps the most proximate study to this thesis with 
regards to both research question and outcome as the article’s title already suggests. 
However, Gerlich’s article is more oriented towards a ‚lessons learned’ from the two 
unification processes, while this thesis mainly focuses on the factors which triggered the 
formation of the unions (predominantly that of the US). Another difference is the sheer 
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length of this thesis in comparison to Gerlich’s article (c.f. Gerlich 2007, 67-79). Like 
Goldstein’s work, Gerlich’s text is an important scholarly starting point for the evolution 
of this thesis and, together with Etzioni’s theoretic framework, build a foundation on 
which the following chapters rest. 
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THE FORCES OF UNIFICATION IN THE US 
 
Writing this essay from a European perspective, one legend about the US has to be 
demystified before moving on with the analysis. In its beginning the US was not one 
single monolithic state bloc, but it was multiple states joining forces against the British. 
These states were (and at some point still are) struggling their way through a lenghty and 
conflictory 200-year-long unification-, integration- and enlargement-process. For the 
European reader, it is therefore helpful to take a closer look at said country’s name again. 
After all the USA is not officially named „State of America“ or simply „America“ but 
„United States of America“. Although we often tend to put the emphasis on the last 
word8, this essay will focus on the evolution of the first two terms. 
Having clarified the conceptual approach to the topic, it is now time to answer the first 
question; Which factors encouraged unification in the case of the United States? Were 
there certain economic, political, or cultural incentives that motivated the states to work 
together?  
 
Introduct ion to American Revolut ionary History9 
Let’s begin our historical journey 250 years ago in a hot American summer in a remote 
outpost of Western civilization. Albany, at that time, was not the typical mid-sized US city 
it is today, but a Dutch settlement on the Hudson river towered over by a British fort. To 
the East and South, the the British King ruled the Anglo-American colonies, whilst to the 
North the French governed their territories. The Indian Nations spread to the West. In 
the midst of the 18th century Albany was a commercial outpost erected at a crossroads 
between three worlds. In 1754, colonial commissioners, Indians and traders, met in the 
Mohawk Valley to attend to the Albany Congress, which should renew and improve the 
treaties with the Indians. But more importantly for this thesis, several commissioners 
                                                
8 Which makes other nation’s citizens on the American continent shudder. 
 
9 The term ‘American Revolution’ has been challenged by some historians. They argue that a revolution is 
constituted by a set of factors other than in the case of the events in Northern America. Keeping the 
criticism in mind, the author of the thesis decided to use the term nevertheless for simplicity’s sake. 
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wanted to unify the Anglo-American colonies. By looking at the writings of the most 
famous (and notorious) Albany attendee, Benjamin Franklin, regarding the formation of 
an intercolonial union, we can glimpse into the mindset of mid - 18th century colonial 
America. In comparing the necessity of an intercolonial union with that of the Iroquois 
Confederacy, Franklin critizised that it 
„would be a very strange Thing, if six Nations of ignorant savages should be capable of 
forming a Scheme for subsisted Ages, and appears indissoluble; and yet that a like Union 
should be impracticable for ten or a Dozen English Colonies, to whom it is more 
necessary, and must be more advantageous; and who cannot be supposed to want an 
equal Understanding of their Interests“ (Franklin cited by Shannon 2000, 103). 
 
Franklin argued that a general union would lead the colonists „to consider themselves, 
not as so many independent states, but as members of the same body“ (cited by Shannon 
2002, 184). He supported a general union because he believed that such a union would be 
better equipped to regulate trade with the Indians, organize Western settlements and 
provide military strenght than partial unions or single colonies. These arguments sound all 
too familiar and repetitive if one is accustomed to the constitutional debates one 
generation later. 
So why include the Albany Congress in an introduction to American Revolutionary 
History? The answer is simple: Franklin and the other attendees discussed their ideas of 
union strictly in a context of British Empire. Surely, they debated the many hows and 
whens and whys of intercolonial government but they never questioned that they were 
British subjects under the rule of the Parliament and the King. Franklin and his 
contemporaries took pride in possessing the „rights of Englishmen“. And although they 
laid criticisms upon shortcomings of colonial government, they didn’t question their 
cultural belonging to Britannia or anticipate American independence, which should come 
into focus only 20 years after the Albany Congress. 
The second reason to discuss the Albany Plan in this thesis is that the plan is a piece of 
evidence, which suggests that the road towards a union is probably not a linear path. If 
anything, the Plan indicates that forming a union is mostly a trial and error process. The 
proposed Albany Plan to unify the colonies and govern them by an elected Grand 
Council (under the general rule of Britain of course) got dismissed in the colonial 
assemblies because it was feared to take too many rights away from them. In London, on 
the other side of the Atlantic, the Plan was mostly ignored and finally rejected because it 
was, among other things, too democratic.  
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So how come the colonists adopted a much stronger plan for a union only some decaeds 
later? What kind of factors encouraged some of the actors to re-new their unification 
efforts? In which context did these factors occur? 
The French and Indian War (1754-1763) strenghtened Britain’s position in Northern 
America, but also left London to deal with a huge war debt. The solution for this problem 
was quick at hand. In 1763, George Grenville, then Prime Minister of Britain introduced 
four new laws to Parliament that were relevant to the colonies. One of them, which 
stirred most of the conflict, was the so-called Stamp Act. The law „unambiguously aimed 
to raise revenue in America by levying taxes on newspapers, pamphlets, almanacs, and 
other sorts of legal documents such as leases, land titles and licenses“ (Kierner 2003, 57). 
Subsequently, the Virginia House of Burgesses passed a resolution against the Stamp Act, 
which was approved by nine other colonies. In October 1765 an intercolonial assembly 
was formed to discuss measures in order to get rid of the Act. Outside these officiall 
channels, colonists boycotted British goods and mass protests were held in urban centers. 
In March 1766, the Stamp Act was repealed, mostly due to the (often violent) street 
marchers who harressed stamp distributors. In a move to save face, Parliament passed the 
Declaratory Act instead, reinforcing Parliament’s power over the colonies and its right to 
levy taxes. 
To summarize, the Stamp Act Crisis and the follow up Imperial Crisis (Townshend Acts, 
Liberty Riot,...) in North America provoked three reactions that should be of importance 
later on; First, the colonial elites began questioning and discussing the nature of the 
British Constitution and its aptitude to serve the interests of the colonists. Second, the 
crisis caused protesters to rethink colonial boundaries and to engage in cross-colonial 
meetings. Third, the conflict mobilized popular (violent) resistance and established a 
relationship between the elites and the masses. The Stamp Act crisis and its subsequent 
discords accelerated the forming of an „imagined community“ of North American 
colonists (c.f. ibid., 54-64). 
The ongoing frictions between townspeople and troups culminated in the Boston 
Massacre in March 1770, in which British soldiers shot 11 men (of which 5 died), after 
being taunted by the local mob. Most Bostonians were outraged by this event and news 
travelled fast through the other colonies10. After three years of relative peace, Parliament 
                                                
10 John Adams, who would later become President of the United States, strongly believed in the virtues of 
fair trial and agreed to be the troup’s lawyer in court. Adams’ decision to defend the soldiers caused much 
dissonance in Boston. However, Adams was succesful: the court acquited most of the defendants. 
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enacted the Tea Act to help the struggling East India Company. Basically, the Act 
established the EIC as a monopoly for tea trade and left many middlemen (traders, 
merchants,...) without income. Additionally, the colonists thought that Parliament only 
lowered the price for tea in order to sell more and thus increase their revenue from the 
tea duty (1768). Hence the colonies opposed the Tea Act. Some did not let the British tea 
ships enter their harbors while others simply destroyed the tea: „On the night of 16 
December, a band of men disguised themselves as Indians, boearded the tea ships – by 
then there were three – and dumped 342 chests of tea into Boston harbor“ (ibid., 89). 
This „Destruction of the Tea“ later came to be known as „Boston Tea Party“. It marks 
another step towards increased colonial lawlessness, violent opposition, and fight. Britain 
responded with the installation of the Coercive Acts to discipline the people of 
Massachusetts. Although the Acts were primarily aimed at Massachusetts Bay Colony, the 
laws were rejected and met with resistance throughout the colonies. 
In late summer of 1774 the 1st Continental Congress convened in Philadelphia. The plan 
was to design an alternative power structure in which the American colonies could exist 
somewhat independently within the British Empire. Economic boycotts were one of the 
measures considered and carried out by the colonists. During the following year, 
Congress still held dialogue with London, although the atmosphere was getting tenser by 
the day. In April 1775, British troops clashed with the Patriots’ militia north of Boston, at 
the Battle of Lexington and Concord. Shortly after, the 2nd Continental Congress came 
together and matters of military funding and command were discussed. As a response to 
congress’ „Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms“, King George III 
issued a proclamation in August 1775 in which he criticized the unlawlessness of his 
subjects in North America, who are 
„misled by dangerous and ill designing men, and forgetting the alliance which they owe to 
the power that has protected and supported them; after various disorderly acts committed 
in disturbance of the publick peace, to the obstruction of lawful commerce, and to the 
oppression of our loyal subjects carrying on the same“ (George III cited by ibid., 125). 
 
The mutual build up continued and both sides engaged in provocations. Thomas Paine, 
for example, published his widely read text „Common Sense“, both a ridicule of British 
monarchy and a call for American independence, since „The cause of America is in a 
great measure the cause of all mankind“ (Paine cited by ibid., 129). On the other side, 
Lord Dunmore recruited runaway slaves into the British Army army: „And I do hereby 
further declare all indentured servants, negroes, or others, (appertaining to Rebels,) free 
that are able and willing to bear arms, they joining His Majesty’s troops as soon as may be 
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[...]“ (Dunmore cited by ibid., 126f). Meanwhile the colonies tried to attract European 
allies to support their cause militarilly and financially. 
With these developments, it was only a matter of time until the Declaration of 
Independence was to be written and signed in congress on July 4th, 1776. One of the 
reasons to adopt a declaration was that a formal declaration would certainly help winning 
foreign allies for their cause and would at the same time publicly rationalize the formation 
of a continental army. Among the writers were Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and 
Benjamin Franklin. The Declaration of Independence has four parts, an introduction, a 
listing of the King’s crimes, a conclusion and signatories (c.f. DoI 1776)11. 
After its introduction to the public, the main chapter of the Revolutionary War began. 
One year later during war, in 1777, congress agreed to the Articles of Confederation, 
ratified and in force from March 1781. These articles established a confederate 
government for the newly independent states and for the first time enabled a „perpetual 
Union between the states“ named „United States of America“. The Articles - amongst 
other things - consist of a preamble, states rights, paragraphs on the formal set up of 
legislature, rights granted the federal government, and military questions (c.f. AoC 
1777)12. 
Although the British Army possessed advantages with regards to ressources, military 
experience, the colonies with their poorly trained militia, inexperience and lack in naval 
power, eventually won the war against all odds by wearing the intruder down. On the one 
hand, the colonists played on the long and slow British supply lines. On the other hand, 
what the militia lacked in experience they made up with volunteer spirit and endurance. 
After all, the Revolutionary War was a people’s war, in the good and in the bad sense. 
Anne Terrel from Virginia, whose husband fought for the continental army, gives account 
of her willingness to support the cause for independence: 
„I am not only willing to bear the absence of my dear husband for a short time, but am 
almost ready to start up with sword in hand to fight by his side in so glorious a cause [...] 
and let the tyrants of Great Britain see the American Ladies both ingenuity and industry, 
and that we can dress with gentility without any of the British manufactories“ (Terrel 
cited by Kierner 2003, 153f). 
 
                                                
11 The Declaration of Independence and its factual meaning for unification will be discussed in depth in the 
following chapters. 
 
12 The Articles of Confederation and its factual meaning for unification will be discussed in depth in the 
following chapters. 
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The Treaty of Paris ended the War in 1793 causing Britain to concentrate its power on 
other colonies, shifting world history in a new direction. On the other side of the Atlantic, 
the former colonies had to tackle many challenges. The war left the states with a huge 
debt and the Articles of Confederation did not allow Congress to engage in meaningful 
foreign relations with European powers. Additionally the Articles prohibited the 
installation of much needed commercial policies and regulations across the newly found 
United States of America (c.f. ibid., 229-231). To summarize, in „the Confederation era, 
Congress was less of a governing body than a forum for discussion and consensus-
building among a loose alliance of states“ (ibid., 228). 
In September 1786, a first attempt to reshape US government in the Annapolis 
Convention failed to motivate enough states’ representatives to produce any substantial 
outcome. It took a violent rebellion to wake up some of the states. In winter 1786/1787 
Captain Daniel Shay started a revolt against the state after freeing imprisoned debtors in 
western Massachusetts. The poor farmers’ inability to pay their base rates got them send 
to jail. A manifesto taking sides with the impoverished farmers states that the „present 
expensive mode of collecting debts [...] will of necessity fill our jails with unhappy 
debtors, and thereby a reputable body of people rendered incapable of being serviceable 
either to themselves of the community“ (cited by ibid., 241). After the state of 
Massachusetts petitioned Congress to send troops, Shay’s Rebellion was struck down. 
Although Captain Shay did not win the battle militarilly, many state leaders were shaken 
to the core by this brutal manifestation of mass discontent and government helplessness. 
The Philadelphia Convention to revise the Articles of Confederation became a real 
necessity in order to reinstall popular faith in government and to take on the many other 
pressing problems of the young union (c.f. ibid., 240f). A worried George Washington 
writes in a letter to John Jay, „What a triumph for the advocates of despotism to find that 
we are incapable of governing ourselves, and that systems founded on the basis of equal 
liberty are merely ideal and fallacious!“ (Washington cited by ibid., 243). 
The Philadelphia Convention started on May 25th, 1787. 12 of the 13 states were 
represented with the exception of Rhode Island. The initial plan to reform the Articles of 
Confederation was soon abandoned in lieu of a much bolder agenda, namely to draft a 
constitution. James Madison, the „Father of the Constitution“, was responsible for the 
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main design of the document13. The influences on the document can - amongst others - 
be traced back to the Magna Carta (1215), the Jamestown Representative Assembly 
(1619), and the state constitutions (John Jay in NY, John Adams in MA). The 
Constitution introduced three branches of government: executive (President), legislative 
(Congress), and judicial (Supreme Court). There are two compromises included in the 
constitution: First, the installment of a bicameral parliamentary system – House of 
Representatives and Senate – allowed both for popular and state representation. Second, a 
clause delaying the states to tackle the slavery question until 1808 and counting slaves as 
3/5 of a person (!) appeased the South and kept them on boat to endorse the document. 
Out of the 55 delegates present at the Convention, 39 signed the Constitution. The so-
called „Bill of Rights“, i.e. the first 10 constitutional amendments, strengthened the rights 
of individuals and concluded the fight between Federalists and Antifederalists. George 
Mason, a Virginian delegate and strong antifederalist supporter of a bill of rights, argued 
beforehand, that there 
„is no declaration of rights, and the laws of the general government being paramount to 
the laws and constitutions of the several states, the declarations of rights, in the separate 
states, are no security [...] This government will commence in a moderate aristocracy. It is 
at present impossible to foresee whether it will, in its operation, produce a monarchy, or a 
corrupt oppressive aristocracy“ (Mason cited by ibid., 279ff). 
 
The Constitution came into effect after being ratified by the ninth state (N.H.) on June 
21st, 1788. In its aftermath, George Washington, an integral figure of unity, was elected 
the first President of the United States, giving the young and shaky nation its first father 
figure, role model, and future point of cultural reference (c.f. ibid., 233-235; Peltason 
2004, 3-17; Holton 2007). 
We began our rocky journey of American unification in 1754 in Albany and arrived in 
1788 looking at a young, independent union consisting of a handful of diverse states 
united under a common constitution. With this general background knowledge in 
American Revolutionary History it is now time to dig deep and ask which factors 
contributed to this unification process. 
 
                                                
13 Thomas Jefferson and John Adams did not take part in the Philadelphia Convention since they were both 
assigned posts in Europe at that time. 
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Economic Factors  
With regards to economic factors one can find a wealth of interior and exterior reasons 
why the 13 British colonies began considering unification. The following questions will be 
answered in the subsequent chapter: What did the economy look like in Northern 
America in the second half of the 18th century? What were the economic challenges the 
generation of the „Founding Fathers“ faced? How relevant were economic questions with 
regards to political and cultural unification? And finally, how much did or didn’t 
economic factors contribute to the unification of the United States? To examine these 
issues, there will be four sections. In the first introductory part, we will take a closer look 
at the nature of trade and production in Revolutionary America. Next, there will be a 
discussion of interior and exterior economic challenges the young union encountered. 
This main chapter will deal with the confederation’s/union’s wide range of monetary and 
fiscal problems. Third, the author will discuss the cultural and political importance of 
economic matters for unification. And last but not least, the summary and conclusion will 
offer insight on the level of unifying energy these economic factors possessed. 
 
Production and Trade 
The British colonies in North America, which would later form the United States, were 
largely agricultural. First and foremost it is important to say that most of the colonists 
were farmers, living their lives in small self-sufficient communities. 
In the South, however, a favorable climatic environment allowed for plantations. They 
provided larger amounts of produce, especially tobacco, which were then shipped to 
England. Slaves, which were “imported” from Africa, often had to work under terrible 
conditions to fulfill the expectations of the rural gentry14. 
In the urban centers that developed on the Mid-Atlantic and Northern seaboard, 
merchants organized the trade between Britain and the colonies. A whole strata of urban 
society depended on this colonial trade, for example seamen, ropemakers, etc. (These 
groups should become essential in the formation of radicalized mobs in pre-war USA). 
                                                
14 It is indeed a sad and ironic fact of the American Revolution that the economic and later political 
independence of the gentry was somehow based on the dependence of African slaves. 
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To the West, small-scale farming and fur trade (with Native Americans) ruled the face of 
North America the second half of the 18th century. 
A great example to illustrate the division between the different North American lifestyles 
is to look at the economic background of two of the most essential politicians of the 
period, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. While Jefferson lived in the South in his 
dreamily named Palladian „Monticello“, John Adams occupied either a small self-
sustained farm in New England or a crowded townhouse in Boston. While Jefferson 
spent his later years managing the plantation, the redesign of the house and the slaves15, 
Adams experienced relatively humble years with his wife Abigail in his Massachusetts 
farm. 
To summarize, the colonies exported mostly raw goods to Britain, while the 
„motherland“ shipped manufactured goods over the Atlantic, therefore tapping into a 
growing market for its commodities. T.H. Breen called this development the „birth of 
Anglo-American ‚consumer society’“ (Breen 1988, 77) at around 1750. He states an 
„exceptionally rapid expansion of consumer choice, and increasing standardization of consumer 
behavior and a pervasive Anglicization of the American market“ (ibid., 79). 
The combination of exporting raw materials while importing a wide range16 of highly 
crafted and expensive manufactured goods is a perfect example of a classical conlonial 
economy. However, what speaks against this hypothesis is that the North American 
colonies had to pay lower taxes than their British brothers and sisters, an interesting fact 
that was often neglected by radical political writers of the American Revolution. 
 
Imperial and Exterior Challenges 
The pre-revolutionary era can be characterized by the colonies growing economic 
relations with Britain. On the one hand, the empire rendered the emergence of a 
„consumer culture“ possible (see above). Additionally, the demand for raw goods and the 
naval protection for colonial vessels boosted the colonies maritime economy, i.e. ship 
building, as well as enabling colonial merchants to find British investors and creditors. 
                                                
15 Jefferson was a busy man indeed. He not only fathered the children of one of his slaves – Sally Hemnings 
- but in the course of history also found the time to invent the swivel chair. 
 
16 In the 1750s, an American consumer could even purchase „purple gloves, flowered gloves, orange gloves, 
white gloves, rough gloves, chamois gloves, buff gloves, ‚Maid’s Black Silk’ gloves, ‚Maid’s Lamb Gloves’, 
and even ‚Men’s Dog Skin Gloves’“ (Breen 1988, 80). 
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And third, Britain’s military success over the French opened the doors for new territorial 
and economic expansion to the West. Kierner states, that „the colonial economy 
benefited overall from the Navigation Acts17, at least up to the 1760s“ (Kierner 2003, 9). 
On the other hand, British companies had a monopoly on imperial commerce, leaving 
little space for colonial enterprises to flourish anywhere outside the empire. More so, 
extravagant consumerism not only led to a very fashionable American gentry, but also 
increased personal as well as international debt and dependencies. Not only did the 
French-Indian war open some new doors, it also shut some by locking the empire into 
the prison of a huge war debt, which became the reasoning ground for new taxes on the 
colonies: „ [...] Britons generally grumbled that the colonists, who reaped the chief 
benefits of victory, did little to help defray its costs“ (ibid., 55). Britain’s effort to raise 
revenue by introducing – for example - the Stamp Acts was met with Northern American 
suspicion and outrage. John Dickinson, a farmer and pamphleteer, argued in 1767: 
„Never did the British parliament, till the period above mentioned [Stamp Acts, R.K.], 
think of imposing duties in America, FOR THE PURPOSE OF RAISING A 
REVENUE [sic!]“ (Johnson cited by ibid., 79). From the Stamp Act Crisis to the Boston 
Tea Party the colonies resisted and protested British regulations. These protests, based on 
economic argumentations, should become one of the main contributing factors for the 
American struggle for independence and unification. 
During the Revolution, trade with Britain came to near stagnation and British products 
were boycotted. The colonies strived to find multiple ways to finance the war against the 
Crown. American emmissaries in Europe tried to attract foreign allies and investors, for 
instance in the Netherlands or in France. The Declaration of Independence was partly 
designed to lure international money into the war-ridden colonies, by asserting the 
„thirteen united States of America [‘s, R.K.]“ (DoI 1776) enlightened strength and 
economic competence: „[...] that as Free and Independent States, they have full power to 
levy War, conclude Peace, contract alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other 
Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do“ (DoI 1776). From a 21st 
century perspective, the Declaration’s assertion of equality and human rights seems the 
most striking contribution to global history. But evaluating the document from a 
standpoint in the 18th century, the Declaration is not only an appraisal of universal rights, 
                                                
17 The Navigation Acts from 1757 were a collection of laws to regulate imperial commerce. 
 41 
but mostly a cleverly designed text serving multiple pragmatic economic and political 
purposes. 
So how can the effects of the document be assessed? Although the Declaration found 
some idealistic admirers in Europe, notably in pre-revolutionary France, in reality the 
document and the diplomatic missionaries contributed little to raise the states’ 
international economic standing. Unfortunately for the „united States of America“, the 
Articles of Confederation did not do any foreign financial good either. Although the text 
establishes congress’ right to enter international „treaties and alliances“ (Art. IX, AoC 
1777) and forbid the states to „lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any 
stipulations in treaties, entered into by the united States in congress assembled“ (Art. IV, 
AoC 1777), the general weakness of the „perpetual Union“ (AoC 1777) under the AoC 
prohibited any substantial positive influence on international trade. In reality congress had 
little authority since it lacked the principle power of taxation and was constantly blocked 
by vetoing states. 
In the post-revolution period it was a glaring fact that the AoC did not provide a 
functioning economic framework for the young union. The Constitution of the United 
States of America 1787 brought new incentives to revitalize international commerce and 
tackle the debt. First of all, the constitution sent a general global message that the US was 
on its way towards a stable and objectively „perpetual Union“ (AoC 1777), therefore 
slowly but surely attracting international investors, that would have shunned the 
confederation before. Second, from now on Congress possessed genuine legislative 
power „ To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; To regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes“ (Art. 1, 
Sect. 8 (2), CoUSA). These sections provided economic parties (international debtors, 
investors,...) with a clear anatomy of responsibilities, ergo increasing economic stability 
and security. Third, Congress’ power to tax further progressed the image of the US as a 
more reliable economic partner, since it - at least on paper – gave Congress a potent 
instrument to raise revenue in order to decrease the staggering war debt. 
„If European merchants could only ‚find in America, the punctuality and security, which 
alone gain credit and support confidence,’ True Friend18 declared, they would be ‚eager’ 
not only to lend Americans money but to sell them merchandise on credit. These loans 
and nothing else would ‚revive our agriculture’, he wrote“ (Holton 2007, 97). 
 
                                                
18 The synonym of an anonymous Virginian commentator. 
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To conclude, the quest to find a solution for the imperial and exterior economic 
challenges was one of the incentives that lead towards unification of the former colonies 
and can therefore be identified as this thesis’ first independent factor. 
 
Interior Challenges 
Linked to the above international economic incentives for unification, the young union 
struggled a great amount of domestic challenges. 
Monetary policies, i.e. the regulation of money supply, was deeply flawed in the early days 
of the United States. On the one hand, paper money was issued in great amounts by 
several state banks and depreciated in face value very rapidly. The national currency, the 
so-called „Continental“ (which was denominated in dollars) soon met the same fate. On 
the other hand, much needed specie – gold and silver – was scarce. Goverment bonds 
were not more than promisory notes that would never commit to their word that they 
would pay the soldiers/creditors/speculators later. 
Fiscal policy, i.e. the control of tax revenue and government spending, was equally 
doomed since the AoC did not provide the political framework to establish a national 
long-term economic plan. How did the young union’s network of economic interests look 
like before the constitution was ratified and Hamilton introduced his reform? 
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Figure 4. Graph Depicting the Economic Relations Between Actors After the War Before the Constitutional 
Ratification (by R.K. 2010) 
 
The above graph was created in order to facilitate a better understanding of the complex 
economic interactions right after the Revolutionary War. Five main actors can be 
identified: debtors (often farmers but also people of higher social rank), domestic and 
foreign creditors, the individual states and Congress proceeding under the AoC. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the war did not only leave the states and Congress 
with a huge debt but also caused great economic loss on the individual level. During the 
war years, agricultural production decreased since many farmers served as soldiers in the 
Revolutionary Army. Additionally, as in any war, property and machinery were destroyed, 
while food and clothing grew scarce. The economic aftershocks of the war were 
experienced by many Americans, especially by those at the lower end of social classes, 
well into the post-war years. To escape financial and productive hardships, debtors 
yearned for money, products and machinery, which were granted to them by domestic 
creditors. In case they were able to, debtors paid their creditors back with products, but 
more often they were entangled in a cycle of debt. 
Now that we explained the relationship between debtors and creditors, it is time to ask 
what the states’ position and interests were. What was at stake for them? The huge 
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amount of debtors after the war posed a dilemma to the states. Should they tax their 
constituents in order to raise revenue for the union’s war debt and therefore risking 
popular punishment at the next election? Or should the states ease their constituents’ 
economic hardships by issuing more paper money and granting tax relief to debtors while 
creating a system of monetary unsteadyness and financial insecurity? To the 
disappointment of domestic and foreign creditors, speculators and Congress, most of the 
states decided to be “ruled by” their constituents’ – i.e. debtors’ – will or by an „excess of 
democracy“ (Hamilton cited by Holton 2007, 5), as Alexander Hamilton noted sharply. 
First, the results of these measures had direct consequences for congress, which by the 
rules of AoC was dependent on states’ funding and couldn’t introduce taxes on its own. 
The lack of financing posed a challenge to the existence of congress and indirectly the 
union itself. Second, the lack of taxes paid to the states hence resulted in the non-
payment of international debts, further destabilizing international economic relations. 
Third, domestic creditors felt great injustice since the state governments did not fulfill 
their own financial responsibilities towards them. Furthermore, the states mostly ignored 
the creditors’ complaints regarding the non-compliance of credit rules by debtors. From a 
creditor’s perspective no one was held accountable for the breaching of rules, neither the 
debtors, nor the states, nor congress. 
To resume, most contemporaries accused the states for the destruction – respectively 
non-reconstruction – of the domestic economy, or as Holton would argue, „many 
Americans who lived through the post-war era [...] admitted that the state assemblies had 
badly damaged the American economy“ (ibid., 17) with their tax relief politics and de-
valuation of paper money by printing more and more bank notes in order to placate their 
constituents. Under the AoC, the only national authority – Congress - was too politically 
insignificant and financially dependent on the states that it could have influenced 
domestic economy to the better. And although the young union under the AoC was 
deeply divided into poor and rich, nearly all citizens agreed that the uncoordinated 
measures by the state assemblies posed a severe threat to the (economic) future of all 
Americans. For example, John Quincy Adams19 described the multilayered frustration 
with the Massachusetts state constitution in 1786: 
„While the idle, and extravagant, and consequently the poor, complain of its being 
oppressive, the men of property, and consideration, think the [Massachusetts state, R.K.] 
                                                
19 Son of John and Abigail Adams and 6th President of the United States. 
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constitution, gives too much liberty to the unprincipled citizen, to the prejudice of the 
honest, and industrious“ (Adams cited by ibid., 13). 
 
The former passage touches on a subject that is central to the development of the 
constitution and hence the strengthening of the union. John Quincy Adams and his 
contemporaries identified and criticized a widespread loss of „civic virtue“ in their 
countrymen. In their argumentation20, the inflated self-interest, which drives creditors and 
debtors, hinders the health of the public good. An overhaul of the AoC, respectively a 
new constitution should reinstall financial justice and sensible monetary and fiscal 
regulation. 
What were the most important differences between the AoC and the CoUSA with regards 
to economic policies? What were the new rules of economic conduct under the CoUSA? 
First, under the Articles the states had the sole power to levy taxes, leaving Congress 
dependent on the state assemblies for their funding: „the taxes for paying that proportion 
shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several 
States“ (Art. VIII, AoC). The Constitution on the contrary granted Congress the right to 
„lay and collect taxes, duties21, imposts and excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States“ (Art. 1, Sect. 8 (1), CoUSA). 
Second, although also partially granted by the AoC, Congress received the right to „coin 
Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights 
and Measures“ (Art. 1, Sect. 8 (5)), thus laying the groundwork for what would later 
become national banks and the Federal Reserve. 
Third, the Constitution prohibited the states to print their own bills of credit and pay 
their debts in paper money: „No state shall [...] coin money; emit Bills of Credit; make any 
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts [...]“ (Art. 1, Sect. 10 (1), 
CoUSA). For many contemporaries, this clause was the most important piece of 
legislation in the whole document. Charles Pinckney, governor of South Carolina, 
referred to it as „the soul of the Constitution“ (Pinckney cited by Holton 2007, 9), while 
Edmund Randolph, governor of Virginia, called it „a great favourite of mine“ (Randolph 
cited by ibid., 9). 
                                                
20 For example see governor of New Jersey’s, William Livingston’s, text „Primitive Whig, No. II“ (1786) 
(cited by Kierner 2003, 239f). 
 
21 „Duties are taxes on goods coming into the United States. Excises are taxes on sales, use, or production, 
and sometimes on business procedures or privileges [...]. Imposts is a general tax term that includes both 
duties and excises“ (Peltason 2004, 53). 
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Last, the constitution virtually forbade the states to levy duties on imports from other 
states or from abroad, which was previously common in some of the states: „No state 
shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, 
except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it´s [sic!] inspection Laws“ (Art. 1, 
Sect. 10 (2), CoUSA). This clause established a zone of free trade across the former 
colonies (c.f. Peltason 2004, 53f, 57f; c.f. Holton 2007, 9). 
Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury from 1789 until 1795, breathed life into 
the constitutional framework. Hamilton introduced a comprehensive set of monetary and 
fiscal measures to bind elites to the government and find the balance between liberty and 
order. Hamilton’s policies were much criticized22 at the time for being too hierarchical, 
elistist or even „monarchical“. What did Hamilton propose and implement? Hamilton 
carried out his idea that the federal government should resume the war debt from the 
state level and he assured that bonds were paid by face value to propel the economy. 
Furthermore, he was partly responsible for creating the first national bank in pursuance 
of providing a stable currency and slowing inflation. This stable monetary supply should 
be a vehicle to encourage investments by elites. Additionally, the Secretary of State 
provided direct subsidies to manufacturers to bind a national ruling class to the national 
government. 
So what were the economic effects and challenges of the constitution and of Hamilton’s 
measures? On the one side, the union experienced an economic boom in the 1790s: 
Relative economic stability went hand in hand with new domestic and international 
investments, less taxes than ever before, increased revenue from import tariffs, Congress 
taking over the states’ debts and the creditors finally getting their money back. On the 
other side, Congress was less responsive to citizens’ wishes than the state governments 
and therefore the national government was enabled to impose unpopular laws without 
much public consent, for example the tax on Whiskey which led to the Whiskey rebellion: 
„The adoption of the constitution spelled the end of annual elections, of grasroots 
instructions to representatives, and of popular control of the money supply – all of which 
dated back to the colonial era“ (Holton 2007, 271). Holton goes so far as to state that the 
Framers’ (of the CoUSA) intention was to „give the ordinary citizens [...] prosperity, not 
power“ (ibid., 277). In reality, most of the import revenue went into the military abolition 
of Indian conflicts or into the payment of government bonds, leaving little budgetary 
                                                
22 First and foremost, the „Hamiltonians“ were criticized by the so-called „Jeffersonians“, who should later 
become the Republican Party. 
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space to invest in infrastructure or agrarian/ small business investments (c.f. ibid., 266-
271). 
The above paragraph shows that the intentions with which the Framers built the CoUSA 
as well as the real-life effects of the document and the politicians’ subsequent policies are 
two-fold and a complex matter to characterize. More important for this thesis, however, 
is to answer and summarize the chapter’s questions on the economic factors leading to 
unification: To conclude, the restoration of „civic virtue“, that is the reinstallment of 
financial justice, as well as monetary and fiscal regulations are a central motive in the 
development of the constitution and thus another composite economic factor which 
drove unification. The effects of the constitutional take on economic issues and even 
Hamilton’s reforms still play a vital role in contemporary US politics and remain at the 
heart of political discourse and conflict even today, i.e. tax reforms, state and national 
debt, subsidies for business, etc.; 
 
Political and Cultural Importance of Economy for Unification 
How relevant were economic questions with regards to political and cultural unification? 
The following demonstrations serve as a bridge to the sections on political and cultural 
factors of US-American unification. Moreover, this chapter exemplifies the importance of 
economic matters in pre- and post-war everyday life and will further underline the 
influence of the economy on people’s evolving shared identity as unified „Americans“. 
In colonial times, especially from 1750 until the war, consumism of British goods was a 
shared experience across all colonies: „From textiles to teapots, colonists were avid 
costumers of British goods; from 1720 to 1770, colonial per capita imports from Britain 
increased by some 50 percent“ (Kierner 2003, 9) This communal happening (ironically) 
also was the basis for the occurrence and success of widespread product boycotts across 
the Atlantic seabord. Without a previous dependence and love of British products, the 
protesters wouldn’t have identified them as viable points of reference. The colonists’ 
boycotts of imports resulted in a wide range of partly obscure outcomes. Tea parties, 
clothing and even funerals became highly politicized events. For instance, in 1769 the 
South Carolina Gazette highlighted Mary Hasell Gadsden’s funeral as an example of great 
patriotism: „Many [...] have this winter clothed themselves in their own manufactures; [...] 
and a great reform is intended in the enormous expence attending funerals, [and] for 
mourning...from the patriotic example lately set by Christopher Gadsden“ (S.C. Gazette 
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cited by ibid., 83). Further, the article urges Americans to „promote INDUSTRY, 
ECONOMY, and AMERICAN MANUFACTURES, and to keep so much money 
amongst us as possible“ (ibid., 83f). 
Now that the author has shown how highly politicized common colonists were with 
regards to an economic matter like British imports and imperial policies, it is time to ask 
what effects these crowd measures had on actual trade.  
 
 
Figure 5. Value of Goods Imported from England and Scotland 1766-1775. Graph Designed by Using Data 
Table from Murrin (1999, 183) (by R.K. 2010) 
 
The above graph shows very clearly that boycotts had a tangible influence on British 
import business. For example, the opposition to the Townshend Acts 1767/1768 caused 
a subsequent decrease the value of imported goods from England and Scotland. After a 
short increase of imports, another market break occurred with the events around the 
Boston Tea Party. At the time of commence of the Revolutionary War, nearly all 
importation inclines towards zero. 
In pre-war America, a pattern of crowd action and Crown reaction can be identified with 
regards to responses to economic matters. In this circle of provocations, crowd action in 
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the colonies was usually followed by an attempt to discipline the people through new laws 
or troops, which was again succeeded by the protests of an even angrier mob and thus 
more army action, etc...The end result of this cycle of violence in the American case was 
the Revolutionary War for independence. 
There is evidence that this pattern continued even after the war was over, with the only 
difference that the role of George III was now replaced by US-American state or national 
politicians. Crowd protests, such as the Whiskey rebellion or Shay’s rebellion, were often 
met with military retaliation. However, and this is the crucial point in which the young 
union discerns from the British government, there was also a strive to find real political 
solutions to economic problems, or – if the former is impossible – to design a political 
framework in which the „wild crowds“ can be tamed: 
„[...] But ordinary Americans did influence the Constitution indirectly. During the 1780s 
relief advocates, the great majority of them farmers, frequently launched uprisings or 
warned that other people were about to revolt. The gentry class was frightened and 
infuriated, and one reason the Founding Fathers favored the Constitution was that it 
would, for the first time, give the federal government the funds it needed to field an army 
capable of suppressing farmers’ rebellions. That is what the Framers were talking about 
when they stated in the preamble to the Constitution that one of their goals was ‚to 
ensure domestic tranquility’“ (Holton 2007, 157f). 
 
To conclude, the consistency of a pattern of crowd action and grass roots’ initiatives 
caused by economic issues, such as taxes and importation, contributed to a unified 
identity of ordinary Americans. Generally, this chapter underlines once again the crucial 
importance economic issues played during the time of American unification. Its role was 
not only sensed by the elites, but the economic situation also affected the every day life of 
common Americans. 
  
Conclusion 
A review of the above chapters on production, trade, international and domestic 
challenges, and the polito-cultural implications of economic struggles shows that the 
importance of the economy in the unification process of the Northern American states 
cannot be overrated. Its significance shall be explored in depth in relation to the 
formation of the European Union in the course of this text. 
To summarize, due to a set of economic and political imperial policies after the French-
Indian War, the British colonies increasingly yearned for independence from Britain. 
During and after the Revolutionary War they were eager to find their own place in the 
global trade of the 18th century, as well as establish domestic economic stability and 
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growth. The newly independent states and their elites soon realized that the loose 
framework provided by the AoC was insufficient to serve their economic needs regarding 
fiscal, monetary and international financial security and debt release. The Constitution 
and subsequent policies, which were substantially shaped by economic concerns, 
accelerated and deepened US-American unification under a new powerful national 
government. The new economic measures allowed for free trade among the former 
colonies, gave Congress the power to tax, stipulate the growth of business, investment 
rates, and global trade. However, the process of economic unification from 1750 to 1800 
was not without inherent conflicts: I.e. the continuation of slavery in the South; citizens’ 
refusal to pay taxes (see for example the Whiskey Rebellion); The exclusion of 
unpropertied US-Americans from the spheres of political power; The progression of 
animosities between settlers and Native Americans on the Western Frontier. 
Many of these positive, as well as negative economic groundstones laid out during this 
crucial period of US-American unification still reverberate in the US political culture of 
today, if one only dares to listen to the echo: The diversion of interests between state-
level and federal-level elites; The scepticism towards taxation; The political and popular 
focus on economic issues23; A certain level of „unruliness“ (Holton 2007) with regards to 
anything remotely resembling state authority; But these are just mere observations from 
the author and shall be verified or falsified in another thesis.  
To conclude this chapter and answer the question stated at the beginning: Which 
economic factors contributed to US-American unification?  
First, there were international factors contributing and driving unification. One was to 
reinstall trust in investors to attract capital from abroad. This was achieved through 
repaying war debts and framing a political and legal system that guaranteed financial 
stability. Linked to this, the Founding Fathers were eager to build an independent 
economic bloc that could hold a place in global trade. 
Second, there were a set of domestic factors pushing unification. Monetary and fiscal 
problems, such as war debt, destabilizing state-level tax reliefs, inter-state tariffs on trade, 
and the lack of a stable currency and national coinage, could not be solved under the 
AoC. To the contrary, many economic problems were magnified or even caused by the 
AoC’s lack of instruments for efficient policy-making. The CoUSA and Hamilton’s 
                                                
23 For instance, Bill Clinton famously used the slogan “It’s the economy, stupid” in his 1992 Presidential 
Campaign. 
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subsequent monetary and fiscal policies restored justice and stability, established a free 
trade zone among the former colonies under the eyes of an empowered national 
regulator, reinstated investors’ trust and generally infused the domestic growth of the US-
American market for several years to come. 
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Pol i t i ca l  Factors 
In addition to economic factors one can also find a great number of potential political 
factors that could have influenced and/or triggered unification. In the following part of 
the thesis, the author will seek to identify these factors, taking into account the historical 
background and socio-economic developments of the time. To extract the relevant 
factors it is helpful to ask some sub-questions regarding the political unification of the 
colonies. What were the political structures and ideas like in pre-revolutionary America? 
What was the political culture like in the colonies? Which ideologies contributed to 
unification?  
First, there will be an introductory chapter on the status quo of the political sphere in 
colonial, „British“ Northern America. The author will examine the structures and ideas of 
the political world in the colonies. This is deemed necessary to reach a better 
understanding of the political status quo before the war and the historical background of 
unification. Second, the political culture of the time will be analyzed. In this chapter the 
focus will lie on the societal breeding ground on which the evolution from colony to 
independet states to union took place. Third, the author will take a look at the ideological 
reasons behind unification. Ideas of republicanism, liberty and good ruler will be put into 
context of US-American political unification. In this chapter, relevant documents 
regarding unification will be examined and analyzed. Fourth, there will be a summary and 
conclusion of the findings to bring out the political factors that contributed unification. 
 
The Nature of Government, Deference, Representation and the „Balance 
Point of Power“  
In order to understand the pre-revolutionary political and ideological structure of the 
colonies it is helpful to distinguish between three types of colonial government and 
acknowledge the diversity of political structures in colonial British America: proprietary 
colony, royal (or crown) colony, and charter colony. A proprietary colony was an early 
commercially oriented form of colonial management. It describes a form of political 
structure in which the King gives land to a so-called proprietor or proprietary company in 
order to establish a commercial outpost and reign over it. A proprietor enjoyed extensive 
rights over his colony and its inhabitants. An example of a proprietary colony was the 
Province of Pennsylvania, which was founded by William Penn in 1681. The most 
common form of a colony - the royal (or crown) colony - was ruled by a governor who 
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was appointed and could be recalled by the King. In a royal colony, the executive branch, 
i.e. the governor, was often times advised by a governor’s council. A colonial assembly 
represents the formal legislative body in a crown colony. It was, so to say, composed of 
the contemporary colonial elite: white and wealthy men of property. Virginia, for instance, 
which was named after Elizabeth I, was made a crown colony in 1624 after being a 
proprietary colony in its first years. In addition, a charter colony was perhaps the most 
autonomous and rare form of colonial government. A charter is a set of articles that 
establish government in the colony. Compared to propietary and royal colonies, Rhode 
Island, for example, received its charter in 1663 and enjoyed relative political freedom and 
governmental independence. 
How were the colonies governed in reality and which ideas shaped colonial government? 
It is fair to say that in royal colonies the governor held extensive powers. The ideal of a 
balance between order and liberty, mixed government and independent branches did not 
hold up to reality. To quote the dreams of a contemporary, Dr. William Douglass of 
Boston, the colonial governments 
„in conformity to our legislature in Great Britain...consist of three separate negatives; 
thus, by the governor, representing the King, the colonies are monarchical; by the 
Council, the [sic] are aristocratical; by a house of representatives or delegates from the 
people, the yare democratical; these three are distinct and independent of one another 
[...]“ (Douglass cited by Beeman 2004, 13f). 
 
As Beeman points out, political power in the crown colonies, which were the majority of 
colonies, „heavily tilted toward the monarchy“ (ibid., 14), thus establishing a system in 
which the governor had the license to appoint members of the assembly and judges, veto 
legislation and dissolve the assemblies (c.f. ibid., 14). 
Fittingly, the colonial structure of society and thence of politics, can be described as 
deferential. Deference is the acceptance of hierarchy and the view that this order is just 
and legitimate. The societal subordination of women, African-American slaves, and to a 
lesser degree white men without property, for instance, was mostly unquestioned at the 
time. This system of deference was closely linked to an argument that saw a causal 
reationship between property, independence and the ability to rule over others in a just 
manner. This classical republican rationale claims that property produced economic and 
consequently political independence that was deemed necessary to be a good ruler and to 
serve the public good. Wealth was also set at equal with education, which is another pre-
requisite members of this „superior class of citizens“ (ibid., 19) needed to possess in 
order to become a responsible politician. In this deferential mindset, democracy was 
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  Level	  
Colonial	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illogical, since it would lead to an unbalanced and ineffective system governed by the 
dependent, uneducated masses. Or as John Cotton, Puritan minister asked: „If the people 
be the governors, who shall be the governed?“ (Cotton cited by ibid., 19). Republicans on 
the other hand, at least the classical English kind, rooted in the idea that a large numer of 
propertied and therefore independent citizens were a potential base for good government. 
The idea of republicanism had substantial influence on the generation of the Founding 
Fathers and can be detected in many political writings of the revolutionary period. 
Politically, all colonists were British subjects and were consequently ruled by a king who 
stood at the top step of the socio-political ladder. Indeed, the assemblies had the right to 
propose legislation regarding internal affairs, but in the end Parliament in London was 
constitutionally responsible. Since there were no colonists sitting in Parliament, English 
politicians decided over laws in the colonies. Needless to say, the governor, and therefore 
indirectly the King had the final word in both domestic and external sayings. 
 
 
Figure 6. Deferential Colonial Pyramid (Simplified Version) (by R.K. 2011) 
 
With the colonies growing economic interests in foreign trade beginning around 1700, 
conflicts emerged over who ruled at home and abroad. For example, when Massachusetts 
businesses started selling food to the Carribbean, Britain saw the trade as a disruption of 
its laws and started to tax those customs (see Navigation Acts). New voices in the 
colonies proposed that the English Parliament should have more say in the proceedings 
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of colonial affairs. According to some colonists - and later to popular opinion - the 
colonial assemblies should be represented in Parliament. The goal was to build 
„parliamentary sovereignty, not popular sovereignty“ (ibid., 11), since the latter would 
suggest a democratic system, which was considered undesirable. Within this discussion, 
the challenge of representation became an especially contested issue during the Stamp Act 
Crisis. The idea of virtual representation, put forward by British imperialists, meant that, 
„each member of Parliament was alleged to represent the interests of all Britain and the 
empire, not just those of his constituents“ (Kierner 2003, 58). Politically admissible 
colonists (white men of property) criticized this concept and demanded actual 
representation in Parliament. These men were already used to vote for members in their 
assemblies and therefore self-confidently argued that only if they had the power to elect 
their representatives in Parliament directly, Parliament possessed the right to legislate 
taxation of the colonies. The slogan „No taxation without representation” was born and 
became an instant hit with the revolutionary-minded wealthy and the colonial masses (c.f. 
ibid., 58). Daniel Dulany, a wealthy man from Maryland, argued famously in 1765 that to 
„give property not belonging to the giver and without consent of the owner is such 
evident and flagrant injustice in ordinary caese that few are hardy enough to avow it. [...] 
not a single actual elector in Great Britain might be immediately affected by taxation in 
America opposed by a statute which would have a general operation and effect upon the 
properties and inhabitants of he colonies“ (Dulany cited by ibid., 67f). 
 
However, it is very important to point out that most of the colonists, wealthy or poor, did 
not question the deferential system itself, but their level in the hierarchy. To put it simply, 
the colonial assemblies – the wealthy gentry - wanted to gain a better place in the food 
chain of British politics, without overthrowing the King (as later happened in the French 
Revolution). They did not want a change of system, but a change of working procedures 
within the system. The central question for this chapter therefore is NOT if the people 
wanted to overthrow the government and start a revolution from the outside, but rather 
how far the system was pushed to its limits from within until it reached a breaking point. 
Beeman points out that „the rise to prominence and dominance of the lower houses of 
assembly“ (Beeman 2004, 14) was not only happening in America. England itself saw a 
similar development of institutions. The difference, however, was that in the colonies, the 
class system was not as entrenched as in England, and society all in all was more diverse 
and volatile, predicting better chances for substantial political change stemming from the 
informal sphere of politics. 
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Due to a number of changes in colonial North America like demographic change through 
immigration increase and growing economic wealth in the upper crusts of society, the old 
rigid hierarchy was undermined and a new, more responsive system was proposed. To 
summarize, pre-revolutionary politics in Britain as well as in America were characterized 
by a discussion about people’s placement within a hierarchy, the nature of representation 
within the Parliamentary system and the equilibrium of power. As Beeman states, after 
years of monarchical tyranny under the Stuart Kings they „believed that governments 
were necessary to preserve order and liberty in society, but they also believed that too 
great a concentration of power within government might endanger the very order and 
liberty that governments were instituted to secure“ (ibid., 29).  
But however big the ideological similarities between the two species of Englishmen on 
both sides of the Atlantic, one of them broke with traditions and built a union of 
independent states. In the above chapter the author discussed the formal sphere of 
politics, i.e. the British institutional structures in the colonies, and the political theories 
prevailing at the time. The following pages will answer why this political change was 
possible and which political and societal factors accomodated it. 
 
Political Culture and the Societal Breeding Grounds for a Unified Spirit 
Almond and Verba define political culture as “political orientations – attitudes toward the 
political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the 
system” (Almond/ Verba 1963, 13). Political culture is different than political thought in 
the sense that it bears an additional notion of action. It is a concept that emphasizes the 
deeds of political actors, and their words. Therefore, political culture allows us to 
understand the political expressions of marginalized groups such as seamen, which often 
lack the ability to communicate their attitudes through “traditional” media, for example 
through pamphlets, newspaper articles,…; 
The concept of political culture, however, does not try to mute the importance of political 
ideology, it just looks at it from an outcome-oriented angle. Which and how do people 
implement their ideas into their lives? Which kind of methods do actors use to voice and 
achieve their goals? How do they establish patterns of communication? Adapting this 
approach for social science research offers new access into the understanding of the 
broader social formations and events that caused US-American unification. So in order to 
see how the colonists filled the American Revolution with life, it is useful to take a closer 
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look at the people who spearheaded the political change. Since the inhabitants of urban 
areas along the Atlantic coast of Northern America play a vital role in the dawn of the 
Revolution, the following paragraphs will focus on this „mob“ culture as it was 
sometimes called by their fearful contemporaries. 
In 1774, Gouvernor Morris of New York, who himself was an adversary of British 
imperial law, began to be alarmed by the crowd action: „The mob begin to think and 
reason. Poor reptiles! It is with them a vernal morning; they are struggling to cast off their 
winter’s slough, they bask in the sunshine, and ere noon they will bite, depend upon it“ 
(Morris cited by Kierner 2003, 103). 
So what did the „mob“ do to trigger uneasiness with the authorities? First, the denizens 
of these waterfront cities lived in close quarters. This is especially true for Boston, which 
in the 18th century formed an island only connected to the main land by a narrow 
bottleneck. The waterfront was an area full of wharfes, maritime businesses and living 
quarters. Due to the limitedness of space, people of different classes and occupations 
lived in close proximity to each other. Thus, all social groups were aware of the others’ 
living conditions. Carp defines this social interaction as a „’face-to-face’ society of 
eighteenth-century Boston“ (Carp 2007, 29). This circumstance contributed to a high 
level of political conscience about societal differences in all classes of maritime society. 
The knowledge of their neighbor’s situation caused both solidarity and envy/fear. 
However, it also increased the immediacy and noticability of socio-economic change and 
thus raising awareness of political challenges. 
Second, the inhabitants of the waterfront were aware of their embedment in the British 
Atlantic world. Due to global shipping trade, the presence of British authorities (Vice 
Admiralty Court, Customs House Office, Royal Navy) and the constant fluctuation of 
people, the waterfront outlook on life was „wordly“ in the literal sense of the word. 
Third, due to high mobility of seamen, news travelled fast through the harbour towns of 
the Atlantic coast, thus accomodating intercolonial communication and consequently 
unified political action (c.f. ibid., 23-61). 
One of the political issues at the time is a good example to illustrate the above 
observations about the „mob’s“ political culture. So-called impressment is the act of 
forcing seamen into working for the Royal Navy. „Press gangs“ often resorted to violence 
to coerce seamen onto military ships, which offered worse living conditions and lower 
wages than merchant business. The act of impressment was highly criticized by the 
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colonial community some even compared the method to slavery. One such impressment 
incidence regarding a vessel from Marblehead and a Boston station ship was reported by 
Thomas Hutchinson. The sailors reacted as follows, “The seamen had shut themselves up 
in the forepeak, and had furnished themselves with harpoons, and other weapons, but 
nor fire arms, and swore they would die before they would be taken, and that they 
preferred death to slavery” (Hutchinson 1936, 167). Due to the existence of a „face-to-
face society“, a sensitivity about global events and a developing intercolonial discussion 
culture, different classes of society mobilized politically against impressment. Some 
marginalized groups even resorted to radicalization and violence advancing the already 
tense relationship between colonists and British officials. Another example would be the 
„Destruction of the Tea“ of the unified protests against the Stamp Act. 
 
Now that we have looked at the urban living conditions and political conscience of the 
waterfront societies at the Atlantic seabord, it is time to examine the methods these actors 
used to vent their anger against the British imperialists: Boycotts of British goods were 
aimed at hurting the empire where it pained most: the economy. Wealthy merchants, 
marine artisans, seamen and the rural population - shortly nearly all of colonial society - 
worked together to boycott British goods. Not only was there a non-consumption of 
imported products, but also some active efforts to destroy British goods. 
To work around the shortage of supplies that soon afflicted colonial society, resourceful 
captains and seamen exercised smuggling. The majority of colonists didn’t grasp this 
transfer of goods as an illegal activity, but rather as a necessary act of resistance against 
imperial policy: „ Seamen, crowds, and merchants were demonstrating their ability to 
draw upon their collective strength and act together in the interests of commerce and the 
smooth operation of maritime life“ (Carp 2007, 40). 
Besides economic methods, „the mob“ also used physical force to voice their opposition 
against British authorities. Next to banishing officials from the cities by force, from the 
beginning of the imperial crisis until the start of the Revolutionary War, colonists used 
tarring and feathering as a way of humiliating public figures. Tarring and feathering stems 
from a maritime tradition in which the naked victim is greased with tar used in 
shipbuilding and then covered in feathers to ridicule the person. What sounds like a 
harmless tradition on paper was a violent action inflicting great pain and public 
humiliation in reality: „When customs official John Malcolm struck George R. T. Hewes 
in the head in 1774, a crowd tarred Malcolm to such a brutal extent that a portion of his 
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skin peeled off, which he preserved for a voyage to England as a demonstration of his 
sacrifice“ (ibid., 53). 
Additionally, the crowds destructed imperial property or property belonging to allies of 
the crown. So was the case with Thomas Hutchinson’s House, which was destroyed in 
1765. Hutchinson, a Massachusetts native and lieutenant gouvernor who oversaw the 
implementation of British laws, soon became the target of Bostonian rioters. He wrote to 
a friend: „You cannot receive the wretched state we are in [...] On the one hand it will be 
said if concessions be made the Parliament endanger the loss of their authority overthe 
colonies; on the other hand if external force should be used there seems to be danger of a 
lasting alienation of affection“ (Hutchinson cited by Kierner 2003, 71). History proved 
Hutchinson’s political assessment correct. The „alienation of affection“ was finalised only 
one decade later with the Declaration of Independence. 
Another method of „mob action“ was effigy burning. Traditionally used on Pope’s Day in 
Boston as an anti-catholic ritual, in which the North Side competed with the South Side 
by burning effigies, the tradition became politicized during the years before the 
Revolution. As a response to the Stamp Act, on „August 14, the crowd hung effigies of 
local stamp officer Andrew Oliver and the King’s former tutor Lord Bute, from the 
Liberty Tree [...]. Finally the crowds ‚stamped’ and burned the effigy on Fort Hill, 
overlooking the water, where British official could clearly see the bonfire from Castle 
William“ (Carp 2007, 41). 
The methods of political protest described above were often times preceded and followed 
by a range of written and spoken political announcements. Pamphlets were printed and 
handed out or published in opposition newspapers. In addition to written 
communication, songs and poems such as the liberty song were composed to jolly the 
crowd along: 
„Come join hand in hand brave Americans all, 
And rouse your bold hearts at fair Liberty’s call; 
No tyrannous acts shall suppress your just claim, 
Or stain with dishonour America’s name. 
 
In Freedom we’re born and in Freedom we’ll live, 
Our purses are ready, 
Steady, Friends, Steady, 
Not as slaves, but as Freemen our money we’ll give. 
[...]“ (cited by Kierner 2003, 82). 
 
In taverns and group meetings people of different backgrounds came together and 
discussed the political events in the colonies and which kind of action to take. Since many 
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of the crowd members were illiterate, speakers held lectures and read from the pamphlets 
and newspapers. Through the advantages of maritime mobility and the circulation of 
gazettes, an intercolonial network of political communication span from New England to 
Georgia and helped convert the waterfront cities into revolutionary hot beds. 
The above paragraphs show that the urban areas at the Atlantic coast were the epicenters 
of political mobilization. From these cities, the local flames of resistance spread inland 
and placed the entire colonial territory under a political bushfire that exploded with the 
beginning of the Revolutionary War. In 1774, for instance, John Adams overheard 
farmers in a rural Shrewsbury tavern discuss the seizure of wharves in Boston: „If 
parliament can take away Mr. Hancock’s Wharf and Mr. Rowe’s wharf, they can take away 
your barn and my house“ (Adams cited by Carp 2007, 58). 
In addition to the factors that promoted urban protest, the colonists in rural as well as in 
urban areas were used to a „localist“ system in which problems were solved directly and 
immediately at the town level thus building an uncomplicated and accessible foundation 
for political involvement at the lowest institutional level24 (c.f. Beeman 2004, 27f). 
 
To summarize the findings from this chapter on political culture, the first thing that 
comes to mind is that the waterfront communities on the Atlantic coast were microcosms 
of what should happen later in nearly all areas of the colonies. In pre-revolutionary 
America, the political culture was characterized by an increase in popular mobilization 
against British hegemony. The maritime citizens used their „community of interests“ to 
fight an often violent fight with a range of methods (boycotts, riots, effigy burning, 
tarring&feathering,...) against imperial authorities. These occurrences of crowd action 
then spread to the countryside with the help of intercolonial communication networks 
(travellers, newspapers, pamphlets, meetings,...). 
The second and crucial discovery from this chapter is that, a share of political interests 
overrode the hurdles of societal diversity. Urban denizens fought alongside farmers, and 
liberal Whigs, although sometimes sceptical about the methods of the „mob“, in principle 
shared their fellow moneyless countrymen’s views on Britain. The colonists, wealthy or 
poor, seemed to share a certain political outlook. Their least common denominator was a 
growing dissatisfaction with British imperial policies, including but not limited to the 
                                                
24 These open „town hall meetings“ exist until today and rose to prominence again during the Presidential 
race of 2008 when the candidates Obama and McCain both engaged in town hall discussions and a TV 
network even adapted this method of political forum for a televised debate. 
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challenge of Parliamentary representation and the taxation of goods. This „unification of 
interests“ was a precursor for a „unification of states“. It is not to say that this 
concurrence of interests was necessary for the building of the political union, but it was 
certainly helpful for the Founding Fathers to have a majority of citizens at hand that – in 
some sense – shared an identity. Even if the colonists’ identities were „only“ defined by 
what they disapproved of, i.e. being controlled by the British Empire. 
 
Political Ideas and Unification – The Advent of Liberty and Republic 
In the following chapter, which touches on subjects of political theory, the author will 
examine three main questions: What were the major contemporary political ideas behind 
the American Revolution and thus US-American unification? How were these ideas 
manifested in the founding documents? How did these political ideas influence and 
enforce unification? First, the author will define and explain the major political ideas of 
the time that played a role in the unification of the states. The three central terms to reach 
an understanding of the „enlightened“ intellectual framework in which the Founders 
developed their thoughts are: liberty, republic, and checks & balance. Second, there will 
be a review of these political ideas and their manifestation in the founding documents, i.e. 
in the Declaration of Independence and the US-American Constitution. Third and last, 
the author will summarize her findings and explore the potential relation between political 
ideas and unification in case of the USA.  
So which were the main political ideas at the time in the colonies and where did they stem 
from? Many scholars have pointed out the intellectual influence of the Scottish 
Enlightenment on the developments in the Northern Americas. The historian Daniel 
Walker Howe, for example, called attention to the effects thinkers like Adam Smith or 
David Hume had on the minds of the Framers. The great influence these Scottish 
philosophers had on the Northern American elites can be partly explained through the 
many societal similarities between 18th century Scotland and the British colonies. Both 
were economically and politically dependent on their „Big Brother England“, both were 
culturally peripheral territories compared to the central status of London, and both shared 
a proud commitment towards their own people and – at least – partial independence and 
liberties (c.f. ibid., 572-587). 
What were the central features of the Scottish Enlightenment? Although there are many 
thinkers and therefore countless facets to the movement, there are some basic ideas that 
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the Americen statesmen borrowed and used for their own good. The Scots, for instance, 
were concerned „with unintended outcomes“ (ibid., 584) of political processes and 
focussed strongly on economic developments linked to societal growth. 
But as Howe points out, „the American Constitution should not be thought of as a 
timeless document received by a grateful nation through an almost super-natural ‚miracle 
at Philadelphia.’ It was the creation of a particular time, place, and social group“ (ibid., 
586). Thus, the Framers not only picked ideas from the Scottish Enlightenment to help 
formulate their documents, they were also affected by, what Kierner calls, „the impact of 
current events“ (Kierner 2003, 120). Jefferson’s preamble to the constitution of the state 
Virginia, for example, strongly resembled that of the Declaration (c.f. ibid., 120). 
Additionally, the Declaration in particular „drew on a range of conventional ideas widely 
shared by eighteenth-century Americans“ (ibid., 120). What were these political ideas that 
were manifested in the Declaration and the Constiution at that „particular time, place, and 
social group“? 
 
Liberty 
First and foremost, liberty is one of the central terms of American unification. But as 
great the word sounds and as useful it is to evoke emotional pictures of happy masses 
swinging independence flags, the term liberty poses a severe problem to the scholar when 
it comes to its clear definition. The meaning of the word liberty differs greatly depending 
on the historical context and the group, which uses the term. To pick up the perhaps 
most extreme example again, liberty meant something different to the poor seaman 
during the Boston Tea Party, than it did to the liberal urban Whig in one of his discussion 
circles. To the former it was an expression equatable to sensible personal freedom from 
abuse by, for instance, British press gangs. To the latter it was a more abstract term 
closely related to economic freedom, free will and political independence from the 
motherland. However large the socio-economic and cultural cleavage between the diverse 
colonial groups was, they nevertheless found common linguistic ground in this term, as 
can be witnessed by the many „lieux de mémoire“25 of the early stages of the United 
                                                
25 „Lieux de mémoire“ is a concept of collective memory developed be thy French historian Pierre Nora. 
The „lieux“ (=places) of memory function as societal embodiments of historical events and as touchstones 
for the self-identification of a given society. They can take the form of statues, monuments, documents, but 
also rituals (c.f. Nora 1999). In case of US-American history, a lieu de mémoire would for instance be the 
Declaration of Independence, the Lincoln Memorial in Washington D.C. or Independence Day on the 4th 
of July. 
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States in which the word liberty functions as a unifying and at the same time equalizing 
parole: Statue of Liberty, Liberty Tree, Liberty Song, Liberty Bell,...: 
                                            
Figure 7. Liberty Bell, Philadelphia. The engraving reads: „Proclaim LIBERTY throughout all the land unto all 
the inhabitants thereof“ (Leviticus 25:10). Legend has it that the bell was rung to announce the reading of 
the Declaration of Independence on July 8th, 1776. The bell became a national symbol of independence 
after the Civil War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Liberty_Bell_2008.jpg, 8.2.2011) 
 
Bernard Baylin, in his standard work „The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution“, solved the definitory challenge by juxtaposing the term liberty to the term 
power: „[Power’s, R.K.] natural prey, its necessary victim, was liberty, or law or right“ 
(Baylin 1967, 57). In Baylin’s argumentation, there exist the sphere of power and the 
sphere of liberty. 
„The one was brutal, ceaselessly active, and heedless; the other was delicate, passive, and 
sensitive. The one must be resisted, the other defended, and the two ‚must never be 
confused’ [...]. [P]ower in its legitimate form inhered naturally in government and was the 
possession and interest of those who controlled government [...]. Liberty was not, 
therefore, for the colonists, as it is for us, professedly the interest and concern of all, 
governors and governed alike, but only of the governed“ (ibid., 58f).  
 
Consequently, liberty must be fought for by the governed, since the governors would 
never voluntarily give up their reign over the sphere of power. But what exactly 
constitutes the state of liberty once achieved? „Liberty, that is, was the capacity to 
exercise ‚natural rights’ within limits set not by the mere will or desire of men in power 
but by non-arbitrary law – law enacted by legislatures containing within them the proper 
balance of forces“ (ibid., 77). Liberty, in connection to „natural rights“ is an unalienable 
status of human freedom that is filled with life in a legislative framework ultimately 
controlled by the governed. Ergo, keeping in mind the delicate nature of liberty, the 
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governmental framework itself has to be protected from the razing grasp of monopolous 
power by a set of rules that prohibit one faction to take control over another. 
It’s necessary to mention that for many „enlightened gentlemen“ government itself was 
rather a necessary evil, than a truly desirable form of societal management: „[H]ere then is 
the origin and rise of government; namely, a mode rendered necessary by the inability of 
moral virtue to govern the world“ (Paine 1776, 3). Thomas Paine points out the 
differences between society and government in the first part of his seminal text 
„Common Sense“, which is perhaps the best example of radical political skepticism by a 
member of the colonial elite. In his view, 
„[S]ociety is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former 
promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by 
restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The 
first is a patron, the last a punisher. Society in every state is a blessing, but Government, 
even in its best state, is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one“ (ibid., 1). 
 
Paine argues that a society of a small number of people can easily retain a state of „natural 
liberty“. In case the population increases and immigrants arrive, the defection from moral 
virtue cannot be regulated and punished by all the people of the village, but have to 
transferred to a higher level: 
„But as the Colony increases, the public concerns will increase likewise, and the distance 
at which the members may be separated, will render it too inconvenient for all of them to 
meet on every occasion as at first [...]. This will point out the convenience of their 
consenting to leave the legislative part to be managed by a select number chosen from the 
whole body, who are supposed to have the same concerns at stake which those have who 
appointed them, and who will act in the same manner as the whole body would act were 
they present“ (ibid., 2). 
 
Since Paine was deeply embedded in the critical mindset of the 18th century, in his 
opinion, the members of government could not be trusted to be of moral virtue and to 
put their own interests behind the concerns of their constituents. Therefore, Paine 
suggested a transparent and easy governmental frame to minimize corruption and misuse 
as supposedly was the case with the English constitution: „I draw my idea of the form of 
government from a principle in nature which no art can overturn, viz. that the more 
simple any thing is, the less liable it is to be disordered, and the easier repaired when 
disordered“ (ibid., 3). 
 
Judging from the previous paragraphs on liberty and government it becomes clear what 
kind of political system the colonists did not want. They refused a governmental body, in 
which power could be seized too easily by men of no „moral virtue“ or by factions that 
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worked against the „public good“ (which was basically the right of men to acquire 
property and work himself up the social ladder, i.e. liberty). In order to argue in favor of 
independence and to provide a negative example of what their government should not 
look like, the Framers reviewed the history they knew best. They concluded that the 
English with their long list of tyrants, oligarchs and even „mob rulers“ were the kind of 
bad archetype they wished to avoid. The graph below shows the three basic societal 
classes, forms of government and dangers deriving thereof, that the colonists wanted to 
avoid like the plague: 
 
Societal Class Royalty Nobility Commons 
Form of 
Government 
Monarchy Aristocracy Democracy 
Abusal Danger Tyranny Oligarchy „Mob rule“ 
 
Figure 8. Societal Classes, Forms of Government, and Abusal Dangers Thereof as Perceived by 18th 
Century Political Writers (by R.K. 2011) 
 
As already mentioned, the colonists did not – at least for a long time – question the 
(deferential) order of society itself, but rather each faction’s inherent tendency to abuse 
their power within government. 
In the 1770s though, during the imperial crisis, the desirable equilibrium of power in the 
Atlantic world had deteriorated, at least in the opinion of the majority of colonists. In a 
concurrence of events that were of economic, political and cultural manner, the 
opportunity arose to form a government completely free from British influence. For the 
Framers, it was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to design a government from scratch. 
Only rarely in history exists a window of opportunity, a sort of political tabula rasa in 
which theory and the study of historical experience can be so thoroughly implemented 
into the creation of a new political system from scratch. 
The Founding Fathers clearly learned their lessons from English history and 
Enlightenment philosophy about what kinds of pitfalls to avoid in a political union. But 
did they have some positive examples to look at regarding the design of a political 
system? 
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Republic 
First, Paine and Madison both mention Holland and Switzerland as efficacious models of 
federal goverments. In his long list of arguments against colonial dependence on Britain, 
Paine mentions that only the European republics enjoy peace, while the European 
monarchies tend to fight each other or cause conflicts within their respective country. 
„The republics of Europe are all (and we may say always) in peace. Holland and 
Switzerland are without wars, foreign or domestic; monarchical governments, it is true, 
are never long at rest;“ (Paine 1776, 15). In Federalist Paper No. 43, Madison even quotes 
Montesquieu to underline his argument that a republican government is perhaps the only 
model to protect a society from the shortcomings of monarchies or aristocracies: 
„In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican 
members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the 
system against aristocratic or monarchial innovations. [...] Governments of dissimilar 
principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort, than 
those of a kindred nature. ‚As the confederate republic of Germany,’ says Montesquieu, 
‚consists of free cities and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us 
that it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland.’“ (Madison 1788, FP#43). 
 
These are only two of the more prominent examples of the many political texts that 
suggest the formation of a republican system of government in the young union. A 
republic, in the mind of the majority of 18th century American thinkers, was the best 
barrier against the dangers of a power-hungry monarchy and aristocracy. 
A republic does not depend on a hereditary process. The representative members of 
government are being elected by the constituents only for a limited term, so there is no 
danger of power being in the hands of a few people over a longer period of time, which 
supposedly leads to a deterioration of morale. Since the members cannot pass their seat 
on to someone who was not explicitly voted for by the electorate, a hereditary mechanism 
is automatically ruled out in a republic. Why is a hereditary system bad in itself and should 
be avoided at all costs? Thomas Paine, as always, provides the answer eloquently in the 
second chapter of Common Sense:  „One of the strongest natural proofs of the folly of 
hereditary right in kings, is, that nature disapproves it, otherwise, she would not so 
frequently turn it into ridicule by giving mankind an ass for a lion“ (Paine 1776, 7). In his 
opinion, monarchy in general, and its mechanism of hereditary succession in particular, 
„opens a door to the foolish, the wicked, and the improper“ (ibid., 8). From historical 
experience, Paine and many of his contemporaries concluded that only a republican form 
of government with recurring elections will provide for a system that minimizes the 
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dangers of corruption, misuse and power concentration. In a letter to George Washington 
from 1792, Jefferson wrote that, 
„ I hold it to be one of the distinguishing excellencies of elective over hereditary 
successions, that the talents, which nature has provided in sufficient proportion, should 
be selected by the society for the government of their affairs, rather than that this should 
be transmitted through the loins or knaves & fools passing from the debauches of the 
table to those of the bed“ (Jefferson cited by Peterson 1975, 462). 
 
In his opinion, the past has proved that a government based on inherited power tends to 
deteriorate over generations and ends up with a structure of decadence and debauchery. 
30 years later, during his closeted26 presidential campaign, Thomas Jefferson argued in a 
letter to Elbridge Gerry in 1799 that, 
„I am opposed to the monarchising it’s [the constitution’s, R.K.] features by the forms of 
it’s administration, with a view to conciliate a first transition to a President & Senate for 
life, & from that to a hereditary tenure of these offices, & thus to worm out the lective 
principle“ (Jefferson cited by Peterson 1975, 477f). 
 
From the quote one can see that even though the Constitution had been implemented for 
over one decade, Jefferson still employed an inherent fear that the young union would 
become „monarchised“ by its opponents after Washington would leave office. Jefferson 
was scared the USA would be falling back into European patterns of hereditary 
succession. This letter illustrates what we 21st century-inhabitants might forget looking at 
the more or less stable US nowadays. For the contemporaries of Jefferson the union was 
a fragile republican experiment that could be destructed by outside forces or domestic 
factions every second and should therefore be guarded like a precious gem. The 
continuing success of the union from the perspective of 1800 was more like a lottery with 
uncertain outcomes than an established truth. Accordingly, one of the first lessons of this 
thesis, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is that a union, at least in the case of the 
early USA, has to go through a (sometimes) painful phase of consolidation before 
reaching a turning point towards a period of stability. This argument becomes more 
substantial when looking at the even hysterical writings of US-American politicians at this 
infancy period of the union, which prophesized all kinds of dangers to destruct the 
republic. 
 
                                                
26 In the early period of US Presidential Elections it was not common to openly run for the highest office. 
The candidates competed against each other in a kind of open secrecy, that should protect their status as 
gentlemen. 
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Second, next to the elective principle and the negation of hereditary succession, a 
republic, i.e. a republican constitution like in the United States, has the supposed 
advantage of providing checks & balances to stabilize the government and secure it from 
exterior influence and domestic power struggles. What are checks & balance and why 
were they so important to the early US-American political thinkers? Checks & balances 
are a set of formulas engrained in the Constitution to achieve a mutual protection of the 
three governmental branches from each other, i.e. to ensure their separation of power. 
The idea of  checks & balances is strongly linked to the Enlightenment credo of mixed 
government27. By dividing the government into three branches (judicial, executive, 
legislative) the risk of being taken over by repressive forces at the same time can be 
minimized. Checks&balances has its root in the belief that the sphere of power is a 
malign force which constantly threatens the sphere of liberty and should consequently be 
corraled and observed. In case of republican government, checks and balances should be 
the gatekeepers that protect the liberty of the separated branches of government from the 
grabbing hands of power. The most famous argument in favor of checks & balances is 
perhaps by James Madison in Federalist Paper No. 51, in which he asserts that, 
„each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so 
constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the 
appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it 
would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and 
judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, 
through channels having no communication whatever with one another“ (Madison 1788, 
FP #51). 
 
Furthermore, Madison demands independent members of government, but admits that 
people can’t be trusted easily. Again, a protection against the malice of human decision-
making is necessary: 
„But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If 
men were angels, no government would be necessary. [...] In framing a government which 
is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first 
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself “ (ibid., FP #51). 
 
Madison however, a man of pragmatism, anticipates that in a republican government, the 
legislative branch dominates naturally at the expense of the executive department. Hence, 
the legislative should be divided into two chambers, while the executive should be 
fortified. With regards to the States’ positions relative to the federal Union, Madison 
reasons that the federal constitution should „perfectly correspond“ to the State 
                                                
27 See for instance Montesquieu’s writings. 
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constitutions.  He assures his readers that in this „compound republic of America“ the 
„different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be 
controlled by itself“ (ibid., FP #51). This sentence, probably not at the center of attention 
of scholars of American Politics, is nevertheless substantial for the subject of this thesis. 
Political unification in the US was influenced by the idea that mutual control (states – 
federal government, state - state, people – state, judicial – legislative – executive), is a 
necessary and desirable mechanism of politics that enables a country to flourish. The 
factor „control“, in American speech „checks & balance“, triggered unification in so far 
as the establishment of an entangled system of mutual observation and protection against 
power misuse provided the whole community with never before experienced security 
from tyranny, oligarchy and „mob rule“. For this republic to work it needed more than 
one actor to check & balance with, it needed a whole complex system of control points 
and departments, be it between citizen and state, state and federal government, or 
between judicial, legislative and executive branch in each of the state capitals or in 
Washington, D.C. The rationale was as follows: The more actors involved in this system 
of checks & balance, the higher the security for all that liberty would be preserved28. If 
this hypothesis about the reasons for political unification also rings true with the 
formation of the European Union, will be examined later in this thesis. To summarize, 
checks & balance are a set of control mechanisms that should contain the „encroaching 
nature of power“, which „if it at first meets with no control creeps by degrees and quick 
subsidies the whole“ (different authors cited by Baylin 1967, 56). 
 
Third, the political elite of the 18th century discussed the advantages of republican 
government while constantly reminding themselves of the disadvantages of a democratic 
system. Next to  monarchic or aristocratic dominion, which were automatically ruled out 
by their practice of hereditary succession and bad historic reputation, the democratic 
system was the only alternative to a republican system. 
How did political theorists of the 18th century define democracy and what were their 
historical reference points? Democratic elements in the union were often mentioned in 
one sentence with the destructive power of untamed crowds, an uncontrolled cacophony 
of popular voices and - in the worst case – violent „mob rule“, group secession, and 
                                                
28 This system of mutual containment holds some interesting contradictions for present day readers, most 
importantly the somewhat paradoxical combination of liberty and security. 
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rebellion. When the thinkers of the American Revolution considered democracy in a 
theoretical context, they associated it with the ancient world, often with the „original“ 
form of democracy supposedly practized in Athens29. Furthermore, they referred to 
works of the European Enlightenment. James Madison, the „Father of the Constitution“ 
and the writer of the Federalist Papers, for instance, received a book package by Thomas 
Jefferson from France in 1786, which contained Plutarch’s „Lives of the Noble Greeks 
and Romans“ or Barthélemy d Felice’s „Code de l’humanité, ou La legislation universelle, 
naturelle, civile et politique“. Madison, through the study of philosophy, history, and his 
own experience in the young union, concluded that „the Founders had rescued white 
Americans from kingly depotism only to subject them to something wors; the tyranny of 
‚the major number of the constituents’“ (Holton 2007, 7). 
Madison was not alone in this opinion, that popular will, i.e. „an excess of democracy“, as 
Hamilton or Gerry would have coined it, was a severe threat to the new union. They 
came to this conclusion, because the strength of democratic elements in the state 
constitutions, more precise, the states’ responsiveness to the will of the debtors had 
supposedly brought the union and its parts down into an economic and political muddle. 
The Framers „lamented that excessive democracy – an overreliance on the popular will – 
had turned the United States into a farmers’ paradise“ (ibid., 12), while the creditors 
experienced great injustices. The white political elite of the United States, often 
themselves wealthy creditors, equated democracy with threats of rebellion and financial 
unfairness. 
But next to the fear of insurrection and „mob rule“ that might disrupt the union’s 
stability, democracy also held another risk for the US-American elite: The popular strive 
for equality. Not only did democracy allow white farmers to voice their opinions and 
influence their government through their vote, but the idea of democracy also appealed to 
African American slaves and women of all ethnicities, who dreamt of political 
representation and equality.  A commenter in Southern newspaper complained that „we 
became intoxicated with Utopian ideas“ (cited by Holton 2007, 165), while Edward 
Rutledge of South Carolina argued that, „the spirit of subordination had evaporated“ 
during the Revolutionary War (Rutledge cited by ibid., 165). 
US-American society during the period of unification differed widely in its sympathy for 
democracy. While the elite feared the powers of the vox populi, the majority of the 
                                                
29 Democracy in Athens does not compare to a 21st century view on democracy, since only a very small 
portion of society was allowed to vote 
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American populace embraced the idea that with independence a new era of politics would 
commence. Holton summarizes that, „[f]or one group, the Revolutionary War had only 
disconnected us from Great Britain. Few internal changes were required. Other citizens 
felt differently. They believed the American Revolution had only begun“ (ibid., 176). The 
white male framers, most of them fearful of democracy, were motivated to „determine 
just how far they could go in limiting popular influence on the new regime without 
sacrificing popular support“ (ibid., 193). 
James Madison not only wrote a memorable argument in favor of checks & balances, he 
also voiced his support of a union that would protect from the perils of „Domestic 
Faction and Insurrection“ (Madison 1787, FP #10), since „[a]mong the numerous 
advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately 
developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction“ (ibid., FP #10). 
Implicitly, the text can be interpreted as reasoning against the adoption of too many 
democratically responsive elements in the CoUSA. In the text Federalist No. 10, he 
defines a faction as „a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority 
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of 
interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community“ (ibid., FP #10). Madison fears that these factions could 
insurrect and violently force the other parts of society to conform to their will, even 
though their will is opposed to the common good. To cure the dangers of faction, 
Madison proposes two ways; First, to remove the faction’s cause, which he rules out as a 
possibility since neither the repression of liberty nor the equalization of opinions is 
desirable or doable; Or second, to control the faction’s effects by forming a democracy or 
a republic. The „Father of the Constitution“ argues that, 
„a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, 
who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the 
mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a 
majority of the whole; [...] [D]emocracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and 
contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of 
property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their 
deaths“ (ibid., FP #10). 
 
Madison defines a democracy as system in which the members of government equal the 
members of society. Therefore, democracy can only have a prospect in a very small 
society, because in a civilization with a large population, direct government through 
personal involvement is logistically impossible. As Thomas Paine noted in another 
context in „Common Sense“, the sheer geographical distance and organizational efforts 
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of convening and governing cannot be managed if a certain population quantity is 
reached. But even in „small enough“ societies, democracy is not a desirable form of 
government since, according to Madison democracy does not protect society from the 
perils of faction, which could be insurrection and violence. Democracy does not only fail 
to guard from the multitude of these egotistical interest groups, it supposedly even 
encourages the formation of factions by allowing everyone to voice their opinion, 
manipulate others and form suitable coalitions. The result of democratical government 
would be instability, violence and a general centripetality of societal forces all going in 
different directions. As an alternative, Madison proposes, 
„[a] republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes 
place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. [...] 
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the 
delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the 
rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which 
the latter may be extended“ (ibid., FP #10) 
 
Republics, as opposed to democracies, are managed through an elected government, 
which represents the society as a whole. Through the mechanism of representation, it is 
not necessary for every constituent to disrupt his home life, travel to a convention place, 
and try to govern with all the other members of society, while having to endure the 
dangers of faction. Thus, a republic is a convenient and logical form of government for a 
large and geographically dispersed society. 
Besides this practical argument, the size of the elected government has to undergo a 
finetuning so that it finds its balance point,  „[T]he representatives must be raised to a 
certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it 
may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion 
of a multitude“ (ibid., FP #10). The larger the electorate, the less prone it is to chose 
corrupt candidates, since the pool of possible representatives is large and therefore people 
have more choices. The elected government will be small in number and therefore more 
able to find compromises and avoid factions than a large democratic government 
composed of a multitude of interests. 
The same principle that makes a republic more desirable than a democracy, „is enjoyed by 
the Union over the States composing it [...] The influence of factious leaders may kindle a 
flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration 
through the other States“ (ibid., FP #10). 
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But in order to not lose the sense for local interests, Madison states that the balance of 
representation between states and federal government has to be acknowledged. The 
common interest of the whole US-American body should be represented in the Union, 
while the local interest should be accounted for by the States, „The federal Constitution 
forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being 
referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures“ (ibid., FP #10). 
To conclude, the idea that colonized the political thoughts of the American elite was that 
of the republic. This form of goverment offered the elective principle instead of 
hereditary succession, provided for a set of checks & balances to keep the grasping hands 
of tyrannical powers at the gates, and was a viable alternative to the democratical form of 
government, that would inevitably spread violence, question the beloved system of 
subordinance (of slaves and women), and open the doors for factions. In contrast to the 
idea of liberty, which besides its multiplicity of interpretations was a common 
denominator of different social groups, the idea of republican government was mostly 
discussed within the higher circles of US-American society and reflects their mind-set. 
The republican framework was the house that should host the new union. It was an idea 
that provided the Framers with an alternative to the old forms of government. During the 
unification process it became inevitable that there needed to be some sort of political 
structure in which the union could operate, function and bloom. Searching for options, 
the only possibility at hand was to form a republic. How did these central ideas of 
American unification, namely liberty and republic, become manifested in documents? 
 
The Manifestation of Political Ideas in the Founding Documents 
Two of the most important documents for the self-conception of the Unites States of 
America are without a doubt the Declaration of Independence (DoI) and the 
Constitution of the United States of America (CoUSA). In both documents we can find a 
palpable manifestation of the political ideas discussed in this chapter, namely liberty, 
republic, and additionaly union. 
In case of the DoI, liberty is the crucial term implicitly standing behind the idea of 
independence and asserting its necessity. From the Battle of Lexington and Concord in 
the summer of 1775 to the signing of the Declaration one year later, the tense atmosphere 
between the colonists and Britain was that of mutual increased provocation. The politics 
of concessions and diplomacy deteriorated into a fastening military build-up. The 
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colonists organized and centralized their troops, while radical writers wrote the 
soundtrack to their actions. Thomas Paine published Common Sense, the most influential 
and popular pamphlet in favor of independence, in January 1775. In June 1776, after the 
Virginian Richard Henry Lee proposed a vote on independence in the Continental 
Congress, two committees were set up to draft a declaration of independence and a frame 
of government for the colonies. In the end, Thomas Jefferson wrote the bulk of the draft 
receiving revisions from Benjamin Franklin and John Adams (c.f. Kierner 2003, 120). 
According to Kierner, the DoI, which was adopted by the Congressional delegates on 4th 
of July 1776, served two causes: first, to persuade the American people of the worth of 
the fight for independence even if hardships will follow. Second, to assert to a „candid 
world“, i.e. European powers, that the colonies acted wisely and in just defense to strive 
for independence. The second cause was elementary to pacify potential European allies 
and convince them of the colonists responsibility (c.f. ibid., 120f). In order to claim 
diplomatic trustworthiness, the DoI was much mellower in tone than, for example, 
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense. In the DoI, only King George III was attacked, while 
the role of Parliament and the injustices of monarchy in general were left out of the 
equation. The drafters did not want to anger likely European allies and creditors in 
advance, since they knew that European investments and loans were necessary to 
establish an effective military. All in all, „ the formal declaration of independence in July 
1776 was in some respects the logical culmination of more than a year of political 
pronouncements and maneuvering at the local, provincial, and continental levels“ (ibid., 
118). 
How did the idea of liberty play out in the DoI itself? Where can we see the ideological 
manifestation of the term and its implications? The word liberty itself is most prominently 
displayed in the famous first sentence of the second paragraph of the preamble: „[w]e 
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and 
the pursuit of Happiness.“ (DoI 1776, 1). This sentence is packed with ideas and possible 
fields of philosophical and scholarly interest. In this thesis the author will concentrate 
primarily on the ideas linked to the concept of liberty and its adversary power. The idea 
that there exist „certain unalienable Rights“ is closely connected to the Enlightened 
concept of natural rights, that were given to humanity by God. These rights are universal 
and not dependent on culture. Amongst one of these natural unalienable rights is 
„Liberty“. In the context of the DoI, the general meaning of liberty refers to 
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independence from the tyrannic, grasping power of George III. The colonists have the 
right, moreso the duty, to fight for the protection of their liberty, which is in imminent 
danger to be held hostage by the Crown. Again, the personal meaning of liberty for 
individuals and different societal classes is open to interpretation. The DoI had to appeal 
to a very diverse readership, which made the use of the term liberty quite convenient. To 
summarize, in its generality, liberty was one of the universal natural rights that was 
corrupted by the power of the British crown and had to be protected by asserting 
independence and fighting for it. Specifically and personally, the term liberty functioned 
as a multipurposed term that was accessible to a diverse range of people and thus colonial 
experiences. The reverbaration of the term liberty can best be seen in the preamble to the 
CoUSA, in which it says, 
„We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish 
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America“ (Preamble, 
CoUSA). 
 
 
The second significant idea, republicanism, was not expicitly mentioned in the DoI and 
only referred to once in the CoUSA. However, the republican form of government is the 
major thread that binds the Constitution together, especially the Articles regarding the 
actual organizational political framework. Since the DoI and the Articles of 
Confederation (AoC) did not satisfyingly answer the question of „who should govern at 
home“, a reform of the AoC became necessary. Mounting war debts, cooling foreign 
relations, domestic economic challenges, and the increasing helplessness regarding the 
states’ responsiveness to debtors’ interests, made an improvement of government 
performance inevitable. Shay’s Rebellion only made the issue of reform more pressing 
than it had already been. In May 1787, 55 delegates met in Philadelphia to work over the 
AoC only to realize that the drafting of a new constitution was inescapable. After 4 
months of debate and compromises, 39 contributers, amongst them James Madison 
(„The Father of the Constitution“), Alexander Hamilton and Benjamin Franklin – signed 
the draft on September 17, 1787. The subsequent ratification by „specially elected state 
conventions“ (Kierner 2003, 244) turned into a highly contested political battle that came 
to a closure after the Rhode Island convention signed the document on May 29, 1790. 
However, the CoUSA came into effect two years earlier after the ninth state, New 
Hampshire, ratified it on June 21, 1788) (c.f. ibid., 233f; c.f. Peltason 2004, 6-13). During 
the ratification campaign, two movements argued in favor and against the Constitution. 
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The Federalists supported the national draft, while the Antifederalists demanded the 
introduction of a Bill of Rights to protect citizen rights and establish additional checks on 
government. The Bill of Rights, i.e. the first ten amendments to the CoUSA, were ratified 
on December 15, 1791 following the effective campaigning of Antifederalist politicians. 
With regards to content, the CoUSA follows the three republican principles that the 
author outlined in this chapter on political ideology: first, the CoUSA adopted the elective 
principle, ruling out hereditary succession and monarchic or aristocratic government. „All 
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which 
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives“ (Art. 1, Sect. 1, CoUSA 1787). 
The modes of election of the House and Senate members are stated in the first Article: 
„The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second 
Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature“ (Art. 1, Sect. 2, CoUSA 1787) 
 
„The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, 
chosen by the Legislature thereof for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote“ 
(Art. 1, Sect. 3, CoUSA 1787). 
 
Section 4 prescribes that „[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; 
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the 
Places of chusing Senators (Art. 1, Sect. 4, CoUSA 1787). The members of the Senate and 
the House can seek unlimited re-election. The election of the President is managed 
through chosing electors in each state, which shall then proceed to vote for a Presidential 
candidate. Until the 22nd Amendment was adopted there was no constitutional limitation 
of the number of 4-year terms a President can serve if elected. However, the first 
President, George Washington, set a precedent by leaving office after two terms, which 
has been followed up until now, with the exception of Franklin D. Roosevelt serving four 
terms during the Second World War. The members of the Supreme Court are appointed 
for their lifetime and „shall hold their Offices during good Behavior“ (Art. 3, Sect. 1, 
CoUSA 1787). 
Second, the CoUSA guarantees both popular sovereignty and checks & balances. „We the 
People“, the first three words of the CoUSA, clearly lay the powers in the hands of the 
populace. Neither king, nor lord should be the source of power. Politics was from now 
on a game played by the people, and not by some distant tyrant. Furthermore, the CoUSA 
guaranteed checks & balances by parting the government into three separate branches: 
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legislative (House and Senate), executive (President), and judicial (Supreme Court). 
Additionally, the states themselves are sovereign, as Article 4 states, 
„The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the 
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against 
domestic Violence (Art. 4, Sect. 4, CoUSA 1787). 
 
The people, the different branches of government, and the states all control and check 
each other and therefore limit the danger of any institution becoming too powerful, 
taking over the rule and acting against the common will. 
Third, the Framers were under the pressure of Antifederalists to constitutionally preserve 
citizen rights and individual freedom. The resulting Bill of Rights is somewhat 
paradoxically connected to the fear of „mob rule“ caused by too much democracy. The 
Framers knew they had to make some concessions in order to calm down the public 
sentiment and to persuade the constitutionally sceptical people to adopt the CoUSA. The 
drafting of the CoUSA and the addition of a Bill of Rights was a balancing game in order 
to find the equilibrium half way between national governability and constituents’ 
concessions. Holton summarizes this challenge as follows: „The delegates [of the 
Constitutional Convention, R.K.] rejected some of the most antidemocratic proposals 
altogether and moderated others. Still other restraints on popular influence were 
jettisoned in favor of alternative measures that accomplished the same goal less 
conspicuously“ (Holton 2007, 193). The indirect election of the President by the Electoral 
College and the composition of the Senate30, which strengthens (smaller) states’ positions, 
come to mind when thinking about „less democratic“ elements in the CoUSA. However, 
the representation-by-population approach in the House of Representatives31 and the 
posterior attachment of a Bill of Rights provided the Framers with a political position of 
strength since they took the wind out of their opponents’ sails. The Bill of Rights grants 
individual rights on the expense of federal rights. The first ten amendments, among other 
concessions, endorse the freedom of religion, press, and speech, the right to bear arms, 
trial by jury, and that „[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
                                                
30 There are two senators per state, regardless of the states’ number of constituents. In reality, this means 
that citizens of states with low population like Arizona enjoy a „higher level“ of representation in Senate 
than, for example, inhabitants of densely populated and merely urban states like New Jersey. 
 
31 The apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives is proportionate to the population in a state. 
This approach allows for a „higher level“ of representation of voters from densely populated states like 
California. 
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to the people“ (Amendm. 10, CoUSA 1789). Thus, the Bill of Rights sets a limit to the 
reach of federal powers. The preamble says that „in order to prevent misconstruction of 
abuse of [the Constitution’s, R.K.] powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses 
should be added“ (Preamble to the Bill of Rights, CoUSA 1789). One can nearly hear the 
fear of a misuse of power reflected in the words of this founding document. 
To conclude, the ideas and the political mindset of the 18th century is palpable 
throughout the Declaration of Independence, the CoUSA and the Bill of Rights. The 
longing for liberty, the anxiety against too much power in too little hands and the need 
for an orderly republican framework of government after years of chaos are incarnated in 
the paragraphs of these ground-breaking political texts. 
 
Political Ideas as a Driving Factor for Unification – Common Sense and the 
Federalist Papers 
After reading so much about the ideas that colonized the minds of these US-American 
thinkers, the reader might ask what all of this has to do with the topic of this thesis. 
Where is the connex between political ideology and the process of unification? First, there 
will be an examination of factors from two of the most prolific writings of the American 
Revolution. What did writers like Thomas Paine, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton 
and John Jay have to say about unification? Subsequently, the author will argue that there 
was a unified ideology to fight for some ideas (liberty, republic) while other ideas were 
fought against (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy). Third, there will be presentation of 
contemporary 18th century linguistic and visual evidence to support the hypothesis that 
there is a connex between political ideology and unification. 
 
In order to get a feeling for what union meant to 18th century thinkers in Northern 
America, two exemplary writings of the time will be analyzed. 
In his pamphlet Common Sense, Thomas Paine basically argues that a unification of the 
colonies is necessary to win the struggle for independence. By union, Paine does not 
immediately think of a political body comprised of the colonies and led by a federal 
government. Rather, Paine understands the colonial union as an „unexampled 
concurrence of sentiment“ (Paine 1776, 26). Union, to him, is more of an atmospheric 
concept and not an actual governmental framework. For Paine, union is equal to a unity 
of emotion and interest. Paine has four major thoughts about the advantages of a union 
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of interests, the objective being independence: First, he states that unity offers the 
colonies a strength that the British might not be able to counterfeit with their own 
military power: 
„'Tis not in numbers but in unity that our great strength lies: yet our present numbers are 
sufficient to repel the force of all the world. The Continent hath at this time the largest 
body of armed and disciplined men of any power under Heaven: and is just arrived at that 
pitch of strength, in which no single colony is able to support itself, and the whole, when 
united, is able to do any thing“ (ibid., 18). 
 
Although the argument sounds quite propagandic at first sight, when stripping down 
Paine’s rationale to the bone it is rather pragmatic and logic. While the struggle of one 
colony against the British would have been strategically unwise and star-crossed, a 
unification of colonial resources would bring a Northern American strength to light that 
could eventually equal that of the British. 
Second, Paine tries to persuade his readers that the relatively small number of colonies is 
an advantage when it comes to the fight for independence: 
„We are sufficiently numerous, and were we more so we might be less united. 'Tis a 
matter worthy of observation that the more a country is peopled, the smaller their armies 
are. In military numbers, the ancients far exceeded the moderns; and the reason is 
evident, for trade being the consequence of population, men became too much absorbed 
thereby to attend to anything else“ (ibid., 21). 
 
On the one hand, he assures that the less populated a country is, the more military 
prowess it has. This is because an increase in inhabitants automatically spurs economic 
growth, which makes men more interested in questions of finance and trade than in 
security and war. Therefore, heavily populated trade nations do neither have the best nor 
largest armies. On the other hand, Paine detects an additional advantage in the relative 
small number of Northern American colonies regarding their comparably unified 
interests: 
„It might be difficult, if not impossible, to form the Continent into one government half 
a century hence. The vast variety of interests, occasioned by an increase of trade and 
population, would create confusion. Colony would be against colony. Each being able 
would scorn each other's assistance; and while the proud and foolish gloried in their little 
distinctions the wise would lament that the union had not been formed before“ (ibid., 
21). 
 
If there would be more colonies, Paine writes, the ambitions of the colonies would 
increasingly divert and a union of sentiment would be less likely, thus blocking a unified 
effort to achieve independence. Implicitly this passage says that a union of interests is a 
necessary precursor for independence, since it supports the people’s will to fight for one 
common goal. 
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Third, linked to the above argument about the relatively small number of the colonies, the 
youth of the union is supposedly benefitial to its attempt in reaching independence: 
„Youth is the seed-time of good habits as well in nations as in individuals. [...] The 
intimacy which is contracted in infancy, and the friendship which is formed in 
misfortune, are of all others the most lasting and unalterable. Our present union is 
marked with both these characters; we are young, and we have been distressed; but our 
concord hath withstood our troubles, and fixes a memorable era for posterity to glory in“ 
(ibid., 21). 
 
Since the union is at an early stage, Paine claims, the bonds between the colonies are still 
fresh and full of vigor and energy. Somehow like a developmental psychologist (without 
much evidence) Paine notes that a friendship that is formed at an early age will last a life-
time and that „[t]he infant state of the Colonies, as it is called, so far from being against, is 
an argument in favour of independence“ (Paine 1776, 21). The comparison and 
connection between political occurrences, mechanics and human bodies/ minds was a 
common thread in 18th century materialist philosophy and a rather familiar metaphor for 
the contemporary reader. 
Fourth, Paine tries to convince his readers that it is the exact right time to take up action 
against the British. The already existing unified devotion of independence is evidence 
enough that the colonies are ready to fight the war, „[...] the TIME HATH FOUND US. 
The general concurrence, the glorious union of all things, proves the fact“ (Paine 1776, 
18). In this argument, previously implicit thoughts become explicit. For Paine, a union of 
spirits is a necessary precondition to build a union of fact. And in his mind, the best time 
to use this emotional unification, which is greatly valuable in itself and will be important 
in the future, is right now: 
„The Sun never shined on a cause of greater worth. 'Tis not the affair of a City, a County, 
a Province, or a Kingdom; but of a Continent — of at least one-eighth part of the 
habitable Globe. 'Tis not the concern of a day, a year, or an age; posterity are virtually 
involved in the contest, and will be more or less affected even to the end of time, by the 
proceedings now. Now is the seed-time of Continental union, faith and honour“ (ibid., 9). 
 
Paine, an experienced rhetoric, highlights the urgency that is imperative to the cause. He 
presses that if the fight is not commenced in time, the window of opportunity will be 
closed and might not open again. He stresses the pressing need to further strenghten the 
union, „[t]he continental belt is too loosely buckled: And if something is not done in time, 
it will be too late to do any thing, and we shall fall into a state, in which neither 
reconciliation nor independence will be practicable.“ (ibid., 26). 
To summarize, Paine tries to persuade his readers of the immediate necessity for 
independence. In the course of Common Sense argues that a union provides strength, 
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even more so if it is small in members and young in age, and that the unification of the 
colonies has to reach new emotional and political heights to successfully fight the British 
as soon as possible. 
 
The second example of political writings that are concerned with the formation of a 
union and its merits, are the Federalist Papers (FP). They are a number of articles 
published between 1787 an 1788 aimed to persuade the public of the necessity for 
intensified unification in form of a federal constitution. The three then anonymous 
writers behind the texts were Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay. The 
most relevant parts for this thesis are Federalist Papers No. 1-14, in which the advantages 
to build a constitutionally based union are discussed. 
John Jay starts the Papers off by arguing that the Northern American geography is quite 
suitable to accomodate a union of states. Jay points out that there is a „variety of soils and 
productions, and watered [...] with innumerable streams, for the delight and 
accommodation of its inhabitants“ (Jay 1787, FP #2). These territorial advantages add to 
commercial interaction and communication. Furthermore, the Northern American people 
themselves are 
„one united  people--a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same  
language, professing the same religion, attached to the same  principles of government, 
very similar in their manners and customs,  and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and 
efforts, fighting side  by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established  
general liberty and independence“ (ibid., FP #2). 
 
As we will see in the following chapter on the factors for cultural unification, Jay might 
have exaggerated this point a little. The Northern American inhabitants in the second half 
of the 18th century were far from being culturally united. However, the war for 
independence these US-Americans fought side-by-side might have contributed to a 
feeling of unified identity. These two remarks regarding geography and culture only serve 
Jay for an introduction to his own personal subject of expertise, foreign politics. 
In Federalist Paper No. 3, John Jay, perhaps the US’s first professional diplomat, 
establishes that the formation of a long-term political union would greatly contribute to 
safety from foreign aggression. Jay presents four reasons for his argument: First, 
European powers would have less temptation to attack a union than separate states or 
three or more confederacies, since the union would more succesfully abide to 
international rules of diplomacy and commerce. Since a union is bigger per definition it 
will offer a greater pool of able politicians to conduct its international politics than a small 
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state could ever provide. These responsible and sensible men would act wisely according 
to international rules of conduct and will thus minimize the dangers of foreign aggression 
from the beginning. Second, if there should be European aggression towards the US 
nonetheless, a national united government would be more tempered, calm and reasonable 
than several small states, since the union would have the interest of the whole Northern 
American community in mind. Jay’s logic is that the greater the stakes, the less risky the 
behavior, and therefore the less prone to actual military attacks. Third, the European 
nation will naturally be hesitant to fight a unified Northern America, simply because of its 
greater power. A confederacy of three or four states, or a separate state would be easy 
prey in comparison: „whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one 
national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is, that foreign 
nations will know and view it exactly as  it is; and they will act toward us accordingly“ (Jay 
1787, FP #4). Last, John Jay concludes that if an attack from abroad should really hit the 
US, a unified people would be more powerful to defend themselve than a separated 
people. This plea is strongly influenced by the writer’s experiences in his lifetime, since he 
lived through the Revolutionary War and saw the unified and succesful struggle against 
the British with his own eyes. 
The second major reasoning in the Federalist Papers to support the formation of a 
political union is the supposed safety against domestic conflicts and faction. All three 
writers offer their thoughts on the topic. In FP #5 John Jay notes that the socio-
economic inequality in case of disunion between the separate states or confederacies 
would eventually trigger quarrels between them. The politically and economically stronger 
states or regions would cause the others’ jealousies and, in the end, political disintegration, 
chaos and conflict: 
„The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would have 
its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and 
commodities are different and proper for different  markets, so would those treaties be 
essentially different.  Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and 
of course different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different 
foreign nations“ (Jay 1787, FP #5). 
 
This „weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that 
nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good 
government within ourselves“ (ibid., FP #5). Hamilton is especially concerned with the 
effects domestic separation could have on internal stability: „To look for a continuation 
of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same 
neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at 
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defiance the accumulated experience of ages. The causes of hostility among nations are 
innumerable“ (Hamilton 1787, FP #6). In Federalist Paper No. 7, he states that if there 
would be no serious unification the naturally evolving competition of commerce between 
the states, the developing territorial conflicts (especially regarding unclaimed Western 
territories) and the quarrels about the apportionment of the looming public war debt 
would consequentially rip Northern American peace apart. War would be the last and 
inevitable resort. Hamilton invites the European powers ironically to support a disunion 
of Northern American states, since „Divide et impera must be the motto of every nation 
that either hates or fears us“ (Hamilton 1787, FP #7). Madison adds some more points to 
Hamilton’s case in Federalist Paper No. 14 by highlighting that only a united government 
could manage to secure the frontiers, which were highly contested areas at the time of 
after the Revolutionary War. Most famously Madison put forward his case that a 
REPUBLICAN union would break domestic faction and insurrection in Federalist Paper 
No. 10 (see also chapter „Political Ideas and Unification“). 
The third substantial advantage of a union in opposition to separate states is the supposed 
growth of economic interaction and commercial activity. In Federalist Paper No. 11, the 
first Secretary of Treasure writes that a united set of laws to counteract foreign 
commercial policies and accorded boycott measures would add to the future union’s 
international leverage on economic questions: „Let the thirteen States, bound together in 
a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to 
the control of all transatlantic  force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the 
connection  between the old and the new world!“ (Hamilton 1787, FP #11). Furthermore 
a free market inside the union would offer „much greater scope, from the diversity in the 
productions of different States“ (ibid.,, FP #11). Hence, the inhabitants would be able to 
choose between a greater range of products than they would if the states or confederacies 
would have trade barriers and/or import taxes. But not only would there be greater 
variety in products accessible, but the availability of goods in cases of emergencies (such 
as a droughts or other shortages) in any given area would be more likely. Interstate 
commerce would contribute to the economic development and stability of all of the 
union’s members. In Federalist Paper No. 10, Madison implicitly mentions monetary 
stability as a factor that speaks for unification, since he uses the diverging interests of 
debtors and creditors as an example for injustice and the potential danger of faction and 
insurrection. A union, better a united government, would provide the necessary 
republican framework to solve questions of mentary concern responsibly. 
 84 
Last but not least, the writers of the Federalist Papers put forward several –strictly 
speaking - political reasons on why a constitutionally based union is a necessity for the 
Northern American states. First, the formation of a successful union would show the 
world - more specifically – the numerous sceptics in Europe, that a republican union can 
indeed work, even if it has a greater size than the Netherlands or Switzerland. Hamilton 
remarks in Federalist Paper No. 11, that unification of the states under a new and 
functional constitution would restore America’s global standing and prove the Europeans 
and their mostly despotic governments wrong. Hamilton makes the union’s case the case 
of the whole world and thereby emotionalizes the debate, heaves it on a universal level 
and links it to the achievement of honor: 
„Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different 
degrees, extended her dominion over them  all. Africa, Asia, and America, have 
successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted her 
to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the  rest of mankind as 
created for her benefit. [...] It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and 
to teach that assuming brother,  moderation. Union will enable us to do it“ (Hamilton 
1787, FP #11). 
 
Second, a republican union would – as repeatedly mentioned above – secure the liberty of 
the people and protect them from despotism, an argument that is exhaustingly examined 
in Federalist Papers No. 10 and 11. Third, Hamilton pragmatically states that the 
organization and maintenance of a union would not be more exravagant than the 
operation of one of the confederate governments. In his mind, the confederacies, which 
would be approximately the size of Britain would be equally hard to govern, „No well-
informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly 
regulated by a government less comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that 
which has been proposed by the convention“ (Hamilton 1787, FP #13). And last but not 
least, in order to pacify his Anti-Federalist opposition against the union, Madison 
appeases his adversaries by guaranteeing that the union’s government will not oversee 
everything, but only the most necessary issues (military, foreign relations, national tax). 
He eases the discussion by ensuring that the state’s fundamental rights will not be 
touched: 
„Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members 
of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The 
subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects which 
can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity“ (Madison 1787, 
FP #14). 
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In addition to the arguments the writers put forward in support of the union, the „Father 
of the Constitution“ claims that a union, i.e. a unified government, would facilitate a 
better infrastructure across the land: 
„Roads will everywhere be shortened and kept in better order; accommodations for 
travelers will be multiplied and meliorated; [...] The communication between the Western 
and Atlantic districts, and between different parts of each, will be rendered more and 
more easy by those numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has intersected 
our country, and which art finds it so little difficult to connect and complete“ (ibid., FP 
#14). 
 
Hamilton himself gave the best summary of factors the Federalists used to argue in favor 
of the constitutioalized union: 
„[...] restraints which the preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and 
insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who may 
acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the despots of 
the people; in the diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue [...]; in the 
prevention of extensive military establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars 
between the States in a disunited situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form 
of government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles of nobility; and in 
the precautions against the repetition of those practices on the part of the State 
governments which have undermined the foundations of property and credit [...]“ 
(Hamilton 1788, FP #85). 
 
In comparison to Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, the writers of the Federalist Papers 
are not concerned with the immediate necessity of „spiritual“ unity for independence, but 
their main concern is the ratification of the Constitution. The Federalist Papers offer a 
more comprehensive view on why these politicians thought that union would be a good 
idea. Their goal was the formation of a novel political system, so they exemplified the 
necessities of unification on a variety of topics, ranging from military matters, economics, 
and identity to the design of government. Although many of these factors for building a 
union seem plausible, it is of importance to notice that the Papers are still political 
pamphlets aimed to persuade citizens. The Federalist Papers, even though sophisticated 
and well argued, are not scientific analysis in the strictest sense of the word, but cleverly 
formulated opinion pieces. When John Jay, for example, speaks about the cultural unity 
of the Northern American citizens, one cannot help but notice that he must have 
polished the facts a little. 
However, since the writings of Paine and the Federalists were an important input to the 
political discussions of the time, and had „real“ effects insofar as they were widely read 
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and discussed32, they deserve to be included in this thesis as important markers on what 
kind of political ideas encouraged the process of unification in the United States of 
America. 
 
In addition to political pamphlets that were intended to persuade the US-Americans of 
the merits of unification, there are plenty of linguistic manifestations of these unification 
ideas in the founding documents that still have a strong influence on the US we know 
today. Not only did the writers of the DoI and the CoUSA mention republicanism and 
liberty but they also put the text under the „umbrella terms“ union, united,..... In the DoI, 
for instance, Jefferson & Co wrote that the document is an „unanimous Declaration of 
the thirteen united States of America“ (DoI 1776, 1) and that „the Representatives of the 
united States of America“ (ibid., 2) hereby declare their independence from Britain. The 
use of the word „united“ as a lowercase adjective was replaced with the now all too 
familiar capitalized proper name and labeling „United States of America“ in the Articles 
of Confederation. The AoC promote a „perpetual Union between the States of New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, 
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina and Georgia“ (AoC 1777, 1). In the first Article of the text the name of 
the Confederacy is designated: „The Stile of this Confederacy shall be ‚The United States 
of America’“ (ibid., 1). Ten years later, the CoUSA starts off with the famous words: 
„We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish 
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America“ (CoUSA 1788, 
1). 
 
Not only is there the repeated usage of the word Union, but also a first person plural 
„we“, which not only emphasizes the group effort to draft a constiution, but more so 
highlights the supposed unity of the US-American people when it comes to their 
motivation to establish a „more perfect Union“ than before. 
 
The connex between political ideas and unification can also be observed in visual 
documents. Next to linguistic evidence, illustrations and graphics can serve as a historical 
                                                
32 Nowadays the Federalist Papers are even sometimes used to interpret judicial challenges deriving from 
the Constitution. 
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source to interpret the meaning and interpretation of union in a context of political 
ideology. 
                    
Figure 9. Benjamin Franklin, „Join, Or Die“, Pennsylvania Gazette, May 9, 1754 
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9c/Benjamin_Franklin_-_Join_or_Die.jpg, 1. 3. 2011) 
 
One of the earliest examples of political illustration in US-American history is Benjamin 
Franklin’s drawing „Join, Or Die“ from 1754. Franklin produced this cartoon on the eve 
of the Albany Congress and the Seven Years War to show the need for the colonies to 
unite and fight alongside the British troops against the French and Indians. The cartoon 
depicts a snake divided into eight parts (omitting Delaware and Georgia, and mingling 
together the New England colonies). The message is simple: Only a united body can fight 
the looming danger. Separated colonies will unavoidably die off and risk the survival of 
the whole body. Two decades later, the cartoon became a popular symbol of unification 
in the American Revolutionary War (c.f. Peltason 2004, 3). 
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Figure 10. "On the Erection of the Eleventh Pillar", Massachusetts Centinel Boston, August 2, 1788 
(https://www.nyhistory.org/web/crossroads/gallery/celebrations/eleventh_pillar.html, 1. 3. 2011) 
 
The illustration „On the Erection of the Eleventh Pillar“, which was published in 1788 by 
the Federalist newspaper Massachusetts Centinel, deals with New York’s ratification of 
the Constitution. The eleven erected pillars, which are connected at the top through star 
beams, represent the states that had already ratified the CoUSA. The two pillars falling 
and breaking apart symbolize the states North Carolina and Rhode Island, which adopted 
the CoUSA last. The poem underneath the drawing predicts that this „federal edifice“, or 
„beauteous dome“ will provide the states of the union with agricultural, commercial, 
religious, and political riches. In this „Saturnian Age“, which plays at the Roman myth of 
Saturn being the god of abundance and wealth, peace, law and justice will reign over the 
union. Between the erected pillars and the tumbling ones, the illustrator states that the 
union will „rise“ if the „foundation [is] good – it may yet be SAVED“ (c.f. Kierner 2003, 
262). 
The cartoon uses visual and linguistic architectural metaphors to illustrate the nature of 
the federal union. The pillars, which are equally built in height and width, serve as a 
fundament for the union, which can potentially achieve more than the sum of its parts/ 
pillars. Together these states can even reach a Golden Age. If some states should choose 
not to join the union by refusing ratification of the CoUSA, they will inevitably crackle 
and fall apart. The message is a more detailed rendition of Franklin’s motto „Join, Or 
Die“ in the context of Constitutional debate.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter on political factors for unification of the US, the author established that 
there was a deferential political system in the British colonies in Northern America. The 
monarch, a hopefully „good ruler“, stood at the top step of the societal ladder both sides 
of the Atlantic, and was the definite authority in all political and economic matters. In the 
second half of the 18th century there was growing dissatisfaction amongst elites and 
commons in the colonies about British rulings mostly concerning taxation and naval 
matters. At first, the critics demanded a deeper influence into British decision-making. 
Since this claim was not fulfilled, the tension increased over the years until the pressure 
was finally released in the cry-out for independence from the motherland.   
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The political culture in this increasingly hostile atmosphere grew simultaneously strained 
over time. The oppositional fire spread from the Northeastern seabords to the South and 
the West through progressively sophisticated intercolonial communication networks. The 
colonists employed both non-violent forms of opposition against imperial policies, like 
economic boycotts and political protests, and violent action, such as tarring & feathering 
and destruction of property. A „community of interests“ overrode the hurdles of societal 
diversity. This political „unification of interests“ was an early precursor for a „unification 
of states“. 
Additionally to the growing dissatisfaction with British government, there were many 
political ideas connected to unification. Liberty and republicanism were concepts that 
were strongly affixed to the need for unification. A shared act to form a union was 
necessary to achieve the realization of political ideas. Additionally union had an intrinsic 
value itself. Unification would supposedly bring foreign and domestic safety, economic 
growth, political stability, infrastructure. Political ideas were the well that provided the 
union advocates with the water they needed to persuade the people. They were the causes 
to fight for. 
To conclude, the political unification of the USA was both a marriage of convenience and 
a marriage of love. What does the author mean by this metaphor? On the one hand side, 
there were multiple practical reasons to form a union of states. Pressing questions of 
international and domestic safety would be better achieved through a unified federal 
system that could succesfully manage transatlantic diplomacy, organize a joint military, 
and secure the frontiers. Economically, interstate trade in a free domestic market and a 
legal framework for financial and monetary stability would facilitate investments from 
abroad and fire up Northern American commerce and trade. Furthermore, there were the 
pressing issues of war debt and creditor reliability that needed to be addressed by a federal 
system with executive, legislative and judicial powers. There was simply more to be gained 
than to be lost by unification. At the end of the Revolutionary War, former dissension 
between colonies were all but forgotten, but the problems the people were facing at the 
time outshone the prior conflicts. The war took a great toll regarding human lives, inland 
security, infrastructure and economic stability. There was an urgent need to solve these 
problems in a joint fashion, since otherwise the chance of survival and peace would have 
been much lower. 
On the other hand side, the unification of the US was a marriage of love, since not only 
were there pragmatic factors in favor of union, but also strong ideological beliefs and 
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even utopias of a Golden Age of mankind. The attitude that there is an undeniable 
human right to „Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness“ (DoI 1776, 1) and the wish 
for a new system of government – republicanism – that should facilitate this „unalienable 
right“ (ibid., 1) were embedded into the mindset that these goals could only be reached if 
the states and people form a union. There were not only practical short-term factors for 
unification, but also the fundamental idea that a better future could be possible, that 
encouraged the supporters of unification; There was a window of opportunity to start a 
new political system from scratch; There were many elites that had the expertise to have 
learned from past historical mistakes with republicanism and had the confidence to 
improve prior frameworks; And there was the knowledge that Old Europe’s eyes would 
be directed at the US-American experiment which caused an additional feeling of 
ambition, and the need to prove one’s political ability. 
The combination of a marriage of convenience and a marriage of love is probably the 
best grounding in politics as it is in real life. History verifies this hypothesis by the fact 
that US-American unification took place and – looking back from today – was a relatively 
succesful project. 
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Cultural  Factors  
Definition 
Now that we established an overview of economic and political factors that might have 
affected US-American unification, it is time to take a quick look at US-American culture 
of the 1800s and its relation to the formation of the Union. At first, the author will try to 
define the term culture for the purpose of this thesis. Second, there will be an 
examination of the nature of languages spoken and written at the time of US-American 
unification. Third, the author will shift her attention to the potential influence religion 
could have had on the American Revolution. Fourth, ethnic considerations will be taken 
into account. Last, the author will summarize and conclude the chapter in already familiar 
fashion. 
To gain a deeper understanding of the possible effects culture could have had on the 
dynamics of unification, it’s useful to first define the term culture before plunging into 
medias res. Culture is perhaps one of the most interesting and at the same time confusing 
terms in contemporary Social Science, that engaged the minds of scholars in over a 
century. As anthropologist Robert Borofsky pointed out, „Culture [...] is not a set term – 
some natural phenomena that one can consensually describe (as tends to happen with 
hydrogen atoms, hamsters, and humans). Culture is what various people conceive it to be, 
and, as these definitions make clear, different people perceive it in different ways for 
diferent ends“ (Borofsky 2001, 433). As a result, cultural anthropologists will define the 
term differently than political scientists or economists. Social anthropologists Akhil 
Gupta and James Ferguson, for instance, speak of „cultures“ broadly as „the idea that a 
world of human differences is to be conceptualized as a diversity of separate societies, 
each with its own culture“ (Gupta/ Ferguson 1997, 1). Samuel Huntington, a political 
scientist with a strong interest in International Relations, described culture in his famous 
text „Clash of Civilizations“ as partly synonymous with the term civilization, 
“[a] civilization is a cultural entity […] It is defined both by common objective elements, 
such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-
identification of people. People have levels of identity [...] The civilization to which he 
belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. People 
can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of 
civilizations change.” (Huntington 1993, 23-24). 
 
In order to reach a coherent and methodically useful terminology of the word for this 
thesis, the author decided to adopt her own definition, which is inspired by both Gupta’s 
and Ferguson’s more technical anthropological view, as well as Huntingon’s more 
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practical political perspective. The concept culture in this chapter is understood as a set of 
different linguistic, religious and ethnic markers, that bind a group of people together in 
shared values, rituals, and behavior. Accordingly, the chapter „Cultural Factors“ is divided 
into the three subcategories language, religion and ethnicity. The author consciously 
omitted other cultural markers such as customs and traditions, for the purpose of keeping 
the thesis within admissible reason. 
Before diving into the topic of cultural factors for unification, it is of importance to 
mention some of the methodological pitfalls that limit the scientific preciness of the 
chapter. The general data regarding language groups, religious affiliation and ethnicity is 
hard to come by. There is only one statistical data set that fits our time period of interest, 
i.e. the United States census of 1790. However, this census was not nearly as 
comprehensive and methodically reliable as present day censuses. Moreso, the only 
information we get from the 1790 questionnaires is data on sex, legal age, and slave status. 
Therefore inventive scholars try to explore the demographics of language groups, 
religious affiliation and ethnicity in the US through the characterization and analysis of 
surname patterns. Another approach is the „biographical method“, in which individual 
biographies from the 1800s were examined and data on, for example, religion is collected. 
Unfortunately this method has a strong bias towards the white male upper classes, since 
valuable biographical information on people other than the Founding Fathers and their 
limited social groups are rare. These methodological shortcomings have to be taken into 
consideration in the following paragraphs on cultural factors. 
 
Language 
Questions about the individuals’ spoken and written language were first asked in the 1890 
U.S. census. Accordingly, there is no reliable data on language proficiency and usage in 
the US prior to that date. However, we know from historic documents that the members 
of the Continental Congress did not automatically assume that English should be the new 
official language for the union. As Heath, quoted by Stevens points out, 
„Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, urged that German and 
French be taught in America's "English schools" (Heath 1992). On the other hand, 
Benjamin Franklin ([1751] 1961: 234) feared that German immigrants in Pennsylvania 
‚will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them’“ (Heath 
cited by Stevens 1999, 387). 
 
As these exemplifying remarks show there was disagreement during the process of 
unification regarding the future of English as a national language. This instance also 
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demonstrates that the early union was not linguistically homogenous, but heterogenous to 
a certain degree. Although it is fair to say that the US-American elites at the time, 
especially the signers of the founding documents, perceived and used English as their first 
language, they were at the same time aware of the fact that immigration groups from 
Continental Europe had already created non-English language enclaves in some parts of 
the country (for example Pennsylvania Germans). As Benjamin Franklin’s comment 
reveals in retrospect, these linguistic groups must have been so present in their every day 
life that a high-profile politician like Franklin would consider them a threat to Anglo-
American dominion. The compromise, so to say, was that the US until present day does 
not have an official federal language, although its founding documents were written in 
English. A diversity of languages exists until today in the US and is fed by ever new waves 
of immigration from different parts of the world33. 
Did the cultural factor language have an effect on unification then? Although the data on 
the subject is not extensive, most communication regarding political and economic 
unification was carried out in English, as historic documents show. And despite the 
existence of several language enclaves, that were numerically significant in so far as to 
prompt a reaction from the Anglo-American elites, English was the prime language of the 
American Revolution, and therefore US-American unification. English facilitated 
unification insofar, as it was understood and used by the most influential intellectual 
leaders of the Revolution. For US-American politicians and pamphleteers of the earliest 
hour, language barriers did at least not hinder or slow down intercolonial communication, 
therefore „passively“ contribute to the process of unification. A widely understood 
common language, even if it does not actively trigger unification, can certainly ease and 
fasten communication processes, and is thus, the author argues, a contributing factor to a 
certain degree. 
 
Religion 
Religious affililiation is certainly linked to ethnicity, but is not 100% congruent with 
ethnic groups as the example of Irish Protestants in colonial Northern America shows 
(c.f. Carroll 2006, 25). Thus, and because of the role certain religious ideas and leaders 
played on mobilization during the American Revolution, it is beneficial to examine 
                                                
33 In some parts of Southern California, New Mexico and Texas –for example - Spanish is the mother 
tongue of a majority of inhabitants. 
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religion as a special factor regarding unification. From biographical information and from 
secondary name analysis of the ethnicity of inhabitants of the US in 1790, it can be 
assumed (with necessary methodical caution) that a majority of US-Americans in the 
1800s was, or was „made“ protestant, including African-Americans, the largest minority 
group in the colonies (c.f. Lambert 2003). US-American Protestantism, however, was and 
is not a monolithic religious grouping, but rather a conceptional parenthesis that holds a 
great diversity of protestant-oriented churches within. As an example of said variety inside 
Protestantism, we can look at the religious affiliations of the signers of the DoI. The 56 
signers of the document belonged to at least eight different religions, most of them within 
the boundaries of Protestantism: Anglican, Congregationalist, Deist, Episcopal, 
Presbyterian, Quaker, Roman Catholic, and Unitarian (c.f. Mount 2011, 
http://www.usconstitution.net/declarsigndata.html#rkey). Furthermore, the diversity of 
churches was so great that there was even space for religious groups that became 
politically relevant forces due to their religiously inspired ideas. The best example for a 
politically active group is the Quakers, a religious circle deeply committed to societal 
equality and pacifism. For instance, the Quakers were strong advocates for the abolition 
of slavery in the 18th century and onwards. From an outside perspective, the US appears 
as a country that is mainly protestant, but looking at the religious affiliations from the 
inside, one can detect a great variety of religious experience within Protestantism – now 
and in the 1700s. 
Now that we established a short overview of the multifaceted state of religion in the US 
at the time of unification, it is time to discover what kind of historic role religious factors 
played in the unification process. 
The very beginnings of Anglo-American colonization on the continent were primarily 
religiously motivated, since the Puritans seeked escape from British rule in the 1600s. 
John Winthrop, one of the first Puritan settlers in New England, famously argued that the 
new colony on Northern America shall be 
„as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us. So that if we shall deal falsely 
with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His 
present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world“ 
(Winthrop 1630). 
 
The new colonial project therefore is not simply one new settlement amidst the others: It 
is a better version, an ideal come to life and thus standing above the others. Other more 
or less persecuted groups followed and soon a great number of settlements sprouced up 
at the Eastern seabord. These colonists brought their own religious beliefs with them 
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over the Atlantic. They then refined and dissipated their faiths over the course of time, 
leading to a unique Northern American religious landscape that was held together by a 
very basic commitment to Protestantism. In the early 1700s, religion experienced a revival 
that brought certain socio-political percussions with it. The so-called First Great 
Awakening, was a religious movement that had effects over multiple denominations and 
somehow contrasted the rational and mind-obsessed preachings of the Enlightenment. 
The main focus of preachers like Jonathan Edwards and George Whitfield lay on creating 
an emotional counterweight to the often detached sermons of other contemporary 
priests. Their religious ideas, often linked to personal repentance and commitment, were 
propagated during mass events, attracting huge crowds of mainly lower class citizens. The 
group mobilization that took place during the Great Awakening should be a precursor of 
the popular crowd events during the American Revolution. The role of religious leaders 
as communicators of political ideas such as egalitarianism and as unifiers of people was 
rehearsed during the First Great Awakening. Their main act should follow during the 
1770s (c.f. Lambert 2003). Although the many groups in the colonies were very different 
with regards to their rituals, rules and beliefs, the majority had one important thing in 
common: growing disrespect for the Anglican church. Religious views in North America 
soon intermingled with politics and served people as a psychological motivator to fight in 
the war for independence. Soon, the Revolution became a moral cause as can be seen on 
the inscription on one of the battle flags, „Resistance to tyrants is obedience to god“. 
                                  
Figure 11. Revolutionary Battle Flag, Gostelow Standard No. 10 1776 
(http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel03.html, 11.1.2010). 
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To summarize, although the colonies and the early US were composed of a patchwork of 
religious groups, the basic belief in protestant values was a cultural unifying factor for a 
diverse society. But this fact alone did not make for unification. The affirmative influence 
of religious actors during the Great Awakening with regards to mass mobilization, 
political change and personal responsibility in social affairs additionally built the 
foundation for the dynamism of unification at a later point in time. Churches with their 
very wordly assets such as meeting rooms and their eloquent preachers that could easily 
sway people’s hearts towards certain political goals were practical facilitators of the 
unification movement. 
The religious pluralism in the US, however, did prompt the Founding Fathers to 
pragmatically adopt the First Amendment, „Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof“ (CoUSA 1789, 
Amendment I), in order to not motivate a single denomination to take over power and 
decide over others. The word GOD itself is referred to only very shortly in the DoI, but 
not in the CoUSA, making the founding documents (but not the people themselves) 
effectively free of religion. 
 
Ethnicity 
At the beginning of this chapter on the eventual influence of ethnicity on unification, it is 
again critical to consider methodological concerns. Since there is no primary data on the 
demographics of ethnicity in the early US, scholars used surnames as a tool to determine 
the ethnicity of the US-American population in the second half of the 18th century. For 
example does the surname Campbell indicate Scottish heritage, whereas the name O’Neill 
refers to Irish descent. Historians categorized the different surnames from the 1790 
census into groups such as „Scottish-American“, then proceeded to count their numbers 
and following that, calculated the percental ethnic composition of US-Americans at 1790. 
Taking into account prior studies from the early 20th century, the McDonalds carried out 
such a study in the 1980s, which was later refined and revised by Purvis and Lavender, 
and critically evaluated by Akenson. According to Barker cited by McDonald, the white 
US population at 1790 can be ethnically differentiated as follows: 
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Ethnicity Percentage of 
US Population 
English 60.1 
Scotch 8.1 
Irish Ulster 5.9 
Irish Free State 3.6 
German 8.6 
Dutch 3.1 
French 2.3 
Swedish 0.7 
Spanish 0.8 
 
Figure 12. Estimated Percental Distribution of Ethnicity in the US of 1790 after McDonald (1980) citing 
Barker (1931) (by R.K. 2011) 
 
The McDonalds criticized some of Barkers methods and re-evaluated the numbers 
especially for the Celtic inhabitants. For this thesis, it is especially interesting to take a 
closer look at the geographical distribution of white ethnic groups in the early US. 
Whereas English-Americans were especially common in New England - Connecticut 
leading the field with an estimated percentage of 81% citizens of English descent (c.f. 
McDonald 1980, 198) - some other ethnic groups made up considerable numbers of the 
White population in certain areas. In Pennsylvania, for instance, German-Americans 
contributed to one third of the inhabitants (33.3%). In the state of New York (New York 
City being formerly know as New Amsterdam) the Dutch population at 1790 is estimated 
with about 17.5 percentage points. More so, adding up the Celtic subgroup in South 
Carolina, for example, the Irish, Scotch and Welsh taken together even made up the 
majority of the white inhabitants with 53.4%34. In Pennsylvania, the total of Non-English 
citizens was an estimated 80.5 percent. To sum up, although the general numbers show a 
majority of English-American population, there were considerable levels of ethnic 
                                                
34 To point out a fairly amusing and admittedly unscientific observation, ethnic heritage might have also 
influenced the reaction regarding certain local alcohol policies. The McDonalds mention that in „western 
Pennsylvania's Washington County, center of the Whiskey Rebellion of I794, more than three-quarters of the people were of Celtic extraction“ 
(McDonald 1980, 199). 
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diversity at the local and regional level. This impression only deepens when looking at the 
estimated distribution of the Non-White population at 1790. 
According to the US Census Bureau (2002), out of the total of 3 929 214 US-Americans 
in 1790, 19.3% (757 208) were of African descent. From these, 7.9% (59 527) were free, 
whereas the overwhelming majority, 92.1% (697 681) were slaves. That means that nearly 
one fifth of the population of the US in 1790 was Black slaves, making them a 
considerable minority. Especially the Southern, and to a lesser extent, the Mid-Atlantic 
States were significantly inhabitated by African-American slaves. Due to the ongoing 
human trafficking from Africa, which secured the landowners with a steady supply of 
cheap work force for their plantation businesses, most of these African-Americans were 
living in unfree and dependent conditions. The US Census Bureau (2002) calculated the 
percentage of the Black population in the Southern Region in 1790 as 35.2%, therefore 
composing over one third of the total inhabitants of the region. The economic and 
psychological fear of Black empowerment and free population growth certainly was in the 
back of some of the Southern Founding Fathers’ minds when they opposed the abolition 
of slavery during the Constitutional Convention.  
In addition to the African-American non-White population, Native Americans 
inhabitated large chunks of the land that piece-by-piece became the US of today. 
Unfortunately, the number of Native Americans living in the United States territory of 
1790 has not been surveyed in the census. The data inclusion from this ethnic subgroup 
only began 100 years later. However, from historic sources the number of Native 
Americans WITHIN the geographical borders of the US of 1790 is to be estimated as 
quite small. Their presence NEAR the borders and their partly military allegiance with the 
British did have some effect on US-American politics though, insofar as the future of the 
relations between the groups was feistily discussed by politicians and implicitly considered 
in the CoUSA. Both topics regarding the current status and future of the non-White 
population on the continent were the seeds for conflict and violence at a later time. The 
question over slavery, which brought the union to Civil War and nearly ended the union 
experiment in the mid-1800s, and the territorial fights and racial repressions that were 
brought upon Native Americans for decades, should define the character of the United 
States until today. But did these seeds of dissention have an immediate influence on 
unification? Did cultural diversity hinder the process of unifiyng people?  
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Conclusion 
Did these cultural factors contribute or hinder unification? Did they have a noticeable 
effect on the process of US-American unification in the positive or negative sense? 
First, despite the fact that there were several language conclaves in the colonies, and later 
states, their existence did not hinder unification. On the contrary, the presence of 
English, which was widely understood on the Northern American continent (especially in 
the upper classes) did ease communication processes and prevented language barriers. 
The cultural factor language facilitated unification insofar as English enabled the popular 
communication that was necessary to drive the formation of the United States. 
Second, religious pluralism existed within the constraints of Protestantism, which can be 
observed by the wide range of religious affiliations exhibited by the Founding Fathers or 
the influence of particular groups like, for example, the Quakers. Regardless of the variety 
of beliefs, the Anglo-American shared history of colonization, which was closely linked to 
religious exile, served as a bonding factor (against the British) and as a historic reference 
point of identity for a substantial number of US-Americaa inhabitants (see ethnicity). And 
despite their religious pluralism, Protestantism was still the main spiritual foundation and 
least common denominator of the colonists’ belief system. Additionally, religious 
movements and figures in the 1700s facilitated US-American unification since they were 
experts in mobilizing masses, providing resources (such as meeting rooms, 
communication networks) and promote ideas like equality and representation, which 
should all come in handy during the American Revolution. Therefore, religion can be 
counted as a cultural factor enabling US-American unification. 
Third, there was great ethnic diversity within the early US-American population if one 
looks at the regional and local level. Although the majority of inhabitants stemmed from 
the British Isles, there was variety within this particular group (Irish, Welsh, Scottish, 
English) and at certain places other ethnic groups, such es Germans or Dutch, constituted 
significant minority populations. There were no indicators found that suggest whether 
this ethnic diversity within the Non-white population constrained or boosted unification. 
Be that as it may, the case can be made that the considerable number of Non-Whites 
within the territory – African-American slaves - and near the borders – Native Americans  
- spawned a racist coalition of fear among some members of the White population. The 
many debates regarding the future of slavery and the prospective allotment of new 
Western territories, which were controlled by Indian tribes then, during the development 
of the Constitution tell us today that these questions were present in the minds of the 
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Founders. On the other hand, ethnicity became a source of conflict later at time and can 
therefore be interpreted as a factor against the future of the union. All in all, though, the 
importance and effect that the cultural factor ethnicity had on US-American unification 
could not be satisfactorily determined at this point and has to be analyzed further in the 
future. 
To conclude, two of the three cultural factors that were examined for this thesis can be 
added to the contributing factors of unification, while one is under consideration. 
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PHASES OF POLITICAL UNIFICATION 
 
Three  Phases  o f  Pol i t i ca l  Unif i cat ion  in the US 
In order to reach a coherent and clear structural framework to compare the US-American 
case of unification with the European one, it is useful to employ a certain time scheme. 
The following so-called „three phases of unification“ crystallized during the work on this 
thesis and function as a first approach to summarize, categorize and compare the findings 
of this work. 
The phases can be differentiated along several lines. First, they can be distinguished by 
time. Nonetheless, the author would like to note that the phases of unification are not 
strictly sequential in their progression. The phases are not clear-cut and finite time 
periods, but rather overlapping sequences, allowing for parallel events to take place and 
sometimes even repeat themselves. 
Second, the phases can be discerned by their function regarding unification. To put it 
simply, they can be distinguished by the relative prominence different factors played in 
them. For instance, one phase might be heavily affected by economic considerations, 
while another might be influenced more through cultural factors. Again, unification is not 
a clear-cut step-by-step process in which boxes are ticked off in sequence. Different 
factors often play a role simultaneously, and many factors show strong connections to 
others (for example: economic and political unification). However, certain „factorial 
centers of gravity“ can be discovered while looking at US-American unification closely. 
For instance, political ideas played an important role in the starting phase of the union, 
while the relative influence of political ideology on unification decreased with time. 
Having unfolded the relative imperfections of the following structural framework for 
unification, it is time to dive into the topic, starting with US-American unification and 
then proceeding to EU unification, finishing off with a comparison of the two.  
 
 
 
 
 
 102 
1st phase (1750s-1770s) 
The first phase of unification in the US is characterized by the formation of a “we versus 
them”-culture, in which the majority35 of the colonists opposed the perceived injustices of 
British Imperial policies. Over time, Britain developed from motherland and identity 
reference point (“British gentlemen”) to the common enemy of the Northern American 
colonists. This transatlantic estrangement, which is linked to a range of political, 
economic and cultural events, was a necessary predecessor of independence, since it all of 
a sudden made the utopia of an independent union on the Northern American continent 
an imaginable alternative to British rule. The establishment of a common enemy not only 
enabled previously unthinkable thoughts to be thought, but it also unified the colonists 
insofar as they now, perhaps for the first time, had a clear group identity. Even if their 
identity was only constructed in a negative sense first - as the antagonist to the British – 
the group spirit, which evolved from this opposition of forces, was still enough to carry 
the weight of the Revolution and evolve into a more powerful identity over the years. 
Over time, this “we versus them” formation transformed into a US-American identity of 
its own that did not need a common enemy anymore to define itself as an entity. 
The second characteristic of this beginning phase of unification is the impact of a bundle 
of reasons, which the author summarizes under the term “marriage of convenience”. The 
colonies unified not (only?) because they had a deep cultural commitment towards each 
other, but they simply saw undeniable military, economic and political advantages that 
would be triggered through unification. The multiple factors within this cluster of 
pragmatism certainly lived on during the other phases of unification, but they were set in 
motion in this first period. As early as during the Albany Congress, politicians such as 
Benjamin Franklin proposed a union out of pragmatism. The formation of a colonial 
union would improve the military strength of all of its members through the bundling of 
forces and would enable better safety measures for the frontier population. During the 
following Imperial Crisis and the American Revolution, the channeling of troops under 
one command throughout the colonies was a simple startegic necessity to win the war 
against the British. 
Later on, during the Imperial Crisis, economic considerations came into play, when it 
became clear that the colonies would certainly benefit from a deepening of intercolonial 
                                                
35 There was a minority of loyalists, which to a large part settled in Canada before or during the American 
Revolution. 
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trade relations. Down the road, the improvement of US-American economy became a 
political priority of greatest concern, when monetary and financial matters grew out of 
control. According to many elites, the solution to the economic downward spiral that set 
in after 1776, was the unification of the newly independent states. The economic 
promises of a free US-American market, the attraction of domestic ond foreign investors, 
the settling of the staggering war debt and the coming to terms with the strained relation 
between states, creditors and debtors, were all factors that encouraged US-American 
unification. 
The political factors of unification that can be subsumed under the umbrella “marriage of 
convenience” are deeply linked to the above military and economic considerations. The 
beginning political unification of the colonies in a framework such as in intercolonial 
conferences and in a document such as the Declaration of Independence was necessary to 
gain footing against the British. Concerted military and economic measures simply needed 
a political arena in which necessary unified policies could be discussed and resolved. 
Furthermore, the politicians of the time were concerned with the international standing of 
the colonies and later independent states. They reasoned that a union of Northern 
American states would attract more global attention and perhaps financial and military 
support against the British than one state alone. The writing of the Declaration of 
Independence, so to say the highlight and apex of the 1st phase of unification, is evidence 
of this political logic. 
But not only can we detect multiple factors for “marriage of convenience” in this phase 
of unification, we can also observe another dimension of unification, the “marriage of 
love”. The colonists not only unfied out of pragmatic reasons and lack of alternative, but 
they regarded the new union as something more than its parts. These “united States of 
America (DoI 1776) would be a novel political experiment, unlike any ever seen before 
on this planet. In many parts, the United States was a tabula rasa of politics: According to 
the DoI, government should not be the instrument of tyrannic rule, but should derive its 
powers from the “consent of the governed” (DoI 1776); Furthermore government should 
secure certain “unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness” (DoI 1776). Jefferson’s declaration, with all due respect to previous political 
thinkers and to the DoI’s shifting levels of influence on US politics, is a “big bang” of 
political thought until today, since it summarizes and voices the very basic foundation of 
human rights and governmental justification, Later on, the republican form of 
government would be adopted for the first time in human history for such a large 
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territory, marking another political milestone, that transcended the sheer pragmatic nature 
of unification. 
From the very beginning, the US was a project that should “show the world” what could 
be possible, if humans only joined hands and fought for a common goal. This ambitious 
– some might call it – vanity and arrogance was certainly a motivator for unification. The 
belief that individuals should take their future into their own hands was ironically both 
influenced by Enlightenment philosophy and 18th century colonial Protestantism. While 
the first emphasized rational thought and logic, the latter highlighted the role of human 
passion and emotion in the struggle for a better life in the here and now. Evidence like 
the “Revolutionary Battle Flag” or the illustration “On the Erection of the Eleventh 
Pillar” show that unification was not only a matter of military, economic and political 
convenience, but a matter of emotion and salvation. Many colonists hoped and fought 
not only for independence from Britain but for a new “Saturnian Age” in Northern 
America, one that mankind never saw before. They strongly believed that they could 
achieve their goals only as a community, and they trusted that a union of people (not only 
states!) would consequently also be the best way to live in the future. 
To summarize, the 1st phase of US-American unification was thorougly characterized by 
the impact the many diverse pragmatic and ideological factors had on unification. The 
combination of a “we versus them” political culture, a “marriage of convenience”, and a 
“marriage of love” laid the groundstones for unification and set in motion subsequent 
phases of US-American unification. 
 
2nd Phase (1780s-1790s) 
The 2nd phase of unification in the US is characterized by the drafting and ratification of 
the CoUSA and the translation of its Articles into the real political world of the early US. 
This is the phase in which the major institutions of US politics were introduced and 
tested. In the 1st phase, we saw that many pragmatic and emotional factors encouraged 
the unification efforts of the colonies and early states. People voiced their common 
interests. In the second phase these ideas were written down, realized and put into 
military, economic and political practise. The framework, which should allow for their 
accomplishment was the CoUSA. After the Articles of Confederation proved to be 
incapable of solving the problems of the young union and allow the US-American people 
to achieve their individual goals, the Constitution provided a republican framework in 
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which matters could be solved without risking that the union would break apart in 
individual states and/or smaller confederations. The legislative, executive and judicial 
branch of US government came to life during this time period of US-American history. 
Many practical matters of union government that were not directly refered to in the 
CoUSA were also given a first try, for example, the installation of monetary and financial 
institutions under Hamilton, Washington’s precedent for a maximum of a two time 
Presidential term, or the actual planning and design of government buildings in the newly 
designated capital city, Washington D.C.. The formation and slow institutionalization of 
the US-American party system also started during this phase of unification, namely during 
the third Presidential election in 1796. 
To summarize, the 2nd phase of US-American unification was characterized by the 
formation of official and inofficial institutions that should define the workings of the 
union for years to come. 
 
3rd phase (1800s-1850s) 
The third phase of unification in the US, which was not discussed in depth in this thesis, 
is defined by institutional consolidation on the one hand, and territorial enlargement on 
the other hand. Both official and inofficial institutions of the union saw a strengthening 
of powers and, after they survived their shaky post-war birth and tumultous 
adolescence36, settled for a relatively calm fifty years until the seeds of disagreement 
between North and South, that were planted in the CoUSA, should grow so inevitable 
that a brutal Civil War finally erupted the young nation. Besides the establishment and 
build up of institutions, the US also saw territorial enlargement, which began during 
Jefferson’s Presidency with the Louisiana Purchase from France in 1803. This was 
followed by the Florida Purchase, and the acquisition of the Northwestern Territories, 
etc.. 
 
                                                
36 In 1804, the political atmosphere in the US was so fired up, that Vice President Adam Burr and 
Alexander Hamilton even took up a duel over a political disagreement and perceived defamation. This duel 
should end deadly for the former Secretary of Treasure. One should only imagine the unlikelyness of a duel 
between Adenauer and De Gaulle to see the blatant differences in “political culture” over the course of 
history. 
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Three  Phases  o f  Pol i t i ca l  Unif i cat ion in the EU 
1st phase (1945-1960s) 
Shortly after the devastations and terrors of World War II ended, European leaders came 
to the conclusion that this zero hour of politics was both a fragile moment in history as 
well as a window of opportunity to re-design the European political landscape from the 
ground. WWI and WWII ripped Europe apart and the gaping wound caused by nearly 50 
years of disastrous nationalism, fascism and nationalsocialism had left the continent in a 
state of estrangement and exhaustion. The ‘Age of Catastrophy’, as Eric Hobsbawm 
named the time from 1914 to 1945, was over but what would come next? 
Three main challenges lay ahead: In the East, Sowjet-backed socialism was taking over 
whole countries, while in the West US-backed capitalism became the go-to ideology of 
post-war Europe. The threat of war between these two blocs characterized the political 
sphere for nearly four decades during the Cold War. How would Europe remain in a 
balanced and peaceful state while being chopped into two different ideological halves? 
Second, although the German Reich had been vanquished and smashed to pieces, half a 
decade of aggression and inhumanity could not been easily wiped out of the collective 
European mind. How could Germany be pacified in the long-term? Third, the ‘Age of 
Catastrophy’ left Europe in economic, infrastructural, artistic and intellectual ruins. How 
could such a devastated continent be lifted to new heights? 
The answer to all of the three challenges Europe faced after WWII lay, one way or 
another, in unification. Paradoxically, the division of Europe in two political blocs 
enhanced Western European unification insofar as the ‘communist East’ supplied the 
West with a common enemy around which a new unified identity could be built. In the 
first and even second phase of unification the physical and psychological dissociation with 
Eastern Europe formed an important backbone of Western European identity. Although 
circumstances and timelines differed greatly, in some points the communist East was to 
the capitalist West what the British were to the colonists: a common enemy around which 
one could build their own new group identity. The perceived imminent threat that was 
the Sowjet Union unified Western Europe and strengthened the bond between the states. 
Second, strategically and economically, it was a necessity for Western European leaders to 
bind West Germany closer to their own hearts. With the help of the US-American 
European Recovery Project (ERP or ‘Marshall Plan’), the first step was made to integrate 
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Germany into a Western capitalist system in order to clear it from nationalsocialist 
tendencies and at the same time shield it from the power of the Sowjetunion. 
Furthermore, the plan was to build an economic bond between the continental 
archenemies, France and Germany, so that they would be pacified through mutual 
economic involvement. The idea behind it was that two countries that were dependent on 
each other economically would be less willing to engage in conflicts. Additionally, 
economic interdependence would have the positive side effect of growth and safety from 
resource shortages that were greatly needed after the destructions of WWII (an argument 
that has been made 200 years before by Alexander Hamilon in Federalist Paper #11). 
This practical thought stood at the center of European unification and was realized 
through the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
The first phase of European unification was less a marriage of love than a marriage of 
convenience. Unification, the author argues, was the least painful economic and political 
option for the strongly needed demarcation from communism, ‘domestic’ pacification 
and general recovery of Western Europe. 
Although some politicians might have had thoughts about the spiritually unified future of 
Europe, at least the first phase of unification does not show signs of a ‘marriage of love’ 
between the inhabitants of the European states. European ideas of unification voiced by 
the political elite (Jean Monnet, Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi,…) did not 
reverberate as strong in the population as the writings and sayings of US-American 
leaders during the American Revolution. The European continent, with its historically 
evolved national sentiments and conflicts, was far from the level of shared emotional 
interdependence and common interest the Northern American colonies showed during 
their its phase of unification. 
 
2nd phase (1960s-2000s) 
In the long 2nd phase of European unification we can see the formation, deepening and 
strengthening of inter-European institutions. First, the ECSC started off economic 
integration between France and Germany in 1952. The Coal and Steel Community was 
followed by the EURATOM and the European Economic Community (EEC) to enhance 
economic relations in Europe in 1958. Slowly but surely, the political arm of European 
unification developed, adding a Parliament (formerly known as ‘Common Assembly’) and 
a Council of Ministers to the European Commission (formerly known as ‘High 
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Authority’). Over time more and more policy fields, such as monetary matters, justice, 
police matters, and security were added to the agenda of European political institutions. 
Furthermore, the European Community, which should become the European Union 
under the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, expanded its territory from only six founding states 
in 1951 (Treaty of Paris for the establishment of the ESCS) to 27 members since the 
beginning of 2007. 
 
3rd phase (2000s-) 
The third phase of European unification is characterized by consolidation and refinement 
of already existing institutions as well as continuing enlargement. The author also argues 
that this ongoing phase is also a period of introspection: After the European Convention 
presented their draft for a European Constitution that should cater to the EU’s new 
challenges (i.e. governing an enlarged body of members) in 2003, the failed ratification of 
said constitution in 2005 led to a period of slowing down European affairs. In 2007 
however, a new initiative led by Germany filled the necessary constitutional reform with 
life and culminated in the adaptation of the Treaty of Lisbon, which is a sort of European 
Constitution Light. 
Like in the US, the third phase of unification is characterized by institutional 
consolidation and – at the same time – the constant reminders that there are great 
challenges in the EU that have not been tackled accordingly yet (international security and 
joint military efforts, immigration, racism, religion, financial regulations, environmental 
questions,…). If one wants to learn a lesson from the US-American experience in the 19th 
century that brought the Union to its limits, it is highly recommended to take important 
societal questions into considerations sooner than later and act in unison on (global and 
regional) challenges that cannot be administered alone. 
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COMPARISON AND SUMMARY 
In order to summarize and compare the findings of this thesis in a clear fashion, the 
author decided to use tables, so that the factors of unification can be spotted and 
compared easily. Each table is arranged around an already familiar thread of this thesis: 
Economy, politics and culture. 
 
Economic Factors  o f  Uni f i cat ion 
After the research done for this thesis, the author feels confident to argue that economic 
factors are at the very center of unification in the US. Both exterior and domestic 
circumstances encouraged the formation of a federal union. Both the US and the EU 
wanted to improve their international standing to attract new investors and establish 
themselves as strong and viable players in the power game of global economy.  
The need to stabilize the financial and monetary situation of the colonies/ the US during 
and after the war was a burning issue to all spheres of society. The constitutional 
unification of the American states was to a great part encouraged because the weak 
framework provided by the AoC did not allow for successful management of war debts, 
financial justice, and taxation. To build a federal state structure that has the powers to 
actually rule its people and states was a necessity to end the economic chaos after the war. 
200 years later, Europe had to tackle some similar issues. The devastations of WWII left 
the continent an economic desert that needed watering and a new global outlook as soon 
as possible. Besides the ERP, some European leaders decided to build an economic zone 
between countries that would make them interdependent and also encourage economic 
growth, increased trade relations and reconstruction. Economic ties between former rivals 
(most importantly France and Germany) were perceived as helpful facilitators of a 
peaceful Western European zone and an economic counterweight to the Sowjet Union. 
The founding of the ESCS, a mostly economic institution, marks the beginning of 
European integration. 
One of the differences between the unification of the US and the EU is that in the US 
there existed a strong link between political protest and economy. During the Imperial 
Crisis most colonial boycotts and revolts were motivated by economic policies (i.e. Tea 
Act, Stamp Act,…). Popular mobilization against British trade policies unified the 
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colonists and should give them a group identity. There was no evidence found that 
suggested that there existed similar popular mobilization in the EU that was linked to 
economic matters and encouraged a unification of interests. 
 USA EU 
 
Exterior Factors -­‐ attract foreign investors -­‐ reestablish international trade 
 
 
Exterior Factors -­‐ improve global economic standing 
 
Domestic Factors -­‐ manage war debt -­‐ establish financial justice -­‐ introduce taxation by Congress -­‐ monetary challenges -­‐ safety from shortages -­‐ $ 
 
 
Domestic Factors -­‐ growth through free market -­‐ economic interdependence for peace -­‐ safety from shortages -­‐ € 
 
Ec
on
om
y 
 
Economy and Political Culture -­‐ Economic increases mobilization -­‐ Trade boycotts -­‐ Common identity through shared 
consumer culture 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Economic Factors of Unification. A Comparison of the US and the EU (by R.K. 2011) 
 
Pol i t i ca l  Factors  o f  Unif i cat ion 
There are some great similarities, but at the same time some major differences between 
the existence and outcomes of political factors of unification in the US and in the EU. 
Both unions were partly built in order to enable/hinder ideas. In case of the US, the wish 
to gain independence, liberty, and a republic and the dream of a ‘Saturnian Age’ were 
factors that encouraged unification. In Western Europe, peace and wealth through 
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capitalism were the main goals of politicians (and the majority of the population) after the 
long ‘Age of Catastrophy’ that was full of privations. In both cases a newly found union 
of states should help fulfill these dreams. 
In the US as well as in the EU, there were ideologies and forms of government that 
people wished to get rid of. The experiences with monarchy, aristocracy and ‘mob rule’ 
alarmed the American founders to build a system in which such ideas would be 
suppressed (see for example ‘checks & balances’). Unification seemed a great opportunity 
to render this possible at the big scale. In Western Europe the very recent encounters 
with fascism, nationalsocialism and communism reminded people of the need to form an 
effective system in which such horrific events could not be realized. The unification and 
therefore pacification of former rivals was one of the options that was supposed to make 
Europe a wealthy and peaceful continent. A common ideological, political and military 
enemy in form of the UdSSR right at the border helped facilitate the unification of the 
Western European states. 
Although there is a wealth of practical political factors, which apply to each union 
individually, there is a great similarity between US-American and European unification. 
Both processes were partly encouraged by very “down-to-earth” factors. To the 
European reader, who is probably familiar with the mostly economically motivated birth 
of the EU, this might sound surprising with regards to the US. In Europe, we sometimes 
use to think of the US as this great ‘sentimental’ political project that was perceived by 
enlightened humanist minds in search of a peaceful heaven on earth. We might forget 
that the US – similar to the EU – was partly unified due to some very practical reasons 
(i.e. infrastructure, greater military power, safety from domestic conflicts…). 
One of the main findings of this thesis, therefore, is that successful unions do not ‘fall 
from the sky’. They are man-made structures, formed to cater specific interests and are 
strongly influenced by a range of historically influenced factors. The individual unification 
factors, as we see in the table below, can differ from case to case, but the evidence from 
this thesis suggests that a certain amount of factors grounded in practicality (‘marriage of 
convenience’) need to exist in order to establish strong bonds between states. 
The biggest difference between the US and the EU regarding political unification factors 
is the lack of common popular interest to form a union. The colonists and later the US-
Americans began early to accordate their actions and built strong bonds across states 
during Imperial Crisis and the Revolutionary War in which the fought side by side. In 
contrast, the beginnings of European unification were not lead, organized, or even 
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noticed by most European inhabitants. Although this point of argument would need 
some more research in the future, for now it looks like US-American unification was put 
through with more public support and/or interest. 
 USA EU 
 
Unification of Popular Interest -­‐ Against British Imperial policies -­‐ Intercolonial communication -­‐ Accordated resistance 
 
 
 
Unification to Enable Ideas -­‐ Independence -­‐ Liberty -­‐ Republic  -­‐ ‘Saturnian Age’ 
 
 
Unification to Enable Ideas -­‐ Peace -­‐ Wealth -­‐ Capitalism 
 
 
Unification to Hinder Ideas -­‐ Monarchy -­‐ Aristocracy -­‐ ‘Pure democracy’ (‘mob rule’) 
 
 
Unification to Hinder Ideas -­‐ Fascism -­‐ Nationalism -­‐ Communism, Sowjet Union 
Po
liti
cs
 
 
Unification for Practical Reasons -­‐ Military strength -­‐ Economic growth -­‐ Political stability -­‐ Safety from domestic and foreign 
aggression -­‐ Improved global standing -­‐ Better infrastructure 
 
 
Unification for Practical Reasons -­‐ Counterweight to communist Eastern 
Europe -­‐ Pacify Germany through binding it to 
France economically -­‐ Rebuilding continent after war needs 
political stability and economic growth 
 
 
Figure 14. Political Factors of Unification. A Comparison of the US and the EU (by R.K. 2011) 
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Cultural  Factors  o f  Uni f i cat ion 
As with political factors, there are some differences as well as similiarities between 
cultural factors of unification in the US and the EU. 
With respect to language, the US of the late 1800s is characterized by the existence of 
linguistic enclaves along historical lines (i.e. Pennsylvania Germans). However, English 
was and is widely understood and remains the inofficial main language of communication 
in most parts of the US, especially in public and political settings. Surprisingly, English is 
not the official language of the US. In comparison, in Europe linguistic diversity mostly 
prevails along national borders with the exception of minority languages (such as Catalan 
in Spain or Slowenian in Austria). The EU officially has 23 languages. In day-to-day EU 
institutional communication English, French and German remain the most commonly 
spoken languages. 
Regarding religion, both the US and Europe were and are mainly inhabitated by 
Christians. If one takes a closer look though, the differences become obvious. In the US 
there is a diversity of affiliations within the Protestant church. In Europe, Catholics, 
Protestants, Orthdox Christians (and due to immigration Muslims), Atheists and 
Agnostics constitute the largest groups. Although diversity endures in both unions, 
Protestant pluralism in the US is spread across the country, while in Europe national 
borders often delineate religious affiliation.  
The situation is similar when it comes to ethnicity. While in the US there is ethnic variety 
along interstate/ regional lines, in Europe the main ethnic groups are still mostly to be 
found within the borders of one specific country. Due to domestic and foreign 
population mobility, this phenomenon is now in the process of change and might reach 
US-level with time.  
All in all, the cultural factors of unification show us that in both unions exist certain levels 
of linguistic, religious and ethnic diversity. The main difference between the two unions 
lies in the allocation of diversity. In the US it mainly goes along regional lines, while in the 
EU variety is mostly found when looking at the whole continent. Within the borders of 
nation states, grades of diversity have not reached US-levels (yet). 
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 USA EU 
 
Language -­‐ Linguistic enclaves along historic lines -­‐ No official national language -­‐ English most common 
 
Language -­‐ Diversity (mostly) along national 
borders -­‐ 23 official languages -­‐ English, French and German most 
common 
 
 
Religion -­‐ Diversity within Protestant parenthesis -­‐ Mobilizer of unification 
 
Religion -­‐ Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Islamic -­‐ Debate about Christianity being 
common identity of Europeans? 
Cu
ltu
re
 
 
Ethnicity -­‐ Diversity along interstate lines 
 
 
Ethnicity -­‐ Diversity mostly along national lines  
 
Figure 15. Cultural Factors of Unification. A Comparison of the US and the EU (by R.K. 2011) 
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CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
After identifying, characterizing and comparing a wide range of unification factors it is 
now time to take a quick look at the implications of the findings. At the beginning of the 
research the differences between the US of the 1800s and the EU of today were glaring 
realities. The author’s fear of answering an unanswerable question quickly vanished after 
digging into the topic US-American unification. Suddenly similarities between the two 
unification processes became palpable.  
Both unions were built on a foundation of practical economic and political factors that, 
besides their differences due to historical circumstance – are comprehensible for the 
contemporary reader. 
The greatest difference between the unification of the US and the EU is that the US was 
and remains a union of both states and people. Elite and common interests were unified 
and in a long process of crisis and war built the US. In comparison to the US, the EU is 
still only a union of states that had not been initiated by a combination of practical factors 
and popular support. 
While the US-Americans identify much stronger with their union, many Europeans would 
hesitate to call themselves European before referring to themselves as Austrians, French 
or Polish. A US-American tourist abroad would never introduce himself as „Joe from 
Georgia“, but as „Joe from the US“. What we learned from this thesis, however, is that 
200 years ago, our imaginary Joe might have presented himself as a Georgian. If one thing 
is for certain in politics, it is that nothing is for certain.  
The question remains: Will Europeans take the US-American path and move towards a 
common European identity that leaves national moods and peculiarities behind? Or will it 
remain a formally united union that is neither state nor society as Beck/Grande implied in 
their quote at the beginning of this thesis? Will the EU harbor many Europeans instead of 
a European people in the future? 
With regards to the global problems every human on this planet faces today it is the 
author’s strong opinion that one country alone cannot tackle these challenges accordingly. 
Therefore,  a strengthening of suprastate initiatives is not only preferable theoretically but 
necessary practically. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
English 
The thesis was aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of unification processes through 
the analysis of two case studies. In order to reach this goal, the author focused primarily 
on the unification of the US-American states during the time of the American Revolution 
in the 18th century. Subsequently, a comparison of US-American unification with 
European unification after WWII was achieved. This case study provides answers to two 
main research questions: Which factors encouraged the unification process in the case of 
the USA? What are the similarities and differences between the US and the EU regarding 
their respective unification processes? 
The diversification of factors into three thematic groups – economic, political, and 
cultural – allowed for systematic research that was carried out through the analysis of 
primary and secondary sources. In the final part of the thesis, US-American and 
European unification were compared regarding their temporal characteristics (‚three 
phases of unification’) and illustrated with the aid of tables. The comparative conclusio 
highlighted the differences and similarities between the two unification processes and 
prompted an outlook on the future of European identity. 
 
Deutsch 
Im Zentrum dieser Arbeit stand es den Prozess einer Unionswerdung anhand zweier 
Fallbeispiele näher zu untersuchen. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen wurde in besonderem 
Ausmaß die Unionswerdung der USA zur Zeit der Amerikanischen Revolution im 18. 
Jahrhundert analysiert. Im Anschluss daran erfolgte ein Vergleich des 
Unionswerdungprozesses der USA mit jenem der europäischen Staaten nach dem 
Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die Diplomarbeit zielte darauf ab zwei zentrale Fragen zu 
beantworten: welche Faktoren förderten die Unionswerdung der USA? Welche 
Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede existieren zwischen dem Unionswerdungprozess der EU 
und der USA? 
Anhand einer Aufspaltung der Faktorenbündel in drei Themengruppen – ökonomisch, 
politisch, kulturell – konnten die beiden Forschungsfragen in systematischer Art und 
Weise und unter Zuhilfenahme von Primär- und Sekundärquellen beantwortet werden. 
Die Gegenüberstellung des US-amerikanischen und des europäischen 
Unionswerdungsprozesses mittels einer Phasen- und Tabellendarstellung bildete den 
Abschluss der Arbeit. In dieser komparativen Conclusio erschlossen sich sowohl 
Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der beiden Unionswerdungsprozesse und regten zu 
einem Ausblick über die Zukunft der europäischen Identität an. 
 
Keywords 
Unification; Union; USA; EU; Comparison; Case Study; American Revolution; 
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